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A year and a half after the Cedar Revolution broke out, I heard the following 
story from a friend watching with a group of colleagues a DVD about the 
large historic gathering of March 14, 2005. At one point, intrigued by a 
heavy silence, he looked around. Every one was quietly crying. For all 
those who were there, and believed in a different future for the country, 
was the acknowledgment of fai lure. 
At the time of concluding this essay, in gi lded exile in the fa ll of 2006, 
the severe setbacks to the Revolution can hardly be gainsaid. The question 
we owe ourselves, and that immense movement of civilization that was so 
hopeful on March 14,2005, is how the Revo lution was won and lost. 
On February 14, 2006, the first commemoration of Rafiq flariri 's 
assassination, suddenly things looked up again for a few days. By February 
2006, my vision of the Revolution had gone from that of advisor, 'public 
intellectual' and foot soldier, to actor, as candidate to the presidency. This 
is a different type of story, personal then collective. l try here to detach my 
own political action from the appreciation of the Cedar Revolution in the 
larger course of human history. 
This essay was started as a first historical sketch of the dramatic 
developments in Lebanon in 2005, on the occasion of two seminars 
conducted at Yale University and at Princeton University on 7 and 11 
November 2005. At Yale, the talk was part of the Middle East conversations 
at the Law School's Orville Schell Centre on International Human Rights. 
It focused on justice in the light of the UN investigation under way for 
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14 the assassination of Rafiq Hariri . At Princeton, the reflection centered on 
how a historian will ' read' the Revolution with the appropriate distance. I 
am particularly gratefu l for Paul Kahn and John Borneman for hosting the 
respective occasions. 
In its own way, this little book is a militant essay. It is also how we win 
our Revolution back. 
Princeton, January 2007 
---
i. Meanings 
The political contradictions on the Lebanese and regional Middle Eastern 
scenes appear complicated. They aren't as intractable as they seem. With 
some detennination and method, policies and events can be comprehended, 
and they are largely understood by those who live them. The Lebanese Cedar 
Revolution is no different. In the web of historical and cultural legacies 
- institutional straitjackets; sociological structures; professional and class 
interests; economic yeamings, individual idiosyncrasies and collective 
logics; serendipitous events, including mass rallies, sudden outbreaks 
of violence, and assassinations -, various factors can be tracked down 
and identified. The more difficult task is to distil the Cedar Revolution 's 
meaning. 
Two central meanings unfolded in the Cedar Revolution: non-
violence, and the search for political and judicial accountability. Of the 
two, non-violence is the more important. Underlying its novelty is what 
Paul Kahn expressed in a recent essay, building on the construction of 
Europe: 'The longing to join the EU among the countries of Eastern 
Europe is not just about economics, but also about depoliticalization, 
i.e., about an emerging perception of sacrificial politics as a form of 
pathology. Indeed, the entire effort of the international human rights 
movement is rooted in this vision of well-being. No one, in this view, 
should die or suffer for politics.' 1 Violence should have no place in the 
I Paul W. Kahn, 'Sacred violence', paper contributed to SELA (Semjoar in Latin America 
on Constitutional and Political Theory), Yale law school, 2003, 13. 
i. 
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16 natural bid of humans for political power, and Lebanon added in 2005 
a significant contribution to a trend which found its most remarkable 
success in the fall of tJ1e Berlin Wall in 1989, a colossal achievement 
which is yet to be appreciated as the one major non-violent breakthrough 
in the history of humankind. 
The Lebanese addition to non-violence is distinct. Non-violence as the 
defining trait of the Lebanese Revolution is the more momentous because 
the prevailing reality of the contemporary Middle East systematically 
undennines the fundamental right to personal security from hann, a right 
which was expressed by the French revolutionaries in the first Declaration 
of human rights.2 In modem history, massive violence, which is the flip 
coin of security, is the one dominant characteristic that sets the larger 
Middle East apart from the rest of the planet. Surely other regions have 
known violence, often on a horrendous scale. But nowhere like the Middle 
East has violence for the sake of politics gone on so relentlessly in the last 
two centuries. The Cedar Revolution, for the first time in modem Middle 
Eastern history, fought with non-violence for the right for the people to be 
secure,- that is to be free of violence-, in Lebanon and the region. And it 
did so in response to an immensely violent act: the killing ofRafiq 1-Iariri 
and twenty-two other innocent people on 14 February 2005. 
The Cedar Revolution rose in direct response to the 'killing of Mr 
Lebanon' .3 By choosing non-violence as the privileged and exclusive way 
of conducting politics, it marked the promise of a watershed. The Lebanese 
route is all the more remarkable since Middle Eastern and world history 
have collapsed into one violent continuum stretching to New York since 
September II , 200 I, after having marked for decades the fate of Palestine, 
Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq. On February 14, 2005 the good 
people of Lebanon said 'enough', there is another way to conduct politics: 
2 Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, 26 August 1789, Art.2: 'Le but de 
toute association politique est Ia conservation des droits naturels et imprescriptibles de 
l'homme. Ces droits sont Ia libcrte, Ia propricte, Ia szirete et Ia resistance a !'oppression.' 
Emphasis on security added. 
3 Remarkable first book-length account by Nicholas Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon, 
London 2006. 
i . Meanings - ------, 
it is non-violent, and it can succeed. 
The second meaning of the Cedar Revolution, accountabil ity, flows 
from a positive application of non-violence on the larger scene of history. 
On its own, non-violence can be construed as non-action. a passive form 
of making history. Antecedents from Christ to Mahahna Gandru show that 
passive resistance can have tremendous effects. But even compared to these 
bearers of world revolutions, the Lebanese revolutionaries had something 
of their own to add. Anew meaning was ushered in on the streets ofBeirut 
when the Cedar Revolution created a positive, tangible application to non-
violence: j udicial accountabil ity. 
The search for accountabi lity was also political. There is little new in the 
search for political accountability, since all revolutions are accountability 
in action against the standing order and those responsible for it, and I 
will argue that one of the weaknesses of our Revolution was its failure 
to hold politically accountable a number of leaders who remained openly 
supportive of the Ancien Regime. This was the case, at the top of the 
political ladder, of the president and, in a more nuanced way, of the speaker. 
Two years after the Revolution, they were still entrenched in extended 
mandates. That fai lure was costly, but it did not prevent the novelty of the 
Cedar Revolution developing its open embrace of judicial accountability 
in response to the assassins ' relentless hand. 
The Cedar Revolution sought an end to impunity in the Middle East, 
and elevated the region to the new horizon developed by human rights 
organizations the world over and taken up by states in the symbol of the 
International Criminal Court. The Cedar Revolution had this particularity: 
it consciously sought its meaning in j udicial accountability, rather than 
in violent revenge, and unfolded in the demand for an international 
investigation, then for a UN tribunal for Lebanon. No revolution in modem 
history bas so consciously expressed itself in the persistent search for an 
independent and effective judicial process. No revolution had adopted as 
the measure of its success, as its fundamental meaning, truth in justice. 
This dual meaning, non-violence and judicial accountability, is at risk. To 
salvage it, we need to put the Cedar Revolution to the larger test of history 's 
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18 the long span of human history, Lebanese and otherwise. To protect the 
revolution's memory, its importance, its sacrifices, its uniqueness, and 
its place in human history, it is essential to elevate and substantiate the 
meaning to the level deserved by the Lebanese who made it happen. The 
present essay is a battle for the place of our Revolution in history, now 
and in 2221. It believes in knowledge and its accumulation. For that, the 
historiography of the French Revolution over two hundred years is one 
powerful guide for understanding 'what happened'4 in Lebanon in 2005. 
Hence 2221. 
4 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Mille Plateaux, Paris 1980, chapter 8: '1874- Trois 
nouvelles ou «qu'est-ce qui s'est passe»?' 
ii. 2221 
Fast forward to 2221. What will a historian standing in the 23nd century 
say about the Cedar Revo lution of Lebanon of 2005 ? When 2221 comes, 
the bicentenary of the Cedar Revolution wi II have passed, with many 
historians' con·esponding flurry of writings, maybe even in the order of 
the 170 conferences worldwide which were held around the bicentenary of 
the French Revolution in and around 1989.5 2221 is a simple arithmetical 
equation: 2221 to 2005 is what 2005 is to 1789. The distance represents the 
historical perspective acquired, and underlines the accumulated knowledge 
that marks the bicentenary of the Lebanese Revolution and a few years 
more, 216 solar years exactly. Add 216 to 17 89, you get 2005. Add the 
same to 2005 , _;~-vben the Cedar Revolution happened, you get 2221. Now 
2221 , or 2205, or even 2021 is a Long time in human memory. 
Should the Cedar Revolution rise to a world event on the scale of the 
French Revolution, there will be some Fran9ois Furet battling its meaning 
out with the disciples of an Albert Soboul, or a stormy debate as the one 
which took place between historians Hyppolite Taine andAiphonseAulard 
at the turn of the 20th century, maybe then in a more ' fundamental science' 
way complicated by some time warp machine physically revisiting some 
of the details of that event, including whether it is moral to do so, and 
what to pick from the February or March 2005 scenes in Beirut One 
5 T.C.W. Bla1ming, ' Introduction', in T.C.W. Blanning ed., The rise and fall of the French 
Revolution, Chicago 1996, I. 
! ' 
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20 certainty by 2221 is that all the protagonists of the Cedar Revolution will 
be dead. But if I want to be coherent with my own writings, even death as 
human kind knows it in 2005 may not be a certain fact then.6 Death may be 
behind human beings in 2221. Like other questions on where science takes 
humanity in the age of cloning and stem cells, this is a wild guess. 
Still, guessing what a historian standing in the 23d century will say 
about the Cedar Revolution is easier than anticipating what hard science 
discoveries have in store for shaping retrospectively an event in ways 
unpredictable today. If the measure of comparison is kept to a reasonable 
scale, one can learn a lot from writings on momentous events, and 
from the accumulation of scholarship. One pole of that accumulation 
of scholarship is Furet and his companions two hundred odd years after 
1789. The school of Franfi:ois Furet, who died prematurely in 1997, is the 
latest major school in the historiography of the French Revolution. The 
opposite pole, like the present essay for the Cedar Revolution, is formed 
by the writings of the contemporaries: Edmund Burke's Reflections on the 
Revolution in France,1 Thomas Paine's Rights of Man,8 are remarkable 
early contributions from outside France, but there are many first essays 
and polemics from within, including 2539 pamphlets in the four first 
months of 1789,9 most lasting being Sieyes 's What is the Third Estate?10 
The non-specialist reader of these early pamphlets will consider most of 
them fairly tedious and fragmentary works on 'what happened' in 1789. 
Some might find that even the more reflective essays from outside France 
read, with the passage of time, rather dull, Burke as a cautiously appalled 
royalist, Paine repeating the far more alluring prose of the Declaration of 
the rights of man and the citizen, while Sieyes says little in his pamphlet 
beyond asserting that the Third Estate is no less important than the other 
6 Argument made in my Democracy in America, Beirut, 200 l (in Arabic), chapter 8, 'The 
conquest of life and the conquest of space: contours of a scientific policy. ' 
7 First published in London on I November I 790. 
8 Thomas Paine, Rights of man, London 1791, cited here in Paine, Common Sense and 
other writings, New York 2005 . 
9 Blanning, ' Introduction', I, citing Jeremy Popkin, Revolutionary News. 
10 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, Qu 'est-ce que /e tiers etaf!, first published in January 
1789. 
ii. 2221 - -------, 
two; in fact, since he Sicyes belonged to it, a far more important one; and 21 
to simplify it in his own words, 'all of it'. 
Maligning Sieyes, Burke and Paine is preposterous. I wish we had such 
writings as theirs for the Cedar Revolution, and we'd be hard put to find 
in comments on Lebanon the equivalent of Tom Paine's memorable lines 
about the ' Revolutions of America and France': 'Monarchical sovereignty, 
the enemy of mankind, and the source of misery, is abolished; and the 
sovereignty itself is restored to its natural and original place, the Nation. 
Were th is the case throughout Europe, the cause of wars would be taken 
away.' 11 These are strong concepts, which have not yet lost their pith about 
the need to take away the causes of war, a hope that stood high in the 
Enlightenment, and was crowned in 1795 by Kant's Treaty on Perpetual 
Peace. 12 Paine overshot on that score, but his words remain powerful. And 
he was right on when he underlined the importance of the French Revolution 
vesting sovereignty in the citizens, peoples and nation rather than in kings, 
for 'when it is laid down as a maxim, that a King can do no wrong, it places 
him in a state of similar security with that of ideots and persons insane, and 
responsibi lity is out of the question with respect to himself.' 13 No person is 
above the law. This is a message of the French Revolution that remains to 
date, as powerful as when it was first expressed. 
A year or two into the French Revolution, the lucidity of these authors 
is remarkab le, despite our unease in appreciating the spirit of 1789 just by 
reading what they say so close to it. The windows they opened on the new 
French reality offered meaning: Burke doesn't like the new Republican 
order, he sees it as disruptive, excessive, and wrong. Paine is sympathetic 
to the Revolution in its (hu)man rights, a legacy that also lasts to date . 
Even Sieycs, pamphleteering for the Tiers Etat, managed to underline the 
new structure of France as one that cannot exclude anyone from power, 
least the majority of its people in the shape of the Tiers-Etat. 
11 Paine, Rights of man, 167. 
12 Immanuel Kant, Zwn ewigen Frieden: ein philosophischer Entwur(, tirst published 
Konigsberg 1795. 
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22 That was the first year, as decisive for the French Revolution as the 
first year, in fact the first month, was for the Lebanese Revolution. With 
the passage of time, and the brutality of the French Revolution, things 
appeared ever more clearly to some contemporaries. Striking is Alexander 
Hamilton, writing in 1794: 'In the early periods of the French Revolution, 
a wann zeal for its success was in this Country a sentiment truly un iversal. 
The love ofLiberty is here the ruling passion of the Citizens of the United 
States, pervading every class, animating every bosom. As long therefore 
as the Revolution of France bore the marks of being the cause of liberty, 
it united all hearts and centered all opinions. But this unanimity of 
approbation has been for a considerable time decreasing. The excesses 
which have constantly multiplied, with greater and greater aggravations, 
have successively though slowly detached reflecting men for their partiality 
for an object which has appeared less and less to merit their regard. ' 14 
These excesses, Hamilton considered them as 'accomplices with Vice, 
Anarchy, Despotism and Impiety.' They should have stopped soon after 
the Revolution put the French monarchy in check. Instead of calm and 
moderation succeeding 'the first shocks of the political earthquake', 
Hami lton observed, the world has 'been witness to one volcano succeeding 
another, the last still more dreadful than the former, spreading ruin and 
devastation far and wide- subve1t ing the foundation of right secmity and 
property, of order, morality and religion - sparing neither sex nor age, 
confounding innocence with guilt, involving the old and the young, the 
sage and the madman, the long tried friend of virtue and his country and 
the upstart pretender to purity and patriotism - the bold projection of new 
treasons with the obscure in indiscriminate and profuse destruction.' 15 
The advent of Terror is what Hamilton bad in mind, although he fell 
just short of using the word. By 1794, Terror had been on the official order 
of the Revolution for a year, with i ts cohorts of victims. By 1794, the 
Revolution had squandered its credit of innocence and universal appeal, 
14 Alexander Hamilton, 'Memorandum on the French Revolution, 1794', in Writings, 
(Library of America series), New York 2001, 833-36. 
151d. 
ii. 2221 - ------, 
after having cannibalized, together with its declared villain, Louis xvi , 23 
its two main heroes: Danton and Robespierre. A similar risk cannot be 
discarded for the Cedar Revolution, and Saturn, the god of revolutionary 
history as portrayed by Goya in a disturbing painting, has a sad tendency 
to eat its own children. 
iii. Chou en Lai 
We have this note of caution from a great revolutionary authority. 'It's 
too early to tell,' was Chou en Lai's answer to what he thought of the 
French Revolution. Apocryphal or not, the report emerged in the 1950s, 
when the Chinese Revolution had something to stand for morally, before 
it turned into the monstrous dictatorship through its so-called 'cultural' 
metamorphosis and the consequent descent into totalitarian Maoism. 1789-
1950, one hundred and sixty odd years of accumulated scholarship, should 
have given Chou en Lai confidence to say something more constructive 
about the French Revolution in 1950. 
A disturbing depth attaches to Chou en Lai 's caution, as one hears 
him warni ng historiography against turning into a perversion of history. 
Historiography pretends to be scientific, while we know that it is always 
contemporary. We also know that some events are more portentous than 
others. The 'Australian butterfly flutter ' theory is at worst incorrect, at best 
another paradox: human beings discern in events those that are meaningful, 
and those that are peripheral. A butterfly flutter in Australia in 2435 BCE 
could have contributed to the sinking of the Titanic, through a tortured 
chain of events, but the theory triggers a smile on the historian's face, 
and a shrug by the common sense citizen. For good reasons, the causes of 
the French Revolution provoked a deeper kind of interest, a meaningful 
interest which renews itself for every generation. The French Revolution 
captured the imagination ever since it came about, for reasons that are 
commonly known: a kingship several hundred years' old came tumbling 
..------ March 2221. Lebanon's Cedar Revolution 
26 in a few weeks; the fascinating rhetoric ofMarat, Robespierre, and Danton 
still inflames their readers; universal declarations of rights were made 
and redrafted; constitutions and civil codes got enacted; crowds thronged 
Paris and other cities; innocents were massacred by the old order and 
neighbouring monarchies' armies; other innocents were led by the dozens 
to the scaffold in an official reign of Terror; and Napoleon usurped the 
Revolution to spread dictatorship in France and his brand of monarchy, 
together with death, across Europe in the name of the Revolution. This last 
trait is considerable in its implication for modern Lebanon. Revolutions 
one had, which turned soon into civil wars, stretching over several, 
interminable decades. No wonder that humanity remains puzzled by the 
French Revolution, so fast in its revolutionary phase, 1789- 1794, five years 
before people were off the streets and the Directoire set its placid pace on 
daily life. For Michelet, Jaures, the Societe Robespierriste, the Lefebvre 
School, the Revolution was over in 1794. Napoleon could be left out of it 
altogether, but Napoleon there was, whose brutality scarred Europe for a 
century. 1789 master historian Georges Lefebvre's book on Napoleon is 
simply dull, for there is no Revolution in it. 16 
So what to do about Chou en Lai's quip: is it too early to assess, let 
alone write, about the Cedar Revolution ? And where should we stop, and 
what should we leave out? 
There may be a deeper dimension to Chou 's quip than meets the eye. 
The French Revolution has not ended yet, and its meanings are still being 
forged, including radical departures from the images that it might jell into 
at various moments of its never-ending historiography. Two examples, one 
civilizational, the other legal-historical, will illustrate this contention. 
Civilizational shift first: in a posthumous book by the co-founder of the 
Annates school, Lucien Febvre noted that the French Revolution resulted 
in the idea of Europe significantly receding from the collective mind, in 
effect being delayed two hundred years. Whereas Europe is a concept on 
the ri se throughout the first three quarters of the 18111 century, Febvre wrote, 
the Revolution comes to displace it with nationalism, French nationalism 
16 Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, Paris 1935. 
... 
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directed inwards at first, then nationalism spreading across the Continent: 27 
'And then, this being said, we can go back to our question, to our tragedy. 
For it is a tragedy, a great tragedy. In the first quarter, in the second qua1ter, 
in the third quarter of the 18th century, Europe was everywhere. There 
was more and more Europe. Europe covered the nations. Europe covered 
France. In the fourth quarter of the 18th century, it is the nation which sets 
its claims, the nation which gets larger, the nation that affirms itself, nation , 
and national, and nationalism, and France which no longer sighs : Europe, 
Europe ... France which shouts at Valmy: "Long live the Nation".' 17 
Fcbvre is right, one can only be struck by how strong the common 
European legal world was until the fourth quarter of the 18th century when the 
French Revolution broke out. and how the idea of Europe started receding 
inexorably, until two world wars and Jean Monoet forced its institutional 
resuscitation. Its cultural reality through the 18th century is well illustrated 
by a passage from Voltaire about Europe, 'a kind of big republic, shared by 
several states, some monarchies, some mixed; some aristocratic, the other 
democratic; but all in close relation, all having the same religious base, the 
same principles of public law, the same political ideas.' 18 
Valmy starts the retreat of Europeanism for the benefit of French and 
other nationalisms, and strict nationalism gets entrenched with Napoleon 
and the Metternich-dominated Berlin Congress of 1815. Not until Jean 
Monnet after the Second World War does Europe have a chance again. 
This momentous development Febvre doesn' t know, of course, as he 
lectures on Europe in the middle of the most devastating European war the 
continent had ever known. This actually makes Febvre's prescient sense 
overwhelming, and his conclusion all the more compelling: the French 
17 Lucien Febvre. L 'Europe. Genese d'une civilization, Paris 1999, 239: 'Et alors, ceci 
dit. nous pouvons revenir a notre question, a notre drarne. Car c'est uo drame, un tres 
grand drame. Au premier quart, au second quart, au troisieme quart du XVIIIe siecle, 
I'Europe etait partout. II y avait de plus en plus d 'Europc. L' Europe coiffait les nations. 
L'Europe coiffait Ia France. Au quatrieme quart du XVIW siecle, c'est Ia nation qui 
reclame, Ia nation qui grand it, Ia nation qui s'affirme, nation, et national, et nationalite, et 
nationalisme, et Ia France qui ne soupire plus: I' Europe, I'Europe ... , Ia France qui erie a 
Valmy: ' Vive Ia Nation' .. .' 
18 Voltaire, Le Siecle de Louis Xi V ( 1751 ), cited in Gamier ed., Paris 1947, 7. 
II 
.-------- March 2221. Lebanon's Cedar Revolution 
28 Revolution killed the idea of Europe for two hundred years, and that may 
be its most powerful legacy. 
What Chou en Lai failed to see a century and half after 1789, almost 
every other questioner of the Revolution's meanings also got wrong, until 
Europe started slowly being built by Jean Monnet and his colleagues in the 
early 1950s. Therein lies the genius of Febvre as historian. As a humanist 
and universal scientist, he could rise above the straitjacket of French 
historiography and its ingrained nationalist bent. But there was also the 
contingency of history: before the birth of institutional Europe, that is the 
EC then the EU, the question was never central in the historiography of the 
French Revolution. A civilizational shift had to take place before the French 
Revolution started to strike historians as an 'anti-Europe ' Revolution. 
Posthumous Febvre should strike a chord. What has Lebanon's 
Revolution done to the Middle East, indeed to world history? No doubt 
an extraordinary awakening of Lebanese nationalism, against Syria 
in particular. A new slogan got forged in the first year of the Lebanese 
Revolution: ' Lebanon first'. In the sectarian mosaic of Lebanon, the Sunni 
community, after the Christian communities, and the Druze, had become 
'Lebanese'. Since the Hariri assassination, that priority of Lebanon is the 
priority for the massive majority of Lebanese. That this is not a foregone 
conclusion is underlined by the corresponding backlash led by Syria's 
allies, chiefly Hizbullah and behind it the Shi ' i community of Lebanon: 
they have different priorities, a different view of Lebanon, another way of 
being Lebanese. But the Lebanese logic of the Cedar Revolution cannot 
be doubted even for them. This is a break in Lebanese history, a paradigm 
shift reminiscent of Febvre's. 
Another illustration of the constant rewriting of the French Revolution 
is informed by law. The latest bout of historiographical dispute is more 
disciplinary than it is global, it pits the lawyer, with his narrower but more 
precise view of things, and the historian, with his larger and more varied 
bird's eye view on life. Here we have historian Fran9ois Furet battling it 
out with j urist Michel Troper over whether the French Revolution was 
institutionally over in 1789; and whether, more generally, the truth of the 
Revolution is historical or legal. The result is a strong exchange between 
iii. Chou en Lai -------. 
the contemporary leading historian of the French Revolution and its leading 29 
contemporary legal scholar. 
The battle was engaged by Troper in an article on the 'usage of legal 
concepts in history', published in the celebratedAnnales. Criticism leveled 
at Furet is about a central thesis, and an adjunct one. Furet's central thesis, 
says Troper concurringly, ' is that all is played out in 1789' .19 Secondary 
thesis: the Revolution is institutionally over in 89, because the Monarchy is 
essentially over as a ' power' by then. The nation is represented henceforth 
by the National Assembly, where sovereignty exclusively vests. 
It is on the adjunct thesis that the lawyer operates, by analyzing the 
will of the revolutionaries in the Assembly. The debate is whether the veto 
accorded to the King makes him an institutional competitor to the Assembly, 
a joint power holder, or whether the veto, being suspensive, is effectively 
inexistent. An intricate analysis ensues, where the concept of sovereignty 
is di ssected, subjecting the whole issue of separation of powers to scrutiny, 
and the King's veto to modulations that make it absolute, suspensive, or 
void. Ultimately, Troper concludes, Furet's intuition remains correct. By 
1789, the Monarchy was over, not because of lack of a decisive, common 
understanding of sovereignty, or because the king remained a recognized 
power in 1789. The game was up when the Revolution, through the National 
Assembly, brought the King down as the holder of any meaningful role 
since the summer of 1789. 
Furet's rejoinder starts with a denial: no, the Revolution was not over 
in 1789.20 The lens of the historian being far more embracing than the 
19 'Tout est joue en 89', says Troper in 'Sur !'usage des concepts juridiques en histoire' , 
Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 47, 1992, 1171-1183, at 1171 , citing Franyois Furet, 
Penser Ia Revolution Franfaise, new ed. Paris 1983, 16: '1789, annee ou l'essentiel du 
bilan terminal est acquis.' 
20 'Je ne suis pas sur de me reconnaitre pleinemenl dans ce qui est pour luj une these 
generale de moo livre : !'idee qu'il m'atlribue, par exemple. que 'tout est joue en 1789' 
n 'est certainement pas mienne. Je pense simplement que dans le domaine civil,l'essentiel 
de cc qu'accomplira Ia Revolution franyaise est conyu et entrepris tres tot, entre le 4 et 
le II aout 1789; et qu 'en matiere politique, bien des elements de ce quj constjtuera le 
dilemme constitutionnel franyais sont presents des les premieres annces de Ia Revolution. 
Sans que, pour autant, leurs consequences soient inscrites. ' Furet, 'Concepts juridiques et 
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30 lawyer's, there are in fact several moments for the Revolution, I 789 is one, 
the advent of regional wars in 1792 another, a third is Thermidor, a foUJ1h 
is the coup d 'Etat of Napoleon, a fifth is the restoration of the Monarchy 
in 1815.21 In this reading of the multiple dates of when the Revolution 
was 'over', Augustin Cochin, a forgotten historian of the turn of the 20th 
century whose importance Furet revived in his last writings, appears as 
the most convincing. The terminus ad quem the Revolution operates as a 
whole, indivisible compact, is 1795: 'It is actually clear', wrote Cochin, 
'for whom judges on the basis of texts and not of feelings, that we are in 
presence of one and the same historical phenomenon, from 1788 to 1795. 
It is, from beginning to end, the same principles, the same language, the 
same means. One cannot put on the one side the voice of the people, the 
"patriotism" of 89, the other, as the lie of conspirators, that of 93' _22 
As in the case of the French Revolution, the choice of dates will also 
fascinate the historians of the Cedar Revolution. I tend to acquiesce with 
Cochin 's dismissal of' 89 as thebe-all and end-all of the French Revolution 
a hundred years before the Furet-Troper debate.' "Eighty-nine-ism" is 
perhaps a wise position in politics, it cannot be defended in history. ' 23 Less 
than two years after it started, we do not have the luxury of the time needed 
to respond adequately for the terminus ad quem of the Cedar Revolution. 
But the question of dates is inevitable, and we must already try to map 
their importance. For the ultimate question is already upon us: is the Cedar 
Revolution over? 
21 Furet, Penser Ia Revolution Fram;aise, 15-16: 'La Revolution a une naissance, mais 
pas de fin.' 
22 Augustin Cochin (d.l916), 'La crise de l'histoire revolutionnaire' ( 1908) in Les 
Societes de pensee ella democratie moderne, Paris 1921, 131: 'II est clair en effet, pour 
qui juge d'apres les textes et non d'apres des raisons de sentiment, qu 'on est en presence 
d' un seul et meme phenomene historique, de 1788 a 1795. Ce sont, d'un bout a !'autre, 
les memes principes, le meme langage, les memes moyens. On ne saurait mettre d ' un 
cote comme Ia voix du peuple, Je "patriotisme" de 89, de !'autre, comme le mensonge 
d'intrigants, celui de 93.' 
23 ld: 'Le "quatre-vingt-neuvisme" est une position sage peut-etre en politique, 
indefendable en histoire.' 
iv. Dates 
Let's simplify the argument by saying that Furet and Troper are quarrelling 
about what happens in 1789, but that they agree on one central conclusion: 
1789 ends the bulk of what the Revolution stands for in history as 
revolutionary. Here is a corresponding thesis for the Cedar Revolution: 14 
March 2005 ends the one month of Lebanese Revolution, in the same way 
1789 ended the French Revolution. Everything afterwards adds li ttle and 
subtracts a lot. Hariri is murdered on 14 February. The Revolution is over 
on March 14. That's it. 
Let me develop some of the lessons of 1789 and its aftermath regarding 
dates and dating. Napoleon was the ultimate death of a process gone 
awry. Here comes dictatorship to close an episode of liberty already 
dented by the association of the French state with a declared, official 
policy of terrorism. By end 1794, the protagonists of the Terreur have 
turned into the victims of their own excesses. In 1795, practically all 
the great actors are dead or marginalized. The Directoire hobbles on for 
four years, as if waiting for a dictator to restore order, and Bonaparte 
eventua lly arrives. Despoti sm came in the shape of Napoleon, who 
killed the Revolution in the name of the Revolution, and destroyed any 
commonalty of Europe by seeking to impose over the continent his own 
brutal monocephalic order. Napoleon had the nerve to acknowledge, 
in a bout of apocryphal wisdom, that the best thing he left behind him 
was the French Civil Code, indeed a matter of pride for France and the 
Revolution; but the Civi l Code is a marginal footnote to the dominant 
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32 fact ofKing Louis XV£ being replaced at the helm of France by Emperor 
Bonaparte I. 
This is also the conclusion ofTocqueville. One wonders when reading 
L 'Ancien Regime et Ia Revolution, how much the Revolution changed 
the social order of pre-revolutionary France. At least, the sense from 
Tocqueville's belaboured book, so different in tone and spirit from his 
masterpiece on American democracy, is that there was little change before 
and after the Revolution.24 But even without contrasting the post-1789 
order wi th the Ancien Regime, the dates separating Napoleon from 1789 
are troubling. Between 1790 and 1795 an exercise in self-cannibalism 
culminated in the execution of Danton, Robespierre, and so many of their 
illustrious colleagues. Immediately before Napoleon, the Revolution had 
already withered into a nameless Directoire, an uninspiring game of sterile 
musical chairs. 
We do not have that dual luxury of events stretching over a decade for 
the Cedar Revolution. It's too early to tell whether it's over, and we do not 
have enough time to judge it. But we can ask the right questions on how 
to read our Revolution, and start assessing what its important dates are: its 
beginning, its end, and its most meaningful moments. 
Dating the end of the Cedar Revolution will be difficult to get a consensus 
over. There is also a problem ofbeginning, which Furet himself, in slight 
contradiction with his above quote, also underlines for French history: 
'I have long thought that it could be intellectually useful to displace the 
beginning of the French Revolution further up, towards the beginning of 
1787 and the meeting of the Notables: this displacement offers a double 
advantage of a more exact dating of the crisis of traditional powers, and 
to integrate what is commonly called the "aristocratic revolution" in the 
Revolution. ' 25 
So problems of date on both sides of history: beginning and end. As in 
the argument that the French Revolution started two years before 1789, 
24 Alexis de Tocqueville, L 'Ancien Regime et Ia Revolution, first published in Paris in 
1856. 
25 Furet, Penser Ia Revolution Fram;:aise, 66. 
iv. Dates ------, 
when did the Cedar Revolution start? Was it the summer of 2000, when 33 
the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon, and the fi rst voices demanding a 
similar action by the Syrians were heard, by the Maronite bishops in a 
retrospectively founding statement on September 20? Or when, earlier 
that summer, Walid Jurnblat, until then Syrian all y, Druze and socialist 
leader (in that order) single-handedly fought the Syro-Lebanese political-
security system through the parliamentary battle which he waged and won 
in the Mountain? Or was the beginning September 2, 2004, when UN 
Security Counci l Resolution 1559 initiated the international snowball to 
save Lebanon from Syria's clutches? Or September 3, when a minority 
of Members of Parliament stood up against Emile Lahoud 's coercive 
extension in power and refused to sign the constitutional amendment 
forced on them by Syrian president Bashar al-Asad and his Lebanese 
allies? Or October 1, 2004, when MP Marwan Hamadeh, Jumblat's right-
hand man, was the target of the first car bomb planted under the Syrian 
Lebanese security order? Or was it 14 February 2005, when Hariri and 
his companions were killed? Or 16 February 2005, when the first angry 
demonstrations broke out during his funerals to request the departure of 
Syrian troops? 
So with questions of beginning, pressing questions of end: Did the 
Revolution end, after accomplishing what it could, when the Karameh 
govenunent fe ll the first time, on 28 February, or the second ti me, on 14 
April? Or upon the formal departure of Syrian troops, on April 26, 2005? 
or when Parliament produced a majority of anti-Syrian parliamentarians 
in June 2005? 
Did the Revolution end when it culminated on March 14, 2005, in its 
largest demonstration? Or a week earlier, on March 8, when the Shi' i 
crowds led by Hizbullah rallied to regain the initiative and undermined 
the national trend? Or on May 7, when the return of exiled general Michel 
Aoun formally started the split in the ranks of the opposition to Syria? 
Or upon Samir Kassir's murder on June 2, which brought fear back to 
those who openly criticized the Syrian leadership and its supporters in 
Lebanon? Or the second assassination, that of Georges Hawi on 21 June, 
which confirmed a pattern of organized killing? Or in the third week of 
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34 June, when parliamentary elections resulted in a deadlock? Or on 28 June, 
when the Speaker of Parliament was reelected to the position for a fourth , 
consecutive time, after twelve years of pro-Syrian unadulterated support? 
Or on 25 September, with the deliberate maiming of Mai Chidiac, the ftrst 
woman so targeted? Or upon the killing of Gebrane Tueni, symbol of free 
speech, and his two aides on 12 December? or later, with the Hizbullah-
Israel war in July 2006, or in the mass demonstrations of the Counter-
Revolution, which occupied the centre of Beirut weeks on end starting 1 
December 2006? 
Beginning, end, but also special moments: how about the One 
Day his tory will assign to the Lebanese Revolution, in the way it has 
assigned 14 July, Bastille Day, to the French Revolution? A number of 
candidate dates is possible. One possible choice is February 14, when 
Raftq Hariri was killed, setting revolt in motion. But why not, also, the 
death of former Minister Basel Fleihan, whose body finally collapsed 
on Apri l 18, after an agony of two months, to the burns he sutiered 
on February 14 as he rode with Hariri? By a stroke of bad luck for 
Lebanon and for the memory of Basel Fleihan, the Revolution was by 
Apri I 18 facing a lull after the departure of the Syrian troops and the 
emergence of a new government. This was bad luck because the shock 
offleihan's death did not occasion the political consequences it merited 
to make its own mark on Lebanese history. Why 14 March, rather than 
14 February then, or Apri I 18? Indeed why 14 March rather than those 
fatidic dates of the coming of the Lebanese Revolution, for instance, 
once again, when 29 brave parliamentarians stood up on 3 September 
2004 against Emile Lahoud 's pursuit of another tenn in power? Or the 
day previous, when Resolution 1559 was passed by the United Nations 
Security Council? 
There is one simple answer to the choice of March 14: the size of the 
demonstration, the largest in Lebanese history ever. The day will long 
exercise the country's memory, especially as it came to counter the large, 
but half its size rally on March 8, engineered by Hizbullah 'in fidelity 
to Syria'. Surely the choice of March 14 sits poorly for a massive, Shi' i 
dominated, part of the Lebanese population, which had taken to the street 
iv. Dates -------, 
less than a week earlier to hear a slate of speakers extolling the status quo 35 
ante, parading pictures of the Syrian president, and chanting carefully 
chosen slogans in support of Syria, amidst the surprising display of 
equally well chosen Lebanese flags. And since the Lebanese Revolution 
was conceivably a fight between those two logics, pro and against 
Syria, the far larger number of Lebanese who came on the side of those 
opposed to Syria on March 14 marks the point of the Cedar Revolution's 
culmination. 
Events get always more subtle upon closer analysis, and royalist 
historiographers systematically pooh-poohed the storming of the 
Bastille as a non-event, considering that the symbol of oppression had 
seven inmates, including one freed drunkard who was surely not worth 
all that trouble . This was received counter-Revolutionary dogma, until 
Georges Lefebvre showed that Bastille Day was a far more significant 
event in terms of innocent blood spilt. Bastille Day came after 
revolutionaries were shot by the established order, in direct reaction 
to excessive reaction of the King 's men.26 And so the J 4111 of July 1789 
is rightly considered the acknowledged tipping moment after which 
Louis xvi 's established order was unable to use open force against its 
opponents. 
The people have a good sense of their own safety. The French have 
celebrated Bastille Day since July 14, 1790, the frrst year after the failure 
of the monarchy's security apparatus to protect or regain that symbol of 
power. Similarly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran celebrates its victory every 
year on February 11. The old order gave up running the country's security 
in the night of the l01h to 1P11 February 1979. That night, the army stopped 
receiving orders from the Shah's government. The people in France and 
Iran know better. In Iran, it was on the night of I 0-1 1 February that the 
security apparatus could no longer shoot to win, and this date was for 
them more significant than the flight of the Shah, or Khumaini 's return 
from exile. Same popular science in France: rather than the October 1789 
26 Georges Lefebvre, Quatre-vingl-neu}; Paris 1939, 130. Ninety eight Parisians were 
killed on Bastille day. 
d ) ! 
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36 march of the revolutionaries on Versai lles to bring the King to Paris, or 
the execution of Louis xvi in January 1793, the French knew that the 
Ancien Regime was over when the Bastille fe ll, never to be regained by 
the Bourbon Monarchy. 
To be precise, the equivalent date for the Cedar Revolution was the 
night of Sunday 27 to Monday 28 February 2005. Late that night and in the 
early morning, Lebanon's armed forces sided with the Revolution, when 
they refused to implement the executive order to ban the demonstrations 
just issued by the President and his security officers. In the early hours of 
Monday 28 February 2005, by 10-11 am decisively, Lebanon's Revolution 
tipped. The evening previous, a central meeting of security forces was held 
in the presidential palace, and the order to evacuate Martyrs' square signed 
by a plethora of anny and civilians officials, and formally issued by the 
Minister of interior. That night was the turning moment for the Ancien 
Regime, which lost its power to repress. The night of 27 to 28 February 
2005 must be restored to the Lebanese Revolution collective memory: like 
Tien an-Men, the Revolution could have been physically destroyed, people 
shot or detained, and demonstrations against the ruling order prevented. 
This did not happen. It could have. The Cedar Revolution came of age that 
night. The security forces and the army had remained the uncertain tool of 
a steadily pro-Syrian government for two weeks after Hariri was killed. 
In the night of 27-28 February, they stood neutral and let the Revolution 
proceed. 
By March 14 mid-day, they receded from the repressive scene for 
good, although the Old Regime retained some parallel security forces. 1t 
was only by the evening of March 14 that all fear vanished, to reappear 
again when Samir Kassir was assassinated on June 2. But even on the 
morning of March 14, before the popular tide filled the streets to an extent 
that surpassed all expectations, the security men of the Ancien Regime 
prevented protesters from holding out banners calling for the Lebanese 
president's resignation. In the evening, they were gone. But it was too late 
by then, for there was no political direction for the movement other than 
what has already been achieved: the physical departure of Syrian troops, 
and the collapse of the Karameh government. 
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Thus the short answer of history: the Cedar Revolution peaked on March 37 
14, 2005, a month after it started. After March 14, it was mostly downhill. 
The French Revolution, distinguished historians two hundred years after 
1789 argue, may have been over in 1789. The Cedar Revolution was over 
in a month. The Ancien Regime ended on 27-28 February, and its passing 
was sealed on March 14. 
v. Geography 
A word on the geography of the Lebanese Revolution is in order. Geography 
is no less important than history in great events, but it gets more easily lost 
on account of the difficulty of spatial perception. On March 14, speaker 
after speaker stood in the midst of Martyrs' Square, also known as Liberty 
Square, also to be known as Nahar square, in the name of a paper which 
elected to have its new offices on the seaside western corner, and which 
would soon offer to the Revolution the life of its two most courageous 
writers, Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueni. Tueni, the editor in chief of the 
Nahar, was one of the speakers who rallied the assembly onto an oath 
bringing Muslims and Christians forever into national unity. On that day, 
the joy of liberation saw no shadow. So large was the demonstration that it 
filled the huge square and spilled over onto Riad Solb's square, where the 
counterdemonstration had assembled six days earlier. 
But why Martyrs' square, other than the fact that it is the acknowledged 
centre of downtown Beirut, and the long Lebanese civil war 's central 
dividing square in the capital? 
Geography plays a major role on more occasions than can be fathomed. 
Georges Lefebvre, the steadiest historian of the French Revolution, calls 
July 14 'the Paris revolution'.27 In Paris came together the three revolts 
which he convincingly describes as the three converging movements that 
brought down the Old Regime: the revolt of the Nobility, meeting already 
27 Ibid., 125-38. 
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40 defiantly in 1787, that of the Bourgeoisie, meeting in May 1789, and the 
revolution of the 'masses' in Paris, giving their voice also to a peasantry 
gripped by the Great Fear of the summer of 1789. The fact of Versailles ' 
distance is obvious, and the republican revolution knew that constraint 
well. The rebels put an end to eight hundred years of Monarchy when they 
went to Versailles and brought Louis xvi and his family to the Tuileries in 
downtown Paris on October 6, 1789. 
Lebanon 's geography of the Revolution was no less important for the 
targeting of the symbols of the Ancien Regime. But unlike Versailles, 
the Revolution failed to go that extra-physical mi le to unseat the tenant 
of the presidency in suburban Baabda, a two-hours walk from where 
the demonstrators rallied. A similar phenomenon occurred with another 
symbol of the long Syrian rule, the parliamentary speaker. Parliament, 
albeit literally three hundred yards from Martyrs' Square, where 'street 
history ' took place from 16 February to I 4 March, was spared by the 
marchers, but it could have gone otherwise - the first two weeks smaller 
groups demonstrated noisily before Parliament on their way to Martyrs ' 
square from near the assassination scene. Despite that temptation, 
Parliament came to be considered neutral partly because it was the site 
where the verbal spark fused when MP Marwan Hamadeh openly accused 
the Syrians ofHariri's assassination as soon as he learnt the news, minutes 
after the blast shook the building soon after noon. Parliament became a 
symbol of courage, not to be assailed or undermined. It was different for 
the presidential palace at Baabda, two miles from the centre of Beirut, 
which remained beyond the reach of the demonstrators simply because it 
was not close enough. Beirut was the site of the Revolution. Geography 
prevailed. Investing Baabda didn 't come naturally to the demonstrators. 
' [Had] the Presidential Palace been within reach and not in the suburbs 
of Ba'abda, it would have been stonned much like the Basti lle.'2H Had it 
been closer, the demonstrators would have inevitably marched on it, with 
consequences that are hard to predict, except that the turn of events would 
have perforce been profoundly different. 
28 Samir Khalaf, Hearl ofBeintl: Reclaiming the Bourj, London 2006, 244. 
--
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It will be hard in 2221 to realize how much the topography of Beirut, 41 
within a radius of literally 800 meters, weighed on events large and small. 
Already disappearing is the memory of early gatherings on the slope leading 
to Hotel Phoenicia, which is the closest place to the assassination scene 
that could be reached by demonstrators. The street where the assassination 
was carried out, flat and by the sea, was cordoned off for the purpose of the 
investigation, and it so remained for weeks on end as public anger prevented 
those in government from turning the site into just another nonnal place. 
There was a decision to be made in the first days: where would the crux 
of the demonstrations take place, near 'Ground zero' , as the site of the 
assassination was briefly called after theN ew York precedent, or in Martyrs' 
Square? Some demonstrators preferred Ground zero, especially as candles' 
vigils were being held there for Basel Fleihan and for remembering those 
killed with Hariri, but also because Martyrs' Square was simply too large 
to make an impression. As the crowds grew, it made more sense to be in 
the wider, more central place. Martyrs' square prevailing was also function 
of two other factors: the new, massive MuhammedAl-Amin Mosque in the 
midst of the square, which was controversial to non-Sunnis because of its 
dwarfing size, was suddenly vindicated as the eternal resting place ofRafiq 
Hariri who had it built but did not live to see it completed. Samir Khalaf's 
refined spatial sense again: 'Had Hariri's family, for example, opted to 
bury him in Saida rather than in the Bourj, ... it is doubtful whether his 
stirring martyrdom would have generated such dramatic consequences. ' 29 
Hariri was buried in a mausoleum rapidly erected in the Mosque's adjacent 
yard, and young Lebanese demonstrators started camping out on the 
Square from 18 February on, two days after his burial, as Hariri 's tomb 
turned into a politically charged pilgrims ' site. There was also that little 
topographical quirk: nearest the site of the assassination was the corner of 
the Phoenicia hotel, which stands down the hill. It is awkward to meet on 
a slope, especially as the comer stood in the middle of roads one did not 
want shut to a traffic that had already been disrupted by the closure of the 
nearby murder site for the investigation. One wonders what a continued 
29 ld., 194. 
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42 gathering in 'Basel Fulaihan 's place', as it lingers in memory, would have 
meant for the Revolution. For this is where demonstrators naturally came 
back every time they heard some news about his deteriorating health, then 
his death. Would the proximity to the ultimate sacrifice, rather than the 
baroque gathering of Martyrs' Square, have prevented Hizbullah from 
demonstrating on Riad al-Solh, in Sunni heartland, keeping them to the 
Shi' i suburbs where they had gathered until then? 
So it was Martyrs' square where the Revolution would unfold. Every 
single square meter became the battleground for the war of wills. People 
were angry at the beginning, but they were a lso apprehensive if not 
downright scared: Marwan Hamadeh's statement accusing the Syrians 
of the assassination was exceptional for its courage, which came minutes 
after he heard ofHariri 's death. It is bard in retrospect to appreciate what it 
takes to challenge the Syrian leaders in this way then. Walid Jumblat, the 
only national leader left when Hariri was killed, was particularly heartened 
to hear the direct accusations leveled at Bashar al-Asad in the large funeral 
procession on February 16, two days after the assassination, which turned 
into the first large demonstration of the Revolution. 
Another spontaneous outburst came the day following the burial, on 17 
February, with telling political consequences. Time recounted the event 
months later, as 'a dozen thirty something friends, Christians and Muslims 
alike, began a sit-in near [Hariri's] downtown grave site. On impulse they 
asked passers by to sign a petition calling on the pro-Syrian Lebanese 
government to resign; after four days, they were wrestling with a scroll of 
signatures some 400 m long. '30 
Like all such stories, there is a dark side, and ownership of the 
banner did create a stir a few months later between 'the thirty something 
friends'. This is un important. What was important was the slogan chosen, 
' resignation' understood as ' resignation of the pro-Syrian Prime Minister 
and his cabinet' . I recall receiving a call from a friend at the scene around 
noon on February 17. He wanted suggestions for the motto on the soon 
30 Scott McLeod, Trme Magazine, October 10, 2005, posted on October 2, http://www. 
time.corn/time/europe/hero2005/andraos.html. 
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to be celebrated petition. r suggested, in French actually, political lingua 43 
franca for many of those who had gathered round the embryonic text, a 
few formulas including ' Lahoud demission'. The petition 's first edition 
was eventually couched it in three languages, but it said simply, also in 
three languages, demission, resignation, istiqala. The motto came to be 
the driving horizon of the movement all the way to March 14. Demission, 
as correctly understood by the Time story, was that of the Karameh 
government. 
So Lahoud's presidency was not challenged, and this deserves an 
explanation. The Revolution was young and uncertain, three days after 
Hariri 's murder, two weeks before the security apparatus finally gave up on 
repression. Lahoud's rule had become characteristically brutal. The people 
sensed that he had a hand in the killing of Hariri, and he was reportedly 
elated by the death of his nemesis. Considering his confirmed brutality, 
people were hesitant to call on his resignation. In contrast, Karameh is 
a placid man, generally incapable of violent mischief, and he eventually 
resigned on February 28 of his own wi ll, albe it under street pressure. 
Had he decided to stay, the Revolution could not have brought him down 
institutionally. Karameh left because he did not want to shoulder the 
responsibility ofHariri 's death. A decent old-style politician, he was mainly 
innocuous for the Revolution, and the Syrians succeeded in replacing him 
with a similar prototype. That Karameh remained in the Syrian camp is 
unfortunate, but he at least resigned. By targeting him, the Revolution 
failed to designate its real problem, the president of the Republic whose 
coerced extension in power six months earlier was the original point of the 
crisis that exploded in Hariri 's death. This failure has lived ever since to 
haunt the Cedar Revolution. 
As the few dozen youth elected to stay overnight on Martyrs ' square, and 
a few tents came up to stay on February 18, day 4 of the Revolution, there 
was grumbling from different quarters. For some, it was simply indecent 
to have young men and women mingling there. Others hid behind the 
argument of law and order. Notebooks and recollections from the tents will 
emerge one day to cast light on dai ly developments, logistics, the role of the 
youth leaders, and the patrons, who supplied food, direction or legitimacy. 
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44 This will be important for history, like those many petitions and pamphlets 
unearthed by historians for the French Revolution.31 Testimonies wi ll 
offer evocative recollections, but I suspect that, li ke the French cahiers de 
doleances, they will remain marginal: for the direction of the Revolution 
was elsewhere, in more rarefied circles assembling around Walid Jumblat, 
who also generally controlled the mood of the street. Even on the ground, 
the archetypal figure of the Revolution in Martyrs' square, if one were to 
be chosen, was Nora Jumblat, whose presence day in day out proved to be 
a rallying point for the upheaval: the middle class. Several women actively 
participated in the logistics that sustained the Revolution, but a wider 
appreciation of what made the Revolution is in order. The Revolution 's 
politkal and social center of gravity was in the educated middle class, and 
was not gender-coloured. 
The socialite dimension is not unimportant. The Cedar Revolution was 
also dubbed 'the Gucci revolution', and the protean figure of Mrs Jumblat 
on this score is remarkable: in her met the elegant wife of the leader forced 
into absence by the imminent risk on his life, but also unusual poise, 
ease in three world languages, much intelligence and common sense, 
organizational skills, and a good enough appreciation by a Syrian native 
of the limitations of the Lebanese poli tical scene. Nora Jumblat was even 
threatened by Emile Lahoud's security people, although she didn't tell her 
husband at the t ime. And so she was perceived by other upper middle class 
women who formed the nerve of the Revolt as a courageous surrogate 
of her husband. Although people were ready at the time to rally behind 
Bahiyya Hariri as Prime Minister, who gave the most noted speech in 
the first, decisive month of the Revolution, women were never ambitious 
enough to take over its leadership. It's also true that the Saudi system to 
which the Hariris owed so much could not stomach a woman as a pillar of 
Lebanese politics. 
31 Michel Denis. Pierre Goubert, 1789: les Fran9ais ontla parole, Paris 1973. 
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vi. Names 
Independence intifada, Gucci Revolution, Cedar Revolution. If we want 
to be serious about Lebanon's Revolution, we better have a name for it 
that lasts till 2221. In English 'Cedar Revolution' has stuck, and I always 
favoured its Arabic equivalent, thawrat al-arz, over other appellations. 
Ten days after the demonstrations started, the Bristol people, named after 
the hotel where the motley group of politicians opposed to Syria's rule 
used to assemble, sought to baptize a movement which they were seeing 
growing. They settled on 'revolt for independence', in Arabic intifada! al-
istiqlal. 'Independence 2005 ', the corresponding English title that saw its 
way on stickers and pins, was meant as a revolt against Syrian domination. 
After fifteen years, a long time in Lebanon 's short history of independence 
( 1943), breaking the shackles in that form was natural, and independence 
became the rallying idea for Lebanon regaining its sovereignty. I never 
liked the appellation intifada much. It was obviously associated with its 
Palestinian namesake, which had simply not succeeded. We all supported 
the first Palestinian intifada in its early days in December 1987, because of 
the unique sense that something different was afoot, namely a non-violent 
revolution in Palestine. Throwing stones is not an altogether peaceful 
exercise, but the result, - no death, though some injuries -, remarkable 
in the Middle East. And then, s lowly and inexorably, the Palestinian 
int(fada turned violent, as much against Israelis as against Palestinian 
so-called 'collaborators', who were ringed with tires and set ablaze. By 
then, towards the end of 1988, the Palestinian intifada had exhausted its 
historical calling. 
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46 The second intifada was started by Ariel Sharon on 28 September 
2000 and deftly taken over by Yaser Arafat to perpetuate his rule over 
a Palestin ian body politic which had grown exhausted by his nepotism. 
The second intifada was ugly from the very beginning. On 28 September 
2000, it should be recalled, Sharon moved onto the esplanade of the Haram 
Mosque in the heart of Arab Jerusalem, triggering the protests that would 
bring him and Israeli extremism to power within months. The Haram 
scene, exactly as he expected, turned into a massacre perpetrated by Israeli 
security forces who shot at the protesters, killing six people. A few days 
and more Palestinian deaths later, the world was shocked by the death of 
young boy Durra cowering in fear behind his father, which was recorded 
live on camera. Calls to bring the boy's ki llers to justice went nowhere, as 
was any move to punish those Israeli policemen who shot into the crowd a 
week earlier. The second intifada quickly turned into the burial of the peace 
process, bringing symbols of hatred and death to power in both societies, 
Ariel Sharon in Israel and the Hamas leaders in Palestine. 
In fact the Palestinians owed the word intifada to Lebanon. In the 
internecine wars of Lebanon in the mid-1980s, politicians ran out of 
appellations for the turns and twists of the successive outbursts of 
violence. In one instance, which was pitting ' Lebanese forces' leader 
Samir Geagea to 'Lebanese forces' leader Elie Hobeika, --or was it rising 
military strongman Michel Aoun? --, Geagea's eminence grise Karim 
Pakradouni sought a new term for his boss 's latest 'corrective movement, 
haraka tashihiyya.' Corrective movement is an appellation dear to Arab 
putschists of the Hafez Asad-Saddam Hussein type turning violent on their 
own companions to take over power. That appellation was ev idently not in 
favour in Lebanon. Then the word intifada fused, which Pakradouni said 
was provided by my father in casual conversation. I am not sure how it 
arrived to Palestine in December 1987, but the word quickly caught on in 
the narrow Levant of a globalised Middle East. 
Knowing that pedigree, and the disturbing image which associates 
the word with ch icken literally 'shaking off' when they get slaughtered, 
I resisted the word intifada for our Revolution. Our Revolution was 
different, because it was premised on non-violence, a pact the Lebanese 
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people contracted amongst themselves as they were carrying it out. 47 
Looking into antecedents, I realized that Hanna Batatu, the great 
historian of 20'h century Iraq, mentions intifada for one of the larger street 
revolts against the Monarchy in Baghdad in 1952.32 Maybe the disastrous 
fate of Iraq was an additional reason why I dislike calling our Revolution 
intifada. 'Cedar Revolution ' was coined by Paula Dobriansky, then US 
'Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs', in a press conference on 
28 February 2005. In the report available, the expression is recorded in 
bracket and in the singular form, 'Cedar Revolution'. Despite its foreign 
origin, an American one to boot, it stood out aga inst the word intifada 
because of the violent and inconclusive Palestinian precedents. One reason 
was also selfish: my grandfather being known as the poet of the Cedar, 
sha 'er al-arz, I naturally identify w ith the name. Less selfishly, the battle 
is also symbolic, and probably also atavistically sectarian. The Cedar is 
the symbol of old Mount Lebanon joining Druze and Christian territory, 
as opposed to the Sunnj coast, or Hizbullah 's strongholds in the suburbs, 
the Biqa' valley, or the South, where there are no cedars. And the Cedar 
was uniquely Lebanese, a beautiful and majestic symbol sitting on our flag 
since 1943, rather than the ugly and non-descript colours that form the flag 
of most Arab countries. 
There is more to names and slogans than meets the eye: throughout 
the demonstrations, we were plagued with a tripartite empty slogan that 
came from the Aoun movement. It said hurriyya, siyada, istiqlal, liberty, 
sovereignty, independence. Sovereignty and independence are redundant 
enough, with liberty adding a further sense of repetition. What was 
missing in our Revolution was democracy, and the recognition of its most 
remarkable trait, non-violence. The redundant slogan stuck, symbolically 
fai ling to inscribe non-violence and democracy a longside independence. 
Fortunately, another slogan developed. 'Truth and Justice' covered Beirut 
streets, and all novelty was not lost. 
32 Hanna Batatu, The Old social classes and the revolutionary movements of Iraq: A 
study of Iraq s old landed and commercial classes and of its communists. Ba 'thists and 
Free Officers, Princeton 1978, chapter on 'the Intifadah of November', 666-70. 
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48 And so it was that between independence and intifada we constrained 
our Revolution, whilst missing its more important characteristics: the 
people's demand for democracy, and their pursuit of security through non-
violence. Words have a logic. One should never underestimate their power. 
Liberte and egalite are enduring concepts from the French Revolution, 
fraternite never quite made it. 
p 
vii. Social structure 
Karl Marx never harboured a doubt on the social structure of the French 
Revolution, and his stubborn diagnosis prevailed in revolutionary 
historiography: 'The French bourgeoisie rose to power through the 
most gigantic revolution that history has known ... Camille Desmoulins, 
Danton, Robespierre, Saint Just, Napoleon, the heroes, as well as the 
parties and the mass under the ancient French Revolution accomplished 
in their Roman costume, and with a Roman vocabulary, the task of 
thei r era, that is the liberation and establishment of a modern bourgeois 
society. '33 The French Revolution was bourgeois. So was the Cedar 
Revolution. When March 14 came, with half the population of Lebanon 
on the street, the cross-section was immense, and it was also for many 
a family outing. But March 14 was the climax, which came after so 
many demonstrations, only a few comprising thousands as opposed to 
the more common crowd, usually in the hundreds. Some will consider 
the Revolution to be that of the youth, and of a nucleus of zealots at 
that, mostly from those most frustrated groups belonging to one 
Christian leader in prison for over a decade, Samir Geagea, and another 
Christian leader in exile for a decade and a half, Michel Aoun. Nuclei 
are important, and the continued physical presence of the tents since 
February 18 prevented a sense of ' back to usual business' from setting 
33 First section of the text taken from The German ideology ( 1846), second section 
from the 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), excerpts in Fran~ois Furet, Marx ella 
Revolution Franr;aise, Paris 1986, 182 and 245 respectively. Emphasis in original. 
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50 in. The eventual departure of the campers in May was a strong signal 
that the Revolution was over. 
The Revolution's middle class backbone was dual: what is traditionally 
described as bourgeoisie, more specifically in that case middle aged 
professionals, bankers, lawyers, doctors, journalists, state employees, 
combined with housewives. Robert Fossaert has written in his Summa on 
society how trade-unionists know that a political order is coming to an end 
when housewives descend on the street to demonstrate: 'All trade-unionists 
know that when housewives, often frightened by strikes and other forms 
of open stmggle, enter the field of action, then the paroxysm is near. ' 34 
Housewives and mothers on the streets of Beirut carried the Revolution to 
its paroxysm. 
It was always a figment of the imagination that the Lebanese youth led 
the revolution. One of the Revolution's greatest disappointments was the 
absence of a youth leader a Ia 68 emerging from the scene. But this absence 
is better understood as an early illusion tmmpeted by Lebanese politic ians 
in the anti-Syrian camp, part wishful thinking part demagoguery. The 
Revolution never risked being led by the youth. Despite all the rhetoric 
to the contrary, leading politicians of the Hariri-Jumblat camp, and their 
Christian supporters of the time, weren't ready to see their leadership 
being taken over by unknown youth. Paradoxically also, the strong 
family structure prevail ing in Lebanon may have also constituted a key 
component of the Revolution's success, at a time when the conservative 
setback brought to the fore family values, the more so in a disoriented 
and naturally timorous Lebanese society emerging from two decades of 
war followed by one and a half decades of Syrian-led thuggery. Youth 
is an active section of nuclear and extended families alike, but never the 
decisive part. 
Sociologist Mel hem Chaoul offered the first serious sketch of 'Lebanese 
34 Robert Fossaert, La Societe, lome 5, Les £tats, Paris 1981, paragraphc 20: 'Tous les 
syndicalistes savent que, quand les femmes-au-foyer, souvenl effrayees par les greves et 
autres fonnes de Iulie ouverte. entrent a leur lour dans l'action, c'est qu'un paroxysme 
est proche. ' 
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society faced by March 14'. In part he distinguished between the mujtama' 51 
ahli of Lebanon, the traditional society, which consists of family, tribal 
and communitarians alliances suddenly meeting in a narrow geographical 
space, and the mujtama' madani, civil society as understood in the vast 
modem literature around that concept. The massive dimension of March 
14 made the two fuse, with the brief dominance of civil society taking over 
the hierarchical mode of traditional society. Leaders evaporated that day: 
'Against the verticality of the structure of the traditional political 
movement, against the one way relation from the direction to "the base", 
the spirit of March 14 initiated the network society, horizontal connections, 
egalitarian relations, mobilisation by choice for the individual. The 
leadership became accessory, subsidiary, and decorative: there is someone 
making a speech, but one doesn't listen, one doesn't follow the speaker 
above, what is important gets exchanged in the throng. End of"directives" 
and of "prefabricated slogans", time for the disorder of words and to 
slogans invented on site. '35 
So it was not the youth, I contend, nor the traditional political 
leadership, nor even the families who were the nerve of the Revolution. 
They all did share in of course, and the housewives and whole families 
descending onto central Beirut transformed the revolt into a Revolution, 
with rare precedents in history for any society. When over a half of the 
active population of a country is in the street, surely the phenomenon is 
awesome. The question is, who was the mainstay of the Revolution? My 
answer, to be tested quantitatively by historians: the Lebanese professional 
middle class, the bourgeoisie, to use Marx's awkward obsession. When 
company executives, bankers, lawyers, doctors take to the street, the 
35 'Face a Ia verticalite de Ia structure du mouvement politique traditionnel, au rapport 
a sens unique de Ia direction vers "Ia base", !'esprit du 14 mars a initie Ia societe en 
reseaux, les connexions horizontales, les relations egalitaires, Ia mobilisation par choix 
s'adressant a des individus. Le leadership est devenu accessoire, subsidiaire, decoratif: il 
y a bien quelqu'un qui fait un djscours, mais on n'tkoute pas, on ne suit pas le locuteur 
d'en haut, !'important est ce qui s'echange dans Ia foule: finis les "mots d'ordre" et les 
"slogans prefabriques", place au desordre des mots et au.x slogans inventes sur place.' 
Mel hem Chaoul, 'La societe libanaise face au mouvement du 14 mars', Travaux et lours, 
76, Autumn 2005, 89-100, at 92. 
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52 rest of the society follows in a country which does not have a core party 
like the Baath in Syria, or a core military like in Turkey, that can muster 
enough centralization and coherence to shoot into this powerful type of 
demonstrators. 
Missing in prominence from the Cedar Revolution was a class 
identified in French history as the sans-culottes. The French Revolution 
knew two high moments: 1789 and 1793. Historians agree, the 1793 
Robespierre moment of the Revolution, tainted as it was by state-
initiated terror, charted also the rise of an expanded form of social 
egalitarianism. This contention has been supported by the Mathiez 
school, and the Societe d ' Etudes Robespierristes which he founded in 
1907, adding much to our understanding of the dynamic associated 
with Robespierre's access to the effective headship of the Comite de 
Salut Public in September 1793, and the real popularity he commanded 
amongst a strata identified as the ·sans-culottes'. A corresponding 
argument could focus on Hizbullah , and the non-bourgeois dominant 
character of its followers. A major difference remains: Hizbullah and 
his allies, lasting or temporary, stand for Counter-revolution. In 1789, 
Robespicrre was on the side of the Revolution against the Ancien 
Regime. In 2005, Hizbullah was against the Revolution, and remained 
openly faithful to the Syrian order. 
The more important parallel between the defining moments of 1793 
Jacobinism as opposed to the original spirit of 1789 was a promise of 
something else, an enhancement of social equality as opposed to fonnal 
equal ity. It did not work in France, of course, but it opened a window 
which remained a dominant trait of historiography, through the Bolsheviks 
who loved the Jacobins, until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989. This 
is why Furet's work is so pregnant. It corresponds to the end of a century-
long debate. In Lebanon, that debate never really started, for those who 
might have aspired to some form of egalitarianism squarely stood against 
the Revolution. 
Like the French Revolution, the Cedar Revolution was bourgeois, in 
that the bourgeoisie led it, which was naturally associated with that most 
successful of the Lebanese bourgeois, Rafiq Hariri. The 'people' followed, 
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though not all the 'people': the overall mass of Lebanese Shi' is stood 53 
by, then opposed it. Here Lebanon becomes impossible to compare with 
modern world revolutions, at least in their western varieties. Suddenly, 
time-honoured sectarianism sets in. Suddenly Middle Eastern religious 
atavisms come to the fore, trumping the revolutionary scene and compelling 
a different type of analysis.36 The central question of the Cedar Revolution 
at the height of its surge, in and around March 14, was: where were the 
Shi'is? Why did they not rally, in their mass? 
They did rally, of course, around Hizbullah, against the Revolution, 
starting March 8. And no one had any doubt: on March 14, everyone else 
in Lebru1on descended onto the street in reaction to the immense Shi' i 
tide of the previous week. The Revolution was also sectarian, as all things 
Lebanese, indeed as all things Middle Eastern. 
36 A telling text fi'om 1870, shared by Jamil Mruwwe as l was completing this book: 
'Written by W.M. Thomson, Protestant minister, in The Land and the book, published 
in London in 1870: Lebanon has about 400,000 inhabitants, gathered into more than six 
hundred towns, villages and hamlets ... 
The various religions and sects live together, and practice their conflicting superstitions 
in close proximity, but the people do not coalesce into one homogeneous community, nor 
do they regard each other with fraternal feelings . 
The Sunnites excommunicate the Shiites - both hate the Druse, and all three detest the 
Nusairiyeh. The Maronites have no particular love for anybody and, in tum, are disliked 
by all. The Greeks cannot endure the Greek Catholics- all despise the Jews. And the same 
remarks apply to the minor divisions of this land. There is no common bond of union. 
Society has no continuous strata underlying it, which can be opened and worked for the 
general benefit of all, but an endless number of dislocated fragments, faults. and dikes, by 
which the masses are tilted up in hopeless confusion, and 1ie at every conceivable angle 
of antagonism to each other. The omnific Spirit that brooded over primeval chaos can 
alone bring order out of such confusion, and reduce these conflicting elementS into peace 
and concord ... 
No other country in the world, l presume, has such a multiplicity of antagonistic races; 
and herein lies the greatest obstacle to any general and permanent amelioration and 
improvement of their condition character, and prospects. They can never form one 
tmited people, never combine for any important religious or political purpose ; and will 
therefore remain weak, incapable of self-government, and exposed to the invasions and 
oppressions of foreigners. Thus it has been, is now, and must long continue to be - a 
people divided, meted out, and trodden down.' For the Lebanese crises and revolutions 
of the 19th century, an excellent introduction is Samir Khalaf, Persistence and change in 
19th centwy Lebanon : a sociological essay. Beirut 1979. 
r------- March 2221. Lebanon's Cedar Revolution 
54 It was somewhere, like all Revolutions, social, but that depth was 
faint and skewed. A class struggle would be loud, one would think, 
considering the massive coalescing of Shi' is around Hizbullah, the 
'voice of those who do not have a voice', of those 'who are left behind ' , 
of the ' dispossessed and wretched ofthe earth ' . But it is not so simple, 
however strong the association of the Shi' i mass of the population with 
deprivation and marginality in modem Lebanese history. The paradox is 
easy to discern: as the closest to the French Revolution sans-culottes in 
class terms, Hizbullah 's people stood actually on the opposite side, on 
the side of the counter-revolution. Another paradox is also worth noting: 
they never asked, individually or as leaders, for political, let alone socia l 
reform. They just harked to the disappearing Syrian order, seeking its 
restoration along with a non-Lebanese agenda concerned primarily with 
Israel. 
Hizbullah spoilt the Lebanese Revolution, and its leadership remained 
behind at all stages of its development: it stood against Syrian withdrawal, 
against justice for Hariri, against the change of Emile Lahoud and Nabih 
Berri, the two foremost symbols of the Ancien Regime. And when Hizbullah 
started the war against Israel on July 12, 2006, it was clearly to stage a coup 
d'Etat. Lost for the Cedar Revolution was the hope, through a Shi'i voice, 
of any social change that would address social inequality. As a strongly 
sectarian movement, Hizbullah made prospects for a non-sectarian public 
space, let alone of democratic equality against sectarianism, totally absent 
from the Cedar Revolution's scene. 
So it was left for the Lebanese bourgeoisie, as middle class professionals 
mainly li ving in the city, to lead the Cedar Revolution. As Chaoul correctly 
noted, there was a fundamental disconnect with the leadership. The mass 
meetings of the Cedar Revolution were spontaneous; this made their charm, 
and their universal appeal. Those on the other side looked ' embrigades', 
and their black shirts, their military appeal, their stilted language, their 
callous slogans, were and will remain on the wrong side of history. Their 
leadership was never capable of appealing to equality, whether democratic 
or social, so conservative and counterrevolutionary was their political bent. 
As a result, those who could give an additional depth to the Revolution in 
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the sense given by Robespierre and his successors of the socially egalitarian 55 
movement, Babeuf and Blanqui, sounded far more as unrepentant royalist 
defenders of the neighbouring dynasty: their motto, fidelity to Syria, was 
made worse by the b lunt and insistent association with a dictatorial and 
corrupt sectarian dynasty that ruled Damascus with an iron fist for almost 
half a century. 
,... 
viii. Leadership 
Disconnect between the people of March 14 and the leadership came first 
with the brutal disappearance of Rafiq Hariri 's towering figure. It turned 
him ' tel qu 'en lui-meme enjin I 'eternite le change·, and deprived the 
Revolution from its larger-than-life leader. In the pantheon of Lebanese 
figures of the Revolution, Walid Jumblat and Rafiq Hariri tower highest on 
the right side of hist01y for year one, month one. 
The psychology of revolutionary actors is a fascinating exercise, as much 
needed for Rousseau, Louis xvi, and Robespierre, as it is for the Lebanese 
political figures during the Revolution. Other than Hariri and Jumblat, the 
many Jesser political figures on the Lebanese scene will find in La Bruyere's 
sarcastic portraits a far more appropriate model. There were many brave 
participants, some of whom will have had a biography of sorts by 2221. 
But those who were on the wrong side of history, disliked the Revolution, 
fought it, or turned their back on it, will have deserved footnotes. 
A brief portrait is in order for my choice of the two leaders of the Cedar 
Revolution. 
For Hariri, the grandeur was posthumous. True, he had reached in his 
lifetime success by any standard, rising to Prime Ministership from nowhere 
official. When he was called to the job by Syrian-appointed president 
Elias Hrawi in 1992, after the first Karameh government collapsed in the 
wake of street protests in the face of economic adversity, Hariri had never 
exercised an official position, elected or otherwise. His prime ministership 
was owed to moderation and networking, to Saudi support, and to his 
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58 proverbial wealth. ln 1992, he hardly knew how to speak in public, in any 
language, and his apprenticeship on this score was remarkable over the next 
decade. Contrary to the many wooden-language prototypes, run-of-the-mill 
Lebanese politicians who are always careful and never speak their minds, 
Hariri was by the time he was murdered capable of interesting interviews, 
and occasionally good speeches, even in French which he learnt on the 
street, so to speak, in the corridors of the Elysee Palace. Hariri was no orator, 
but he was astute politically, standing on the right side of history by virtue 
of his intelligence and moderation, without realizing that the contemporary 
Middle East carries a non-discriminating killer logic that does not spare 
moderates. 
I met him on several occasions, especially after the enthusiasm he 
expressed toward the case against Ariel Sharon in Belgium. His support 
was welcome and uplifting, but any political or financial translation of that 
support meant the death of the case, and he understood that well. Hariri 
knew the importance of the law, as much as he knew the power of money, 
but for him money spoke louder in politics. The cabinet position he was 
most keen to keep for his camp was the ministry of finance. Next came 
the ministry of justice. No surprise then that his two closest non-family 
aides, Fouad Siniora, his chief money manager and adviser, and Bahigc 
Tabbara, his chief legal counsel, became respectively ministers of finance 
and justice when Hariri was Prime Minister. Both were able number 2s, 
with a mind of their own, but they did not quite project the warmth and 
unique generosity that came naturally to their patron. 
Looking into the foibles of political life is easy; the sinews of politics 
are as disheartening to the idealist as the kitchens of great chefs to the 
happy diner, and Hariri as leader was incapable of making a distinguishing 
mark in his lifetime. The reconstruction he presided over came at a 
heavy cost, driving the country into deep structural indebtedness. Even 
the architecture of downtown Beirut was controversial, and raised much 
37 See e.g. Jad Tabet, 'al-i 'mar wal-maslaha a!- 'amma, fil-turath wa/-hadatha: Madinat 
a/-harb wa dhakiral al-mustaqbal (Reconstruction and public interest. On tradition and 
modernity, the city of war and the memory of the future), Beirut 1996. 
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opposition amongst respectable Lebanese architects.37 Hariri 's followers, 59 
save a few, were unpa latable sycophants literally waiting in the Saudi-sty le 
corridors of his gilded mansion for the boss to make an appearance and 
accord them a few precious minutes they could then translate in a lucrative 
deal. 
Hariri became much greater in death than in life, for the revulsion at 
killing such a gentle soul was commensurate with the accommodating 
temper he manifested in the worst adversity. In the Middle East tough 
neighbourhood, accommodation also comes at a price. Hariri 's last 
accommodation on August 26, 2004, when he gave in to Bashar al-Asad 's 
injunction to extend Emile Lahoud's presidency, cost him his life. 
It is in death that he became suddenly big, as big potentially, I wrote in 
the first days of the Revolution, as Mahatma Gandhi.38 It may be difficult 
to imagine Rafiq Hariri's ultimate sacrifice on 14 February 2005 standing 
in history like the murder of the Mahatma on 30 January 1948. Still, the 
argument that Hariri is to Lebanon and the Middle .East what the Mahatma 
was to India I continue to defend. There was hard ly a more peaceful soul 
in the Arab world than the former Lebanese Prime Minister: he was simply 
unable to conceive violence as a tool for policy. Not only did he reject 
violence against rivals or enemies in political life, he always refused to 
get drawn, in a country and region where violence is a daily occurrence, 
into a process that might tum into bloodshed. Even his opposition to Emile 
Lahoud, which was real and palpable, never developed on hi s part into an 
attitude conducive to armed confrontation. And as in the case of Gandhi, his 
rivals did not have any scruple in resorting to violence to get rid of him. 
Non-violence prevailing on the political scene is the critical test fo r 
over half the Lebanese population who adopted Hariri as the icon of 
March 14, 2005. The month of demonstrations after his death was both a 
fulfi llment and a message: a fu lfillment of the silent and steady resistance 
38 Mall at, ' Hariri et le Mahatma Gandhi, de Ia non-violence au Liban com me prom esse 
d'avenir ', Le Monde, Proche-Orient edition. 20 May 2005. Tbe article was written in the 
first week after Hariri 's death, but it wasn't published then. Another version appeared as 
"Ahd al-ra 'is al-hatriri wa 'ahduna /ah (the tenure/commitment of president Hariri anti 
our commitment to him'), al-Mustaqabal, 24 December 2005. 
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60 of the Lebanese people to humiliation, domination and heavy-handedness 
over the previous fifteen years; and a message of active non-violence from 
Lebanon to the region and the world, so that people in the streets of Beirut 
should take the political lead in society. 
To win the challenge, Hariri's sacrifice needed to herald a Middle 
East where consistent refusal of the use of force for political ends could 
slowly transform him into a Mahatma Gandhi figure for Lebanon and 
the region. The achievements of the first month of the Revolution were 
impressive, but they remained the tip of the democratic and non-violent 
iceberg which did not materialise into a stable course and failed to create 
the alternative. 
The man bears the historic mantra of a Gandhi only if his successors 
succeed in extricating the non-violent profile from the rest of Hariri 's 
personality, which was nothing like Gandhi 's. To put the contrast mildly, 
Hariri never offered sacrifices like Gandhi 's constant near starvation. 
Gandhi had no property in his legacy, save his remarkable soul. Hariri 's 
wealth ranked amongst the most impressive in the world. But Hariri 's 
world was no longer Gandhi's, and the greatness oflndia is inconceivable 
without its slow but detennined transfonnation into a world industrial-
technological power. Nothing of the sort appears in Gandhi's economic 
philosophy. His call for a return to basics in dai ly life and in the economy 
is not only impossible. It is wrong, as was the whole socialist idea which 
impressed its charitable dimension on Gandhi and his colleagues in the 
anti-colonial struggle. Even Nelson Mandela, a half century later, left at 
the door his militant socialism and his weapons as the means of liberation, 
before taking over the presidency of South Africa. Hariri would have 
nothing to do with communal-socialist economic schemes as world vision, 
and he was right, for Gandhi 's India has inexorably moved in the opposite 
direction to where better things lie, in liberal capitalism. 'Better ' relatively 
of course, for even capitalist societies have their moments of compassion, 
their marginal efforts to bring everyone on board, and their occasional 
taxes for the benefit of the poor. The politicians manipulate the language of 
social equality, but who wouldn't? Hariri knew the system, and he played 
it well, until he pushed his luck too far. And he was candid. Hariri never 
-
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hid hi s companionship to the money march of the late 20111 century, and 61 
money was also for him a way to avoid violence:39 in 2 151 century terms, 
Hariri is the embodiment of soft power. 
But he was ultimate ly na"ive. After he succumbed to Syrian pressure 
for the extension ofLahoud's mandate in September 2004, he thought he 
would recoup in the parliamentary elections planned for May 2005, but the 
illusion he harboured with Walid Jumblat to get back at the Syrian order by 
way of a parliamentary victory betrays his weak sense of timing, and the 
narrowness of his constitutional understanding. Never was power vested 
in Parl iament in Lebanon. Hariri was guided by the precedent of 2000, 
when parliamentaty elections resulted in the defeat of his Sunni nemesis 
of the time, sitting Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss. That victory he owed 
primarily to the courage of Walid Jumblat, who took on the challenge 
against the deepening Asad-Lahoud order sing le-handedly, and won 
elections in the Mountain against aU odds. By a special Lebanese twist to 
Jumblat's unexpected victory, Hariri benefited from the shock and profited 
from the tide obtaining from staggered elections Lebanon has managed to 
distinguish its system with. Twist, because in a tiny country like Lebanon, 
the vote should be easily managed over one day. Instead, it is staggered over 
four successive Sundays. In 2000 Beirut voted after the Mountain, which 
Jumblat had won, and Beirut rallied behind Hariri against the government 
then led by Hariri 's Sunni rival, Selim Hoss. Lahoud and the Syrians had 
a brief setback. 
Building on his vicarious victory of2000, Hariri focused after Lahoud's 
extension in September 2004 all his energies on the parliamentary elections 
engineered, oddly and unconstitutionally enough, to take place four years 
and six months (rather than the constitutionally prescribed four years) after 
the 2000 summer elections. He thought he could win a decisive majority to 
39 Nicholas Blanford reports a telling story on Hariri 's unfortunate propensity to use 
money as a solution to political problems: 'According to a veteran pro-Syrian Lebanese 
politician, Hariri made a last-ditch effort to stave offLahoud's three extra years by offering 
Rustom Ghazaleh [lhe head of lhe Syrian security services in Lebanon at the time], $20 
million to tell the Syrian leadership he was unable to arrange lhe presidential extension. 
Ghazaleh, however, refused the offer'. Killing Mr Lebanon, 107. 
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62 change the system. That was at best nai"ve . 
Walid Jumblat was also nai"ve. According to published accounts of the 
aftermath of the tragic Asad-Hariri meeting at the end of August 2004, 
Jumblat advised Hariri to yield to the Syrians over Lahoud. That was lethal 
advice. 
Walid Jumblat is an endearing man, full of chann, with a sharp brain and 
an impossible temper. Amongst some twenty speeches during the longest 
day of the Revolution on March 14, most notable was the absence of his. 
Then was lost a chance for the democratic dimension of the Revolution to 
make headway, and Jumblat would have no doubt called for the removal 
of Emile Lahoud. Amongst the other speakers, on ly Carlos Edde requested 
that the president step down, and he deserves a salute for that mention, 
the only meaningful one politically during the day. But the mention was 
expressed too sarcastically to make an impact: take some rest for yourself 
and us, Edde said to Lahoud, btirtah wa bitrayyih. That was not sufficient 
to force a president out, considering the atmosphere the world over about 
presidents' sacro-sanctity, let alone Lebanon. 
When was the last time that a president or a Prime Minister res igned 
in the world? The Middle East is far worse. The last resignation which 
came willfully at the top level was Israeli PM Itzhak Rabin 's in 1974, 
over the illegal bank account he held abroad with his wife. In 1983, Ariel 
Sharon was dismissed kicking and shouting from the Defense Ministry 
after the Kahane Commission concluded he was ' personally responsible' 
for the Sabra and Shatila massacres in September 1982. He remained in 
government, playing on the words of the Commission: out of Defense, 
but not out of the Cabinet. Instead of see ing an end to a massively brutal 
career, Sharon eventually came back to lead Israel and Palestine again into 
the abyss twenty years later. 
Why did Jumblat fail to develop the democratic character of the Cedar 
Revolution? He was the undisputed leader of the movement in the first 
few weeks, but surrendered people's expectations on March 14, or on 
March 27, depending on one's appreciation. On March 14 he did not join 
the demonstrators, for reasons of security, and the Revolution appeared 
suddenly leader- and rudder-less. On March 27 he paid a visit to Hizbullah 's 
viii. Leadership -------, 
chief, signaling a weakness he came to regret too late. Before and after 63 
March 14, there were many other occasions when leadership failed him. He 
advised Hariri wrongly to give in to Asad in August 2004, and then pushed 
parliamentary elections as the panacea for presidential change when they 
would obviously fall short politically and constitutionally. He fai led to 
rally the large, massive movement into some institutionalized structure, 
including a common front to face the parliamentary elections when they 
took place in May-June 2005. He swung dramatically from one pole to the 
other, losing more credibility at each and every tum. And so on, one could 
lengthen the list significantly. And yet Jumblat was the incontrovertible 
leader of oppos itional, decent Lebanon, for three decades, like his father 
was for half a century before him. The fact that, born Druze, they didn 't 
belong by birth to the sects that commandeer the three key constitutional 
positions in the Republic (president, speaker, prime minister) forced them 
to always bow to some secondary character who would use their support 
gladly, and rum his back on them once in power. 
In the course of three decades of upheaval, Walid Jumblat comes out 
in Lebanon 's history as a courageous, visionary leader of sort in the tragic 
epic of the 20'11 centuty Middle East. He generally knew how the regional 
winds blew, who was worth vesting confidence and political capital in, and 
how some moral value could be added to the brutal Mideastern hallmark 
of history. On occasions, even that moral value failed him, as when the 
Christians of the mountain were killed or ejected from their homes by 
Jumblat's men in 1983. That blot will never go away. But like his father 
from 1946 to 1977, Walid Jumblat set the tone of Lebanese politics soon 
after he took on the feudal mantle upon Kamal 's assassination by the 
Syrians in March 1977. 
In the Cedar Revolution, Walid Jumblat lacked two depths: a horizontal 
sense of revolutionary reach, as he never realized the power that Lebanon's 
relative though real democratic vantage point had upon the rest of the 
Middle East. Only a full year after March 14 did he see that regional 
overdetennination had to be addressed in a frontal way, and called for 
changing the Syrian regime. This came late, for he ignored at the crucial 
moment the regional dynamism of the Cedar Revolution. Such dynamism 
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64 is bard to get back, for great historic occas ions are unique. 
The other depth he did not have was inte llectual. That was sure ly a 
revolt against the father, who read and wrote a lot. Kamal Jumblat authored 
some seminal books of 20'h century Arab political literature, an exception 
rather than the rule in politics. In comparison with politicians the world 
over, Walid Jumblat is a good reader, but a certain critical mass was never 
reached that would have turned his speeches, and his reference points, into 
Danton's or Robespierre's.40 It is true that neither Danton nor Robespierre 
was necessari ly a marking thinker of the French Revolution. When you 
act, you usually do not have the luxury to think a lot, or to express that 
thinking philosophically. Jumblat and Hariri were no philosophers. Nor 
did they have any pretense to being so. 
But could the Cedar Revolution remain without any philosophers 
whatsoever? 
40 Except perhaps Jumblat's emotional speech of 14 February 2006 challenging theAsad 
government, a powerful testimony on Lebanese anger against the Syrian order. 
ix. Intellectual roots 
Historians of the French revolution dedicate a choice place to its' intellectual 
roots' , which they discuss in the context of the Enlightenment's battle 
against absolute monarchy. Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu, two 
hundred and thirty years later, are the political philosophers to whom 
historians generally ascribe the Revolution's intellectual pedigree. 
The causes of the Cedar Revolution are plain. Here is a country where 
the domination of Syria was paramount over a period of fifteen years. ln 
its simplest fonn, the Cedar Revolution was about breaking Lebanon's 
shackles from Syrian control and the people who represented Asad's rule 
in Beirut. When one of the least provocative contesters of that domination 
showed his persistent concern with reducing its power, he was ki lled, and 
the country revolted. Opposition to Syria + Hariri 's assassination = the 
Cedar Revolution. 
An un impeachable equation indeed, but as we learn from the history 
of the French Revolution, an insufficient one. The intellectual roots, also 
known as cultural or ideological, may be more difficult to follow, because 
Lebanon did not have a Voltaire or a Rousseau whom people recognized, 
even during the French Revolution, to be its intellectual forerunners: 
Je suis tom be par terre, c 'est Ia faute a Voltaire 
Le nez dans le ruisseau c 'est lafaute a Rousseau. 
In Lebanon, the Cedar Revolution's closest to be philosopher figures 
were two Christian men of religion: the Maronite Patriarch, Mar Nasrallah 
Butros Sfeir, and Jesuit anthropologist Selim Abou, the rector of Saint 
I ' I 
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66 Joseph's university. T heir style was most contrastive. As the head of the 
most important Christian community of Lebanon, Sfeir had a matter-of-
fact, affectedly nai"ve styl e: he met everyone and told everyone what he 
exactly thought. In a country where double talk and self- inflicted taboos 
are the norm, this was a considerable feat, but he was simply brushed 
away by the Syrians as a harmless nuisance. Sfeir had stayed the course 
of decency throughout the war years first, when extremist Christian 
Maronites of different persuasions ended up killing each other, after heavy 
participation in blind violence against Muslims. And he carried through 
the years of Syrian domination with the same equanimity. The credit 
accumulated during these years meant that he emerged as the wise man 
for Christians, and the marja ', the society's ' reference', a staple of Middle 
Eastern politics in search of a beacon ofwisdom. ' Reference' was found in 
Sfeir in Lebanon, as it was in Ayatollah Sistani, the mar) a' of Iraq. 
What the prominence of religious leaders also meant was the collapse of 
leadership amongst non-religious politicians, and a continuous deadlock: 
because one had no Sfeir or Sistani to turn to amongst Lebanese and Iraqi 
politicians, one needed to turn to Sfeir and Sistani, a turn which oiled the vicious 
circle of sectarianism. After all, these are heads of religious communities, 
not political leaders. The moment they become the reference for political 
leadership, they do not stop being the religious heads of their community. 
In Lebanon, Sfeir offered the best possibilities available, and stayed 
a course which sounded du ll : no violence, no extremism, dialogue, no 
subjection to the Syrians.41 But the course struck root, and offered limited 
but effective intellectual and political leadership by way of a political group 
called Qomet Chabwan, and more solidly by way of regular statements 
issued by the Council of Maronite Bishops who met under the aegis of 
the Patriarchate, and expressed the pondered line of resistance that was 
its hallmark. While nearest to it for the Cedar Revolution, theirs was not 
however a philosopher's language of liberation. 
41 Good biography of the Patriarch by Antoine Sa'd (Saad), Al-sabe' wal-sab 'un. Mar 
Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, 2 vols., Beirut 2004-5, English translation of the first volume as 
The Seventy Sixth. Mar Nasrallah Boutros Cardinal Sfeir, Beirut 2005. 
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A more articulate philosophy of liberation came in the annual lectures 67 
of Selim Abou, which he gave starting March 1996 as he took the helm 
of Saint Joseph's University, the century-old educational institution which 
the French Jesuits founded and developed to educate most of the political 
leaders of independent Lebanon. Abou 's lectures offer the ideological 
pillars of the Cedar Revolution much in the way the writings ofthe French 
philosophers in the second half of the 18th century offered the ideological 
pillars for the 1789 Revolution. 
There were three moments l personally relate to in Abou 's lectures. The 
first was early on, I had been just a year back in Lebanon, and shared the 
country's enthusiasm for the courage of the man, and for the quality of his 
language. The second was in March-April 2005 , as the revolution was on 
the march, with a promise that was larger than Lebanon. The third is now. 
Through these three moments spanning a decade, it is worth reflecting 
on why those lectures remain the staple of Lebanon's philosophy of 
liberation associating w ith its Revolution. 
Moment 1 was an occasion for the translation of his speech of 1997 in 
English, and its publication with an introduction by Gareth Smyth, then 
opinion ed itor of the Beirut Daily Star, which Jamil Mruwwe, a man of 
subtlety and vision, had revived in Beirut as the leading English regional 
newspaper a year earlier: ' On March 19, [ 1997] SelimAbou, the rector ofSt 
Joseph 's, Beirut, gave a speech to the university 's annual meeting. Rarely 
in modem Lebanon has an "academic" talk provoked such controversy 
-in the press, in politics, and in education circles. '42 The tone was exactly 
right. Here is my own introduction to that translation, published a few days 
after the speech in homage to the man 's courage. To appreciate the context 
better, one should know that any criticism, veiled or open, of the Syrian 
order in Lebanon at the time stood way beyond the security services' 
tolerance. Abou was paid a threatening visit by men sent by then Anny 
42 Gareth Smyth, introduction to the English translation of Abou's speech, ' The challenges 
of the university' , The Daily Star, 15 April 1997. The speech, which was read on 19 
March 1997, appears as chapter 2 in Selim Abou, Freedoms: Cultural roots of the Cedar 
Revolution, Beirut 2005, 45-64. 
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68 commander Emile Lahoud a few days later, and he refused to see them. 
Also at the time, a huge storm followed the talk because of accusations 
leveled at Abou as 'Christian extremist' by then minister Walid Jumblat. 
Here are my impressions as I wrote them down then: 
Le Silence de Ia Mer ('the silence of the sea'), 1942: the book 
was the most powerful cultural and literary expression of French 
opposition to occupation during the Second World War. Written 
by Vercors, the pseudonym of Jean Bruner, one-time communist 
party activist, it remains a signal literary memory of the years of 
occupation. 
Vercors, a towering literary figure since that short novel, went on 
to establish one of the most creative publishing houses in twentieth 
century France, les Editions de Minuit, before his death in 1991. 
S ince Selim Abou, the rector of the Universite Saint Joseph, 
pronounced his speech on the annual occasion of the faculty meeting 
three weeks go, I have been haunted by the imagery ofVercors' short 
novel, which I read years ago. In Le Silence de Ia Mer, the author-
narrator depicts the mute dialogue taking place between an educated 
Nazi officer and his s ilent host on whom he foists his presence during 
Germany's occupation of France. 
My memory of the novel is understandably faint, but its lingering 
power has remained. I am not certain why, but the reflections of 
Professor Abou have reawakened this reminiscence in a quasi-
obsessive manner. 
For nothing happens in Le Silence de Ia Mer. Page after page, 
the reader feels a heavy and muted presence in the Frenchman's 
house, while the German officer, graced with an immersion in 
Goethe's literature, and in Beethoven's music, is unable to achieve a 
rapprochement with his unwilling host despite his rarefied aesthetics. 
They share a refined European culture, but opposite the Gennan is 
silence. The barrier cannot be broken. Although the occupation is not 
mentioned once, it is there, ever-pervasive, in the most oppressive 
form. 
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But I must try to make sense of my subconscious, and to offer 69 
elements of response to that obsession, which, considering the ripples 
created by Abou in Lebanese circles, is the sign of a wider feel of unease 
towards, or identification with, that speech. Selim Abou's reflections 
may be offering the outlines of a watershed in Lebanon's intellectual 
history. 
And yet, there is little in the speech's learned construction which 
should have triggered the recollection of Le Silence de Ia Mer. The 
reader will find a patiently built, three-fold argument, developing 
around history, sociology and politics. In it is little silence. 
In history, Abou 's message is a call for addressing Lebanon's 
past in its Mille Plateaux, to borrow the title given by the French 
thinkers Gi lles Deleuze (d. 1995) and Felix Guattari (d. 1992) to 
their groundbreaking philosophical tractatus, published in 1980, 
perhaps not coincidentally, at the Editions de Minuit. 
'A thousand levels': this is the rich reality of Lebanon 's history, 
and Abou argues for the need to reclaim, from within Lebanon, those 
vast tracts of history which have been left to the research of foreign 
scholars. 
I have experienced this void, as Abou aptly remarks, in more than 
just the Lebanese context. In many years at the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, one realizes the richness of the whole field of 
Mesopotamian studies in Britain, France and the US. I have not 
stumbled, despite my better efforts, on anything near the amount of 
depth or width conducted in Arabic, in Iraq or elsewhere. 
In sociology, the call is for a defense of pluralism, which is an 
integral part of Lebanese identity. In some of the criticism leveled 
against it, the accusation has been directed, particularly by minister 
Jumblat, at this part of Abou's speech. 
Walid Jumblat's contention is that Selim Abou conjures up 
some of the extremist Christian leaders' veiled call, during the civil 
war, for secessionism in the name of Lebanese Christendom. I beg 
to differ with this reading, even though my legal apprenticeship 
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70 suggests much more care before trying to force on Middle Eastern 
societies a common personal status code in the name of nationalism 
or secularism. 
1 am not as supportive as Professor Abou of Tunisia's proto-
secular code, and noted once how the Iraqi personal status code of 
1959 was the first mark of the downside slope, in Iraq, towards the 
fa lse unity we now have in that wretched country. 
1 have great attachment to a four-generation friends hip between 
my fam ily and the Jumblats, but I would argue that Walid bey and 
Selim Abou are much closer to each another in their appreciation of 
the interface between the Lebanese mosaic of communities and their 
advocacy of secularism, than 1 am to either of their views. 
And then there is the third, most troubling part of the rector's 
speech, where the paltry, poor, and empty political discourse which 
surrounds us in this at country is confronted with the exigency of 
truth, which Abou vests in the university. 
1 must confess that! cannot stand five minutes of news on Lebanese 
television, let alone of those endless interviews of local politicians. 
The reason is exactly what Selim Abou courageously spoke about: the 
emptying of fundamental words, like ' independence', 'sovereignty' 
and ' democracy' from their basic meaning. 
A few years hence, hopefully when the situation in Lebanon will 
have stabi lised as it should for a normal nation-state, 1 have no doubt 
that the rhetorical cacophony we have heard since 1990 will not be 
different from that of France between 1940 and 1944. 
From all the speeches will remain nothing, but the sounds of 
embarrassed silence. Then, people wi ll read Abou 's speech as the 
articulate version of Yercors ' Le silence de Ia Mer. For my part, 
perhaps lacking courage or literary ability, I might stick to silence.43 
Moment 2 was the publication of the book, in English, soon after the 
43 Mallat. ' Ideology and Arabism: the challenges of the university', The Daily Star, 15 
April 1997. 
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Cedar Revolution was under way. The quality of Abou 's eight annual 7 1 
speeches, and the courage displayed at a time of great fear in the country 
to express any dissent from the received mantra, had originally led me to 
translate all the speeches in English so that a sophisticated testimony of 
courage from within reaches a larger audience in Lebanon and abroad. A 
decade later, Abou asked me to write the preface to the English version of 
the book. This offered the occasion, in the midst of the Lebanese upheaval, 
to underline the power of Abou 's words as the ideological pillars of the 
Cedar Revolution: 
This ambitious depiction is made as the Lebanese, and the larger 
Middle Eastern, Revolution starts yielding results . Weeks only after 
the mass protests took to the street following Hariri 's murder, the 
process stands very much at its beginnings, but it has fu lfilled a 
central demand that the reader will fi nd expressed early on in this 
book: the fulfillment of sovereignty with the departure of Syrian 
troops and security agents from Lebanese territory. 
In a larger historical context, the mention of Syrian security agents 
appears bizarre. This oddity finds its explanation in the immense 
impact of Abou's lectures, as he underlined time and again over the 
years that the full apparatus of Syrian control remove its grips from 
the country. Here is one sample, in his lecture of 19 March 2001: 'But 
it is not so much the physical presence of this army which wounds 
the dignity of the Lebanese, as the symbol of domination which 
it represents, and the effective domination which its intelligence 
apparatus exercises over all sectors of public life. This Syrian control 
is not about to be relaxed, and there will be no dearth of Lebanese 
sycophants to laud its alleged benefits in a discourse which reflects a 
true culture of servility and which, therefore, belongs to the category 
of disrespectable speech. '44 
While the Lebanese people, free from apparent Syrian domination, 
will need to continue asking themselves for a long time how to put 
an end to disrespectable speech, the reference to the fu ll apparatus 
44 'The University on watch', 19 March 200 I, chapter 6 in Abou, Freedoms, 139-167. 
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72 of repression is present throughout these lectures, - rather than 
intell igence gathering by people who operated in the dark, but whose 
names were known to all as the decision-makers at the highest level 
in the Lebanese Republic, including on commercial and financial 
deals. Here rests one incontrovertible evidence of a direct causal link: 
in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (2 September 
2004) requesting the departure of foreign troops from the country, 
one will not find mention of security services. The omission was 
soon rectified, and the mention appears emphatically in the Report 
of the UN Secretary General, written by the Swedish diplomat Terje 
Roed-Larsen: ' In addition to the uniformed armed forces Syria has 
deployed in Lebanon, the Syrian government has infonned the United 
Nations that there is also a substantial presence of non-uniformed 
military inte ll igence officials which, it says, are usual components 
of military units. These officials, together with the uniformed forces, 
constirute the full Syrian troop strength. '45 
Since then, the emphasis on Syrian intelligence has been taken 
up both domestically and internationally by the leadership of the 
opposition in Lebanon, as well as by the American and French 
presidents. This precision is owed in the first place to the foresight 
of Selim Abott. It is rare for such a specific mention to find its 
way to becoming a universal demand. While a detai l in the larger 
scheme of things, that evidence is telling on the effectiveness and 
comprehensiveness of these lectures' impact. 
Even more striking is the courage displayed in the rector 's annual 
speeches from 1996 to 2003. Now that most political taboos have 
been broken, after half of the Lebanese population found itself on the 
streets on 14 March 2005 putting into effect the leitmotivs underlined 
over eight years by the USJ rector, courage may be less apparent. But 
the first public figure in Lebanon to speak up was Selim Abou, and he 
45 Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to Security Council resolution 1559 
(2004), New York, 30 September 2004, para. 14. 
46 Abou, Freedoms, chapter 2, 45-64. 
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did it with the authority of a scientist. When he embarked on his first 73 
lecture, on March 19, 1996, it was received as a bolt of lightning in a 
charged sky. The following year, his lecture on 'the Challenges of the 
university'46 led to a torrent of abuses from various quarters, who saw 
correctly how these lectures undem1ined the Syrian-established order. 
In the weeks following the lecture, literally dozens of comments for 
and against the speech appeared in the media. 
It was clear that this was the language the country needed, 
because it was the language of truth. Truth is the one central slogan 
of the Lebanese Cedar Revolution. In his report on the assassination 
of Hariri, the police officer in charge of the enquiry noted that the 
large demonstrations ofBeimtcarried one dominant motto, the truth: 
'During our stay in Lebanon, ordinary people stopped us in the streets 
of Beirut and thanked us for our efforts to find "the truth", urged us 
not to leave this matter unresolved, and reminded us of the importance 
of bringing the culprits to justice "for the sake of Lebanon". Posters 
in the streets of Beirut carry one word, in two languages: the truth, 
al-haqiqa. Politicians, officials in the government at all levels, and 
_even some security officials, told us that finding the truth "this time" 
is cmcial for restoring civil peace in the country, reducing the tension 
and allowing Lebanon to move toward norrnality.'47 
, What [Freedoms] had been building, year after year, was a call to 
restore through the University the spirit of truth which was wanting 
in the country. ln Abou's words, 'ten years were necessary before 
the tongues unwound and freed themselves from coded language, 
that is from periphrases, metaphors, metonymies and other figures of 
speech under which was expressed the increasing unease caused by 
the presence of the Syrian anny on the whole of Lebanese territory 
and the intervention of its intelligence apparatus in all the fields of 
47 Report ofthe Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes, circumstances 
and consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, 25 February 
- 24 March 2005 (Fitzgerald Report), para. 53. See infra section xii. 
48 Abou, Freedoms, chapter 6, 'The University on watch', section on 'Liberation of 
political language'. 
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74 social, political and economic life. '48 
In February 2005, the dyke finally broke. Tragically, it needed 
the shock occasioned by the attempted assassination of Marwan 
Hamadeh three months earlier, and the assassination ofRafiq Hariri , 
two close friends of Selim Abou, whom the reader will see referred 
to often in Abou 's lectures. That closeness was no coincidence. 
Beyond the sacrifices offered by Hamadeh, Hariri and their aides 
who perished in the crime, words bad been the central actors of 
the fight for freedom. 'Never underestimate the power of words in 
history', the great French hjstorian, Lucien Febvre, reminded his 
small academic audience at the College de France in the midst of the 
darkness ofNazi occupation.49 
The reader will fmd in Freedoms a rare instance of words 
buttressed with science finding their way to the street, which carried 
their promise of change in non-violence through the hearts of the 
demonstrators across the country. Michel Barnier, the French Foreign 
Minister whom Selim Abou had presciently brought on board the 
Strategic Council of the university when he first established it in 
L 998, expressed the clear causality chain upon his hosting the Council 
in the Quai d'Orsay on 10 December 2004, two months before the 
Cedar Revolution broke out: 'Saint Joseph is the incarnation m 
Lebanon of the defense of freedoms and democratic values. ' 50 
In Freedoms, the reader finds a reflection on how to move 
the country forward beyond ' crashing the infamous ', as Voltaire 
called gruesome dictatorship, as welJ as a political program yet to 
be fulfilled: ' It is not enough to request the phased withdrawal of 
Syrian troops and their intelligence services. The opposition, which 
I willfully call Resistance, has the right to request the departure of 
the Syrian "High Commissioner" and his followers, as well as an 
49 Lucien Febvre, Michelet et Ia Renaissance, Paris 2002, original 1942-43,2 1: ' Precisely 
what this course would like to be is, in ultimate analysis, an essay on the power of words 
in history.' 
50 Speech of Michel Bamier at the meeting of Saint Joseph's University's Conseil 
Strategique in Paris, USJinfo, January 2005, 32. 
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exchange of ambassadors between the two countries.' 51 75 
There is more. Like the philosophers of the Enlightenment, whom 
one wi ll find often quoted in these lectures, this book is destined 
to start a debate in Lebanese, Arab, and Mideastern societies, and 
beyond in their natural European partners, which will be with us for 
the better part of the 21st century. 
This is yet another dimension of the book, which elevated public 
speech to a plane which is unusual on the Lebanese political scene: 
suddenly. Montesquieu, Kant and Habennas appeared relevant. 
Suddenly, the mantra of' Arab' and 'Lebanese' identity, sacred cows 
of empty words, started yielding unsuspected riches. As the country 
recovers its sovereignty, as truth slowly finds its way through the 
international commissions set up to stop impunity, new horizons for 
Lebanese, Arab, Middle Eastern and European democracy wi ll face 
difficulties and choices that this book informs in ways unprecedented 
in the literature.52 
This comment was written at the height of action, in February-March 
2005. Now, in the fa ll of 2006, is Moment 3. A year after the Cedar 
Revolution's series of setbacks, the many questions raised in Freedoms 
remain as much in need of answers as they were when first raised. Reform 
of society, of laws, institutions, and education is more needed than ever, but 
the ways of reform are also fuzzier than ever. Abou primarily cared to keep 
his world, the world of the university, protected from the corruption and 
mediocrity that the ambient dictatorship was forcing on higher education in 
the coontry. One such form of corruption came from a proliferation of newly 
baptized universities which operated first and foremost on a profit-malcing 
base. Between 1990 and 2005, Lebanon witnessed the corrupt licensing of 
dozens such establishments, including one consisting of a building, maybe 
only a few flats in a building - as 1 never saw it - called Hawaii University. 
With my sense of libertarian laissez-faire, I never cared much for these 
51 'The Wrath of the university', chapter 7 in Abou, Freedoms, 168-90, section on ' the 
alienated state'. 
52 Mallat, 'SelimAbou's power of words' , Preface to Abou, Freedoms, 11 -20. 
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76 institutions, and believe that time and the market will deal with them 
eventually, but the annoying effect they have on respected and hard-working 
institutions that see many students lured away from their walls is palpable, 
including the conferring of degrees to non-meriting graduates artificially 
made at par with students who went through hard college studies. 
This dimension of Abou 's struggle to preserve university quality may 
not count much in history, although one can see in Egypt and Iraq how 
once decent educational institutions become derelict when the state turns 
into a dictatorship. More important a legacy was Abou's close rendering of 
the dominant mood amongst the honest people of Lebanon: one of constant 
shock and humiliation at the base perfom1ance of politicians seeking their 
cue from Damascus, either directly - but these are easy to take one's 
distance from - , or in a subdued, more elusive way by many who were 
too coy to speak their mind: the mental break with the tatters' ugly habits 
is far more difficult. Abou spoke their minds for the people of the Cedar 
Revolution, and far better than they could ever have expressed it. 
The Abou annual demonstration, which brought together a university 
community of over a thousand people of faculty and staff on St Joseph's 
celebration in mid-March, became the expected rallying point for articulate 
dissent. ln this regular and cumulative manifestation the intellectual roots 
of the Cedar Revolution grew, and the buzz these lectw-es created was 
palpable in the country after 1997. When the people rose in March 2005, 
their mood looked very much in its first weeks as the vindication of Abou 's 
speech. The mass of assembled people in downtown Beirut was inchoate, 
naturally. It lacked the purposeful attention of a university community, 
but the Revolution also suffered from the Rector's narrow geographic 
horizons. Abou's criticism focused on Syria, because Syrian rule was the 
dominant problem in Lebanon. Abou occasionally gave examples of better 
Arab practices, for instance in reference to the equality between men and 
women in Tunisian family law, but his horizon was restricted to Lebanon 
by conscious choice. The horizon was mirrored in the Cedar Revolution's 
sway, which never went beyond Lebanon into the Middle East. This, 
despite an overwhelming regional overdetennination. 
T 
x. Regional overdetermination 
Demonstrations in Beirut were fo llowed by demonstrations in Damascus 
and Cairo. They were brutally suppressed in Damascus, where the 
technique, well honed in Tehran, was to send in counter-demonstrators 
organized by the government, who would beat up the smaller and far less 
structured dissident gatherings. ln Cairo, demonstrators were contained 
differently. The Kefaya ('enough' ) movement had been particularly active 
in 2004, focusing on a simple slogan against an Egyptian president who 
had succeeded to remain in power more than any other ruler of Egypt 
but two since the earliest Pharaohs: Ia tamdid Ia tawrith, no extension, 
no succession. A few months away from the fonnal end of his mandate 
under the Egyptian constitution in September 2005, an occasion which 
would have otherwise gone unnoticed as a simple repeat of the perennial 
solution for such constitutional dates in the Arab world, Kefaya suddenly 
turned into a serious challenge to the presidency on the back of the Beirut 
demonstrations. Husni Mubarak responded to the growing Egyptian 
version of the Cedar Revolution by a constitutional maneuver which he 
combined with a calculated endorsement ofthe Lebanese leadership of the 
Revolution. On February 26, Mubarak suddenly announced an amendment 
to the Egyptian constitution which allowed for a more open competition 
between contenders, but he ensured the dwarfing of any opponent by keeping 
the ballot under tight control with a string of complicated conditions. He 
further defused the Lebanese model by receiving Walid Jumblat on March 
2 1, 2005, a week after the largest democratic demonstration in recorded 
Middle Eastern history. Jumblat came out from the meeting with the 
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78 Egyptian dictator to declare that the removal of the Lebanese president 
was no longer an objective of the Cedar Revolution. This simple statement 
broke the joint democratic calling on the Egyptian and Lebanese streets, 
and abruptly severed Egyptian protests from a regional dynamism which 
was starting to look like the East European tide of 1989. In effect, Jumblat 
let down the Arab protesters. True, he needed Arab support against Syria, 
and his trip had taken him to R iyadh then Cairo, offering some balance 
to Syrian influence. But Saudi or Egyptian support came at a dear price, 
and when the chips went down, the two authoritarian Arab governments 
were, once again, on the side of the status quo. Three decades after they 
turned their back on Kamal Jumblat, who underlined their letdown in his 
posthumous civil war Memoirs. 53 Arab governments turned their back on 
Walid Jumblat. To criticism, Walid Jumblat's answer was that 'he was not 
responsible for the revolution in Egypt'. He meant that Egypt was far too 
big an issue for him, and that he had no pretense or ambition to reform 
the Egyptian system. The fact remains: he succeeded in undennining both 
revolutions in the same breath. While this did not totally come as a surprise, 
since Jumblat's unique acumen was often short of the statesman's vision 
needed both for Lebanon and the larger regional set-up, it was also a grave 
political mistake. Unwittingly, Jumblat stopped a peaceful revolution in 
Egypt dead in its tracks, and undern1ined the higher democratic ca lling of 
the Cedar Revolution for the M iddle East. 
Regional overdetennination is not new to Lebanon. Veteran Lebanese 
statesman and Naharpublisher Ghassan Tueni had entitled his most famous 
book 'a war for the others' ,54 and Lebanon remained for a long time the 
battleground for Middle Eastern despots. Sometimes it cost interlopers 
dearly, like the Israelis after Ariel Sharon 's brutal adventure in 1982. When 
53 'An honest and patriotic minister of the Gulf States once asked our socialist comrade, 
Abbas Khalaf, who was on a mission to the area, "What on earth are you after in Lebanon? 
You demanded democracy, but surely you must know that none of the Arab States want 
anything to do with it?' Kamal Jumblat, I speak for Lebanon, London 1982, 113, original 
French Pour le Liban, Paris I 978, 251-2. 
54 Ghassan Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres, Paris I 985; 1 have developed the concept 
of overdetennination, which is originally psychoanalytical, to characterize the dominance 
of regional and international factors over domestic factors in Lebanese history. 
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the Cedar Revolution peaked in 2005, it was the turn of the Syrians to be 79 
worried by the domestic backlash. Exceptionally, outside influence was 
positive, as when Ukraine underwent a massive popular revolt against 
authoritarianism exactly at the time ofHariri 's assassination. The Ukrainian 
revolt directly inspired the Lebanese as a model for effective mass protest. 
It was inconceivable outside the larger East European tide, which started 
in 1982. Regionally, the Cedar Revolution was inconceivable without the 
end of dictatorship in Iraq, however tragic the aftermath of that regional 
earthquake turned. 
Generally, overdetennination in the shape of outside patronage was 
disastrous, as it withdrew all internal checks and balances between 
Lebanese factions, which did not hesitate, when the wind was not blowing 
their way interna lly, to resort to foreign patrons. Nor is it easy to avoid the 
temptation to turn to outside support in civil wars: you always hate your 
immediate local enemy, when he's shedding your blood, more than the 
foreign power who offers his help, and you invariably end up taking up 
that help, if not soliciting it. At heavy cost. 
Overdetermination caught up with the country most spectacularly in 
the 2006 summer war, which Hizbullah initiated in order to deflect the 
domestic agenda, once again, from presidential change, by redirecting 
the country towards its own priority: the fight against Israel. The war 
between Israel and Hizbullah was also a war between Lebanon and Israel, 
a war between Iran and Israel, between Syria and Iran, arguably a proto-
war between Iran and the United States. The war brought back the worst 
possible nightmare to Lebanon as the playground, sometimes directly, 
more generally by proxies, of a regional and planetary fight. Mostly, it 
turned out to be a coup d'Etat engineered by a factional military group 
which decided, without consulting anyone, least the government of which 
it was part, to start and pursue a major mil itary adventure. It resulted in the 
renewed devastation of Lebanon because of the combination of Hizbullah 's 
bravado and a brutal overreach oflsrael, the latter coupled with ineffective 
diplomacy by a blind American supporter. Soon after the war, Hizbu llah 's 
coup turned inwards. 
A few days before the war started on July 12, I had an occasion to 
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country. While it was not possible to know that bloodletting would take the 
tragic form it did, imminent large-scale violence was evident. The analysis 
offered listed the many regional flashpoints which would inevitably have 
repercussions on the Lebanese scene. Gloomy though it was, the assessment 
made then does not require much after the war, as can be appreciated under 
the eight flashpoints identified in the original lecture: 
(i) In Iran, a radical populist leader was elected to the presidency in 
2005. The system is entrenching against a refonnist movement in 
disarray. Iranian reformists are overtaken by events, unable to regain 
the initiative, which is increasingly lost to the provinces. Instability 
inside Iran takes the form of guerilla movements mounting challenges 
of a mainly national nature. Arabs, Azeris and Kurds against Persians, 
who represent slightly over half the total Iranian population. Instability 
outside Iran takes the form of exacerbated language aga inst Israel 
and the US, and the pursuit of nuclear experimentation as a matter of 
national pride. 
(ii) In Iraq, it took five months after the January 2005 elections for the 
government to be formed, despite a severe security situation with 
insurgents on the offensive across the country, and increasingly 
succeeding in a strategy of civi l war between Shi'is and Sunnis. 
(iii) In Syria, the government tightened the screw on dissidents, while its 
rhetoric increased in a declared three-forked resistance to western 
policy in the region, in Palestine in open support to Islamic factions, 
in Iraq in continuous challenge to the presence of foreign am1ies, 
and in Lebanon with attempts to compensate the forced withdrawal 
of troops in April 2005 by intimidation and support to its Lebanese 
allies inside and outside power. 
(iv) In the West Bank and Gaza, elections led to the victory of the 
lslamists at the end of 2005, with a chill across the region resulting 
in radicalisation and the breaking of all contacts on both sides of the 
divide . The new Israeli government has adopted a systematic pol icy 
of assassination against leaders of the movement, whi 1st stonewalling 
as a matter of principle on any negotiation. 
x . Regional overdetermination -------. 
(v) In Israel, the government continued to remain oblivious to a large 81 
section of its population on account of it representing a Trojan force 
at worst, at best an oddity in a self-styled Jewish state. The Supreme 
Court supported an openly discriminatory law against Arab Israeli 
citizens, preventing them from uniting inside Israel with spouses 
from outside the 1967 Green Line. 
(vi) ln Egypt, a president in power for over a quarter of a century fights 
the slightest challenge to hi s rule, going as far as jailing a fonner 
rival to a pres idential contest he had himself called for, while taking 
on a rebellious judiciary in open resistance to executive abuse of 
power. Entrenchment is deepened by the dogged attempt of the 
ruling nuclear family to secure a dynastic takeover. 
(vi i) The Gulf States witnessed a combination of political retrenchment 
and petrodollars-bought consent, made easier by the rise of o il prices. 
In Saudi Arabia the ruling fami ly stonewalled on any political refonn 
by putting on the same level peaceful advocates ofliberalisation and 
violent Is lamic factions. Entrenchment of dynasties is the trend across 
the region. Even Kuwait, where a parliamentary tradition is over half 
a century strong, the ruling fami ly signaled its determination to put 
limi ts on parliamentary life, d ismissing Parliament after its scrutiny 
of the Council ofMinisters performance. 
(viii) In the West, despite a ll the talk about democracy, US and European 
signals were at best ambiguous. The Libyan dictator was brought 
back from a three-decade cold on the argument that he has foregone 
his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. Nom1alisation 
with Libya suggests to other similarly bent autocrats a model for 
survival: an open strategy of anning, or threatening to develop 
such arsenals, against international acceptance, in due course, of 
the domestic status quo. The regime then disarms or gives up its 
WMD, real or projected, on its own tenns. Such is also the logic 
of the Iran-US developing clash. Since Qaddafi 's Euro-American 
rehabilitation, the US administration has explained that Libya is a 
good example for Iran and others to follow. As a result of this logic, 
Iran needs to develop its WMD research as a bargaining chip for 
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82 nonnalization. Whether it wishes to restrict itself to civi lian nuclear 
power, as it claims, or whether the real objective is an atomic bomb, 
like Israel or neighbouring Pakistan, the Libyan logic now prevails, 
and the Iranian government calls the shots. That events can develop 
in unpredicted manners is immaterial to the strategy. 
How do all these flashpoints affect Lebanon? The country remains the 
sounding board of regional, and now characteristically international, 
conflicts. This is in part owed to its socio-historical setup, where 
communities mirror East-West contradictions in a unique way. 
Lebanon's diversity, which is its blessing, becomes its curse. The 
indicators in the region being so unanimously negative, there is little 
breathing space for the Lebanese for an unprecedented Revolution to 
yield decisive results. 
Iranian populist radicalism, Iraqi civil war, Syrian violentbtinksmanship, 
Palestinian extremism and factionalism, Israeli occupation and 
exclusionism, Egyptian dynastic dictatorship, Gulf countries' authoritarian 
entrenchment, Westem retreat from democratization policy: the effects 
of this array of negative regional and international overdetem1ination on 
Lebanon are plain. 
(i) In the case of Iran, the large Lebanese Shi'i constituency, which 
is driven by the dominant mi litary power of Hizbullah, has little 
leeway to chart an independent course. Not only is the religious 
structure of the leadership a striking example of how Hizbullah's 
politics is dominated by mullahs in the velayat-e faqih (rel igious 
rule) fashion; but the open embrace of its Iranian colleagues by the 
Lebanese leadership, and its acknowledged following of the Supreme 
Leader in Iran, is matched by a one-directional flow of material 
support. Depending on sources, this support takes the shape of 300 
to 500 mi llion USD a year. Figures are difficult to document with 
any precision. What is undisputed is an increase over the past two 
years, which was facilitated by the rise of oil prices, and the strident 
ideological bent: with an Iranian president who openly advocates the 
destruction of Israel, Hizbullah is the acknowledged forefront of the 
battle for civil ization as seen from Tehran. 
-x. Regional overdetermination - --------, 
(ii) The case of Iraq is more complex, but the announced visit of Iraqi ~D 
radical leader Muqtada al-Sadr to Beirut in Spring 2006, which was 
cancell ed at the last moment, captures some of the Iraqi projections 
onto Lebanon. Sadr hurriedly returned to Iraq upon the news of the 
sectarian mosque bombings that led to a state of civil war between 
Iraqi Sunnis and Shi'is. The interruption of the visit underscores a 
similar concern in Lebanon; there are other te lltale signs, such as a 
Sunni murder conspiracy, apparently the act of a small group, against 
the leader of Hizbullah two weeks later. With the exacerbation of 
the crisis in Iraq between the two large communities, and the lack 
of governmental cohesion in Lebanon because of the split between 
the President and the Prime Minister, the lack of trust between the 
dominant Muslim communities the world over carries grave threats 
for Lebanon. As in Iraq, such an open crisis would be unprecedented 
this century, where the strategy of civil war announced by the 
infamous 'Zarqawi letter' is now reaJ.55 The country is at risk from 
fringe groups which drive policies against the will of the majmity 
of citizens, and cany the violent order of the day with the help of 
a millennium-deep antagonism. To these dark forebodings adds the 
American and British dismal sinking in the I raqi shifting sands. 
(iii) There is little to be said about Syria in Lebanon that is not obvious. 
With increasing tension resulting from additional demands by the 
Security Council upon the Syrian government, Damascus sees a freed 
Lebanon (specifically if its press if free) as a c lear and present danger. 
Syrian leaders are convinced that conspiracies are being hatched in 
Beirut, Paris and Washington for their demise. It is hard to see how 
the downward spiral can be stopped, which the investigation into 
Hariri 's assassination may bring to a head. Iraqi, Palestinian, Iranian 
and Israel i fights on Lebanses soil operate in fateful triangles where 
Syria and Lebanon are the two other sides, w ith Lebanon always on 
55 The Zarqawi letter was intercepted by Kurdish police in Febmary 2004. It describes a 
chilling plan for Sunni-Shi'i civil war in Iraq as the way forward. English text on http:// 
www.stale.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm. Jordanian Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi was killed in Iraq 
on 7 June 2006. 
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84 the receiving end of immense violence. 
(iv) Palestine in Lebanon is a footnote to the Syrian triangle, as the 
recurrent Syrian-based Palestinian troubles show. One day, it's the 
Jibril faction, another the all but forgotten Fatah dissidcnts.56 More 
worrying is the dynamic emerging independently, which follows the 
fluid situation in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian camps 
in Lebanon have traditionally been sympathetic to Yaser Arafat's 
leadership. With the r ise of Hamas, an inevitable rivalry has been 
developing in the camps. Lebanon witnesses a race against the clock 
from the Fatah factions to consolidate their 'embassy' at a time when 
Hamas is in government. The slide into civil war witnessed in Gaza 
can hardly leave untouched fragile Palestinian camps, wh ich are 
awash with weapons and lawlessness. 
(v) It is received wisdom in the M iddle East that Israel calls the shots, 
and benefits from Arab internecine fighting. This no doubt is true, 
but as in the case of the Lebanese civi l wars, patterns of unrest in 
the immediate neighbourhood engulf the principal sooner or later. 
The Israeli government is aware of the slide into civi l war in the 
West Bank and Gaza, and has devised a policy of ' unilaterali sm ' 
to disengage with the view that such a confl ict will further weaken 
Palestinians. This may be true, but in a cheese-like teJTitory where 
desperate peoples are stranded and strangled, there will be no let up of 
violence against the principal. Whether it takes the fonn of nagging 
Katyushas across the barbed wires in Gaza, su icide bombs in Tel 
Aviv, or the more threatening weaponry ofHizbullah on the Northern 
front, unilateralism as remedy is wishfu l thinking. 'Unilateral 
disengagement' may buy some more assent in Washington to the 
56 Ahmad Jibril is the leader of an extremist faction of the Palestinian leftist movement 
called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-
GC), and is based in Damascus with outposts in Lebanon, especially in the region of 
Jiyye in South Lebanon. The Fatah dissidence was led by Abu Saleh and Abu Musa in 
the Lebanese Biqa' Valley in fall 1983. Jt disappeared from the news soon afien.vards, 
but reemerged in 2006 in connection with military activities in Lebanon and an Islamic 
ofTshoot, calJed Fath ai-Islam. 
--- - __________ _,_ 
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Israeli policy of assassinations, but it will not bring peace to Israelis. 85 
Lebanon in this context is another frontier of unrest so long as the 
outstanding issues are not negotiated by Israel with Palestinians as 
wi ll ing partners. Meanwhile, radicalism prevails on both sides and 
renders any negotiation impossible. To that negative picture is also 
added the Israel-Iran looming confrontation, over Hizbullah and/or 
the nuclear file. 
(vi) How are Egypt and its ruling despots- father and son - relevant? By 
the mere fact of its 70-million strong population, Egypt a lways affects 
the region , and Lebanon owes much of the 1982 Israeli invasion to 
Egypt's negative disappearance from the scene. A renewed Egyptian 
interest in Lebanon operates by ricochet. Like other Arab countries, 
the Egyptian ruler dislikes the Cedar Revolution profoundly, 
especially as it shows to his own dissenters a real possibility that 
the street could bring down the head of state. The constitutional 
amendment in Egypt was a direct reaction to the Lebanese street, but 
it was also clear that no change in the presidency would be tolerated. 
Egypt appears as the central weight in an Arab system of leaders-
for-life stand ing up against any precedent for peaceful change that 
fo llows the example of the Cedar Revolution. 
(vii) This is true mutatis mutandis for the Gulf and other monarchies, 
which unwillingly fan further items of frustration for export to 
Lebanon, via Syria, in the Qa'eda and Zru·qawi type of bombers. 
This at ground level. Brutal export happens also at the top. In an 
extraordinary display of chutzpah, the ruler of Sudan dispatched 
an envoy to mediate Lebanon 's crisis with Syria. Considering the 
several civil war fronts in Sudan, the absurdity is telling: the Omar 
Bashir envoy represents the worst form of Arab nationalism, hanging 
on by a combination of oil buyouts and sheer repression. ln the 
Lebanese context, such sinister brand of Arabism seeks to prevent 
any political solution that would vindicate the Cedar Revolution as 
a successful precedent against those who use strong-anned pol icy to 
simply remain in power. 
(viii) To add to the gloomy picture, it's hard to describe US administration 
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Lebanon into Realpolitik counterbalance, lacking in principles 
because of its blindness to the absence of democracy elsewhere, 
but dogged and eventually fierce, against Syria, Iran, Hizbul lah or 
Palestinian or Islamic factions. 
The ever deepening regional deadlock is a pressing challenge, and has 
no easy answers. Violence, if not war, is upon us. Shutting one 's eyes 
to the regional and international complications is not an option. 57 
Predictable as the looming violence illustrated in that text was, 
it exploded on July 12 in one of the worst possible shapes: an open 
confrontation between Hizbullah and Israel. With the war also predictably 
ending in stalemate, regional tensions translated into prodromes of civi l 
war inside Lebanon. One knows the country and the Middle East enough 
to expect that something had to let go, and that it would take again the 
usual shape of immense violence. Regional, and now straight international 
over-detennination, will continue and intensify in Lebanon as the new 
fracture point between East and West, Islam and Christianity, Arabs and 
Jews, Shi ' is and Sunnis. As a privileged locus of a strange but real third 
World War, a war officially described in Washington as 'global war against 
terrorism', GWAT, Lebanon wi ll compete with other such Middle Eastern 
places where the fracture is gravest: Iraq, the Sudan, Palestine, Somalia. 
Nor are other countries immune, including Western countries which are 
the inevitable place of regular outbursts of violence. New York, Madrid 
and London have experienced dire foretastes of such predictable and hard 
to prevent outbursts. 
Against this persistent over-detennination, what does the French 
Revolution tell us? 
This is the one area where the historian of the Cedar Revolution is hard 
put to offer answers drawn from French revolutionary historiography. 
Still, revolutionary France offers, in sheer numbers, a useful contrast. 
In 1789, France was the largest and most populated country in Europe 
57 ' Lebanon and Middle East flashpoints: An analytical list'. Lecture read at Saint 
Joseph's University, 31 May 2006. Text also in Mallat, Presidential talk, Beirut 2007. 
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with 23 million inhabitants, far ahead of England, which had about 9 87 
million inhabitants. In the Middle East, Lebanon is a small country, with 
some 4 mi llion people, at a time Israel counts 7 million people without 
the Occupied Territories, and Syria more than 15 million. Both are 
small compared to the larger, massive neighbours: Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, 
Iran. Like the countries' economies, scale demography is important, and 
Lebanon's small size commands also its reduced importance. In size and 
population relative to its neighbours, revolutionary France could never 
be over-determined regionally in the same way, although the conspiracies 
fomented by an unhappy monarchical Europe were feared, and real, and 
regional war was very much part of the French Revolution from 1791 on. 
At this level, comparison is too skewed to be meaningful, but the spirit of 
the interlocking problems, including the regional or foreign dimension, 
was well captured by Victor Hugo in his novel 93. 
ln a formidable scene, the perils threatening the Revolution bring together 
Danton, Marat and Robespierre into a fictive discussion that provides 
the master grid of ever present questions. For Danton, the enemy of the 
Republic is abroad, fomented in England and Prussia. For Robespierre, 
it is the insurrection inside, in Vendee. For Marat, the enemy is within, 
amongst conspiratorial factions inside the Revolution.511 
58 The text deserves to be quoted extensively : ' Danton venait de se lever ; it avait 
vivement recule sa chaise. 
- Ecoutez, cria-t-il. ll n'y a qu'une urgence, Ia Republique en danger. Je ne connais qu'uoe 
chose, delivrer Ia France de l'ennemi. Pour cela tousles moyens sont bons. Tous ! tous ! 
tous ! Quand j 'ai affaire a tousles perils, j 'ai recours a toutes les ressources, et quand je 
crains tout, je brave tout. Ma pensee est une lionne. Pas de demi-mesures. Pas de pruderie 
en revolution. Nemesis n'esl pas une begueule. Soyons epouvantables et utiles. Est-ce 
que I' elephant regarde ou il met sa patte? Ecrasons l'ennemi. 
Robespierre repondit avec douceur : 
- Je veux bien. Et il ajouta : 
- La question est de savoir ouest l'ennemi. 
- II est dehors, etje l'ai chasse, dit Danton. 
- II est dedans, et je le surveille, dit Robespierre. 
- Et je le chasserai encore, reprit Danton. 
- On ne chasse pas l' ennemi du dedans. 
- Qu' est-ce done qu' on fait ? 
- On l'extcrmine. 
- J 'y consens, dit a son tour Danton. Et il repri t: = 
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Israel. Enemies inside: Syria's allies, Hizbullah and its weapons. Enemies 
within: sectarian leaders pursuing the narrow scope of their community, 
Maronite contenders to the presidency pursuing their petty personal interests 
without heed to the larger pressing issue of removing the 'coercive ly 
extended president', as Lahoud's description will remain in history. Minus 
the formidable rhetoric of Victor Hugo, the variations sound close, and 
similarly cacophonic. But the reality of regional overdetem1ination, at 
various moments, is invatiably overwhelming. 
=- Je vous dis qu'il est dehors, Robespierre. 
- Danton,je vous dis qu'il est dedans. 
- Robespierre, il est a Ia frontiere. 
- Danton, il est en Vendee. 
- Calmez-vous, dit une troisieme voix, il est partout ; et vous etes perdus. C'etait Marat 
qui parlait. .. 
[Marat] Vous avez chacun votre dada ; vous, Danton, Ia Prusse ; vous, Robespierre, Ia 
Vendee. Jc vais preciser. moi aussi. Vous ne voyez pas le vrai peril ; le voici : les cafes et 
les tripots. Le cafe de Choiseul est jacobin, le cafe Pat in est royaliste, le cafe du Rendez-
Vous attaque Ia garde nationale, le cafe de Ia Porte-Saint-Martin Ia defend, Je cafe de Ia 
Regence est contre Brissol, le cafe Corazza est pour, le cafe Procope jure par Diderot, 
le cafe du Theatrc-Fran~ais jure par Voltaire ; a Ia Rotonde on dechire les assignats, les 
cafes Saint-Marceau sont en fureur, lc cafe Manouri agile la question des farines, au cafe 
de Foy tapages et gourmandes, au Perron bourdonnement des frelons de finance. Voila ce 
qui est sericux ... 
(Marat] Ah ~a ! citoyen Danton, pourquoi m 'avez-vous faiL venir a votrc conciliabule, si 
ce n'est pour avoir mon avis? Est-ce que je vous demandais d'en etre? loin de Ia. Je n'ai 
aucun gout pour les tete-a-tete avec des contre-revolutionnaires tels que Robespierre et 
vous. Du reste, je dcvais m'y attendre, vous ne m'avez pas compris ; pas plus vous que 
Robespierre, pas plus Robespierre que vous. 11 n'y a done pas d'homme d'Etat ici ? 11 
faut done vous mettre les points sur les i. Ce que je vous ai dil voulait dire ceci : vous 
vous trompcz tous lcs deux. Le danger n'est ni a Londres, comme le croit Robespierre, ni 
a Berlin, comme le croit Danton; il est a Paris. Il est dans !'absence d'unite, dans le droit 
qu'a chacun de tirer de son cote, a commencer par vous deux, dans Ia mise en poussiere 
des esprits, dans l'anarchie des volontes ... 
Ainsi parlaient ces trois hommes formidables. Querelle de tonnerres. · (V1ctor Hugo, 
Quatre-vingt-treize, 1874, chapter 2, 'Magna Testanture Voce per Umbras') 
--- -------------------------------------------rlk~, 
xi. Counter-revolution and war 
On December l , 2006, when Hizbullah 's campers settled in the same place 
in downtown Beirut which the Revolution had occupied in February 2005, 
it was clear that the Counter-revolution was on the march, with one declared 
detennination: to physically besiege the government and intimidate it into 
resignation. 
That was the latest phase of a steady counter-revolution. The earlier 
phase had taken place in the large demonstration on March 8, 2005, as 
Syrian withdrawal was becoming a pressing demand. March 8 was 
defensive and backward looking. In the summer of 2006, Hizbullah went 
on the offensive. The devastation lasted thirty four days and shook the 
region; so the Hizbullah-lsrael war needs a reading. 
Narratives over wars are fluid, either in their causes or their outcomes. 
Few doubt that the First World War dominated the 20th century, in the 
Middle East and elsewhere, but causes and consequences long remained 
a fascination for the generations that suffered from the war, not to 
mention the special concern of historians. Two polarized readings of 
World War I emerged early on: the Leninist ' imperialist' description, and 
a less convincing Britain-France victors' reading of an expansionist and 
militaristic Germany that ' democracies' were there to check. One common 
narrative eventually jelled: WW1's unique absurdity, best illustrated in 
Thomas Mann's Zauberberg. While this is true of all wars, WWI is the 
paragon of unwarranted wanton deaths. Another jelled narrative of WWI, 
this time specific to the Middle East, is that the war was followed by a 
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While apposite and opposite positions are inevitable, a consensual 
opinion does also jell. Opposed readings, and a consensual core, offer a 
parameter of sorts for all wars, large and small. 
There are two additional important factors that bear on the legacy of war 
and its representation: time, and consequences. Time tends to underline all 
wars' vacuity, but shifts in time constantly occur, giving renewed or altered 
meanings to the core perception of what a war coheres into. lmQlediately 
after hostilities cease, some sense of victory may emerge, for instance that 
of France and Britain against Germany in 1918, or as a long-lasting feature, 
say US world preeminence after World War II, or Muslim victory against 
Christendom as the Crusades unfolded, or the 1967 expansion of Israel. As 
time passes, however, shifts occur, and the core meaning,- sometimes, not 
always -, does change. The Franco-British victory in WWI increasingly 
became meaningless, operating as a shadow game for Hitler, and causing 
WW2, indeed giving way to the characteristic vacuity and wantonness of 
four years of senseless human slaughter. This became the lasting, dominant 
perception of WWI. 
Consequences are different from time shifts. They tend to operate 
on a separate register, and do not causally flow from the war military 
outcome. The emergence of Bolshevism in the shape of the October 
Revolution, or the Palestinian problem in the wake of WWI's Balfour 
commitment, are two such illustrations for WWI. Consequences are 
particularly difficult to perceive during the hostilities. They also tend to 
overwhelm the original event, and outweigh and outlast the protagonists ' 
foreseeable consequences, indeed their lifetimes. A similar exercise 
is possible for the French revolutionary wars, including Napoleon's. 
Lucien Febvre's conclusions on the death of Europe consequent to the 
French revolution60 show the most unexpected consequences of violence 
run amok. 
59 Classic account by David Fromkin, A Peace to end all peace: the fall of the 01/oman 
empire and the creation of the modern Middle East 1914-1922, New York 1989. 
60 Developed in section iii. 
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The summer war between Hizbullah and Israel had nothing of the 91 
magnitude of great wars, but the parameters just identified apply: 
Contrastive narratives, common core, shift over time, breach in causality 
with regard to major consequences. 
Here is how the above four-pronged grid applies on the 2006 war. 
Contrastive narratives. The war immediately created its own narrative, 
which was inevitably dual, and shifting. It shifted over the month-long 
conflict as an inevitable form of propaganda, de bonne guerre as it were 
in all wars. On the side of Hizbullah, the position changed considerably, 
from the initial ·world battle for Islam' argument on July 12, to a far 
more Lebanese agenda, with express support to the Lebanese Cabinet's 
ccasefire proposal on August 3, and even a curious apology in the regretful 
afterthought expressed by Hizbullah 's secretary-general just after the 
Ceasefire. On the fsraeli side, declared objectives to teach Hizbullah a 
lesson, overconfidence, and hesitation over the territorial objectives also 
expressed a moving narrative: so the inevitable contrasting parameters, 
with nuances under the general banner of a battle for civilization defined 
by each side on its own, absolutist, terms. 
Common core. One consensual line may have already jelled: Hizbullah 
was wrong to start the war, and Israel 's reaction was excessive. Considering 
the absence of judicial accountability over 'war crimes' committed on both 
sides/'1 this seems inconsequential, but it explains a moral and political 
deadlock: no hero is expected to emerge from the war, whatever claims 
to the contrary. As in WWI, that common core will play an important role 
over time, and the question is whether it will morph further into faulting 
Hizbullah for its reckless act on July 12, or, converse ly, condemning Israel's 
disproportionate reaction and unnecessary prolongation of the hostilities. 
Trme will polish the narratives and the common core. The battle over 
names is already on. ' July war ', says Hizbullah neutrally enough to take 
the sting out of its initiation of the conflict on July 12, or ' divine victory ', 
to hammer in its legitimacy. It could also be called Lebanon-Israel lil 
6 1 John Borneman, Jarae'am al-harb ba 'd harb isra 'il-hizbullah (war crimes after the 
lsrael-H izbullah war), Nahar, 14-15 January 2007. 
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92 or whatever number the war could carry, the sixth Arab-fsraeli war, and 
so forth. Six months after the Ceaseflre, the Israeli government was sti ll 
looking for an official appellation. I offered mine early on, by choosing 
to call it the Hizbullah-Israel war in the first week of the hostilities,62 as 
I did not think Lebanon as state, government, or society at large, could 
identify with the war as an active protagonist. It was not quite an Israel-
Lebanon war. Ninety per cent or more of the physical destruction was 
Hizbullah territory. Other names are possible, but it sounds politically 
incorrect to speak of the war as a Shi' i-Jewish war, which it also was. 
There is no doubt however that the war was also a Lebanon-Israe l war, 
an Arab-Israeli war, a continuation of the Palestine strife, indeed a mini-
world war of sorts between allies clearly identifiable on the large divide 
between Islam and the West, and between the Syria-Iran-Hizbullah v. 
Israel-US- 'moderate' Arab axes. Lots of controversies in perspective over 
the appellation. 
As consequences go, which are by nature difficult to anticipate, they 
often turn out, as in other large military conflicts, dwarfing the immediate 
hostilities. Michael Young was the first to underline the more significant 
consequences of the Hizbullah-Israel war: it was the beginning of a 'coup'. 
Having started its peri lous military adventure and prosecuted it doggedly 
and unilaterally, the Hizbullah coup was not so much against Israel, since 
the word makes no sense in that context, but against Lebanon. As events 
unfolded, especially since the physical siege of the Lebanese government 
by Hizbullah and its allies materialized in December 1 in the heart of 
Beirut, these consequences were becoming tangible. 
The whole three paragraphs of 'Hizbullah's Coup d 'Etat'63 deserve 
to be saluted as a unique intellectual compact, but the two opening lines 
62 Mallat, ' Who is really at war? The patterns so far', [New York} Times Select, 4 August 
2006. 
63 Michael Young, • Hezbollah's Coup d 'Etat' , [ Washington} Postglobal, August 7, 2006: 
' Beirut, Lebanon- There is real danger today that Hezbollah will inherit Lebanon after 
the war. If it does, an uncontainable civil war will probably ensue. 
Militarily, Israel has not scored a decisive victory that would compel the militia to disann. 
Hezbollah will use this "triumph" to defeat its adversaries inside Lebanon who want it to 
surrender its weapons. = 
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are particularly insightful: 'There is real danger today that Hizbollab will 93 
inherit Lebanon after the war. If it does, an uncontainable civi l war will 
probably ensue.' 
One has indeed witnessed Hizbullah turning its 'victory' and weapons 
to Beirut, pushing back the Cedar Revolution, and bringing the country, 
alternatively, to civil war. This is the war's most important consequence 
as it unfolds: the Hizbullah's coup. Even graver is the civil war which I 
mention as an 'alternative'. Here another dynamic is at play, and a deeper 
one, as it connects with the region, and the sectarian world war developing 
from within the Middle East. 
Lebanon remains in the midst of the evolving coup, which constitutes 
the most disturbing consequence of the war, a springboard for Ilizbullah 
to take over Lebanon, whi le the civil war is looming. How to deal with the 
coup will define the legacy of the Hizbullah-Israel war. So how does one 
prevent Hizbullah from taking over Lebanon? And how does one prevent 
the descent into civil war? 
The premise, naturally, is that civil war is a bad thing, and, slightly 
more controversially, that Hizbullah as it stands is a bad thing for Lebanon. 
Everyone wi ll agree on the former, excuses can be found to reject, or at 
= At the same time, the Israelis have devastated the Shiite community. They have broken 
down any Lebanese consensus around the party and have neutralized Hezbollah's 
military deterrence capability (there to serve Iran) since the party cannot possibly put its 
coreligionists through another catastrophe similar to the one faced today. These setbacks, 
in tum, will encourage the party to go on the offensive domestically to refocus the anger 
of its supporters away from its own responsibility for the d isaster and toward its domestic 
foes. 
What will this mean for the Middle East? It will be a severe setback for a rare liberal 
outpost in the region and may carry Lebanon into a new civil war since no one will long 
accept Hezbollah 's hegemony. It will heighten Sunni-Shiite tension in the country and the 
region. It will be another nail in the coffin of the Bush administration's ambition to create 
a democratic Arab world. It could transform Lebanon into a new version ofGaza, proving 
that Israel is remarkably adept at ensuring that its worst foes inherit power on its borders. 
And it will mean the death of a country that, for all its faults, nonetheless tried to recreate 
a formula for peaceful coexistence between its religious communities in 1990 when that 
Lebanese civil war ended.' [Update: In a conversation with Carlos Edde on II August 
2007, it was clear he was the Jirst to describe the war as a coup d'Etat by Hizbullah, in 
the early days of the conflict.) 
..----- --- March 2221. Lebanon's Cedar Revolution 
94 least temper the latter. I find it difficult to introduce nuances at this stage-
even if my audience is also naturally the people ofHizbullah. My position 
was and remains that this war was absurd, unnecessary and cruel, like all 
wars tend to be, and that it is therefore important to insist on Hizbullah 's 
responsibility in triggering it. That's for a start. It's true that Israel, and 
American diplomacy behind it, prosecuted the war in a bungled way, but 
considering that the Hizbullah has since been trying to take over Lebanon 
by force, the argument is irrelevant insofar as the outside 'coup' was 
actually redirected inwards: we, the rest of the Lebanese who did not 
support the war, were turned into enemies. It is no coincidence that we 
were also the supporters of the Cedar Revolution which Hizbullah fights. 
From there flows that surrendering to the thesis of Hizbullah's 'victory' 
constitutes the most dramatic mistake in the political conduct of the war. 
'Victory' may have come in part from tangible facts , such as the 
brave and sustained resistance of Hizbullah fighters in the South, 
making any Israeli advance extremely costly, and belying triumphalist 
expectations of the Israeli Prime Minister who did not understand 
that war against a seasoned gueri lla movement could not square with 
classical wars 1967-style. But this is immaterial to Hizbullah's coup 
against Lebanon. 
Hizbullah's self-congratulatory 'victory' is nonnal for its leadership, 
c 'est de bonne apres-guerre. One would not expect otherwise. Nor 
would one chiefly blame those within Lebanon who opposed the war, 
a position shared at the outset by the massive non-Hizbullah partisan 
section of the population, including its Lebanese allies at the time. 
One could not have expected more than unease from Hizbullah 's 
declared allies in Lebanon. The graver share of the mistake came from 
those who are the object of the unfolding coup, namely the Lebanese 
Prime Minister, as the man in charge, and Walid Jumblat, as the central 
leader of the Cedar Revolution. Fouad Siniora never openly denounced 
Hizbullah's coup, even if everybody knew of his frustration and anger at 
being sidestepped, and of his sincere tears of frustration at the Arab foreign 
affairs meeting in Beirut on August 7. Jumblat probably bears the heavier 
political responsibility. For he provided the springboard for the 'divine 
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victmy' when he repeatedly asked, a week into the war, 'to whom will 95 
Hizbullah offer its victory'?64 
Now what kind of victory was that for Lebanon, especially for over a 
thousand civilian casualties, and a million displaced Lebanese Shi'is, a 
number of whom should naturally ask, if the destruction of their homes 
gets described as victory, how defeat would look like? Since then, Jumblat 
has derided the 'divine' dimension of the victory, openly identified and 
resisted Hizbullah's coup, but there is much to blame in his initial position, 
and that of the Prime Minister, who allowed the HizbuUah leadership to 
tum a costly adventure into bombastic, indeed divinely ordained, victory. 
The upshot, then, was that Hizbullah's position jelled into a 'victory' 
which its own Lebanese rivals/foes, and now victims, were openly 
admitting, leading to I-Iizbullah's consequent bid for dominance in 
Lebanon. Hizbullah's call was loud and clear: since we were victorious, 
they said, and stood up for the country on our own, then we should indeed 
lead it. One can see how the political mistake in Jumblat describing the 
war as Hizbullah's victory provided that logic. A proper anticipation of 
that consequence was one which should have been fonnulated differently 
from the first day: considering the quasi-deafening silence resulting from 
a stunned country and a real fear of Hizbullah's vindictiveness, Hasan 
Nasrallah 's initial speech having expressed a clear warning of the type 
'those who are against us in Lebanon, beware ... ', the only way was to 
candidly ask how Hizbullah could take the rest of us to war, whatever its 
outcome, by openly breaching international and Lebanese law that would 
put the whole country injeopardy.65 
Israel's brutal behaviour and unnecessary prolongation of the hostilities 
did not help. A Security Council Resolution denouncing the kidnapping of 
the two Israeli soldiers, and potentially coercive mechanisms to get lasting 
results on the border, was offered on July 13. It didn't pass. A replay of 
the 1996 Israeli war crime at Qana on July 30 made things worse, further 
64 See e.g. statement reported in Washington Post, 29 July 2006. 
65 Argwnent developed in Mall at, 'Nasrallah has dismissed intemational law', Daily 
Star, 14 July 2006, and throughout the war. 
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96 cornering Siniora and Jumblat, while American diplomacy was busy 
stalling so that Israeli could teach Hizbullah 'a lesson' on the back of wide-
scale destruction and the physical elimination of the leadership. 
So how to prevent Hizbullah from taking over Lebanon? and how 
to prevent the civil war? I see no other tools but law, domestic and 
international, that is determining responsibility under a framework of law, 
and not of raw power. It may not be an adequate response, but it is the 
only response the Cedar Revolution should seek to formulate. For that, it 
has two incomplete tasks started in Year l which it has failed to address: 
legally, justice for the people who suffered and died for it; politically, the 
emergence of a leadersh ip that looks more like the Revolution, and that 
speaks the language of democracy. 
xii. Revolution restored: 
truth and justice 
Ilow as victim do you react to a policy of targeted assassinations against 
the political leadership of your country without launching a war, or without 
responding in kind by carrying out political counter-assassinations? 
This is where the Cedar Revolution has been most noble. The request 
for judicial accountability is the institutional response to regional 
overdetermination, which the Lebanese Revolution underlined with a 
message of unique civility. It is more, a civilised collective response to 
that age-old conundrum: how to respond to violence without violence? 
The idea of judicial accountabi lity emerged in the persistent efforts 
to set up an international court in response to the assassination of Rafiq 
Hariri , to be eventually called the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 
in UN documents. It is international because it was set up at the Security 
Counci l. although it is a mixed court that includes Lebanese and foreign 
judges and investigators. The ·Revolution fought hard for the STL, which 
stands a lso for the principle that government is a government of Jaws, not a 
government of men. There is no appropriate response to barbarity outside 
the framework oflaw, domestic and international. Law is the only response, 
and international law takes the form of retribution by an internationally 
sanctioned court to address efficiently such an over-determined regional 
and international context playing itself out in Lebanon. 
This is new. Calls for justice always surface in revolutionary times, 
but the common characteristic is the failure of carrying it out, and its 
replacement by violence. The French Revolution has its own history of 
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98 legal fai lure in the shape of Terror, which is the worst possible distortion 
of justice. In France, the revolutionary government's response to the 
challenges it perceived on the domestic and international fronts in the 
shape of various real or imagined plots was to remove basic procedural 
rights. This was couched in an infamous set of laws and practice, from the 
Law of Suspects in September 1793 to the Grande Terreur, introduced by 
the Loi du 22 Prairial An II ( l 0 June 1794 ). Simply put, the law said that 
mere suspicion suffices for the guillotine. The absence of any due process 
led some 2500 'suspects' to the scaffold in Paris alone.66 
With the rejection of violence, the attachment to international justice is 
one of the Cedar Revolution's unique characteristics, a novelty indeed on 
the international scene if this faith in justice is eventually vindicated by 
tangible results and the punishment of the culprits. 
Now international criminal justice was not an absolute novelty, in 
the Middle East or elsewhere, when Rafiq Hariri was ki lied. 1n 1996 
leading Iraqi, British and American activists founded in London the Indict 
movement to bring Saddam Hussein and his aides to trial. In June 2001, 
twenty eight families who lost a close relative in the Sabra and Shatila 
massacres brought a case againstAriel Sharon and other Israeli and Lebanese 
commanders responsible for the killings and disappearances which had 
taken place twenty years earlier in the Palestinian camps of Beirut. They 
won the case, and the judicial victory achieved in the Supreme Court of 
Belgium on 12 February 2003 offered an important contribution to the 
reality of international justice despite its political reversal by unprecedented 
retroactive legislation which stopped the proceedings in September of 
that year. In the summer of 2004, the Lebanese chief prosecutor indicted 
Mu'arnmar Qaddafi and seventeen other conspirators and fa lse witnesses 
for the disappearance of Shi'i Imam Musa Sadr and his two companions 
on an official visit to Libya in 1978. 
This web of cases, to which must be added the advances and retreats of 
66 Georges Lefebvre, 'Sur Ia loi du 22 Prairial', in Etudes sur Ia Revolution Fram;aise, 
Paris 1954, 67-89. Original in Annates Historiques de Ia Revolution Franfaise, 1951 , 
227-256. 
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international criminal law with the cases of Chile's Pinochet, Yugoslavia's 99 
Milosevic, Chad's Habre, Sudan's Haroun and eventual Bashir, through 
the International Criminal Court and other j udicial outlets, created a 
culture against the impunity of large-scale political criminals. It jelled 
upon llariri's assassination into a call for an international investigation, 
then into the demand for a Tribunal established by the Security Council. 
What would become the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was set up against 
continued resistance from those who participated, aided, abetted or covered 
the murders carried out since October I, 2004.67 This is the day when 
fanner Minister Marwan Hamadeh was gravely wounded in a car bomb 
which took the life of his driver sitting next to him and maimed an aide 
sitting behind. It was clear that the attack was a response to his resistance 
and that of Rafiq Hariri and Walid Jumblat to the coercive extension of 
Emile Lahoud's mandate. Since this was an international matter, flowing 
from UN Security Council Resolution 1559 that requested presidential 
elections 'free of foreign influence', I advocated at the UN an international 
investigation as soon as news of Harnadeh's bomb reached New York. The 
investigation did not happen then, but the culture of accountabi lity, which 
had found its uncertain way to the Middle East in the Saddarn trial, and in 
the indictments of Sharon in Belgium and Qaddafi in Lebanon, started to oil 
the future court's wheels. When Hariri was killed three and a half months 
later, the idea of judicial accountability had taken root in influential circles. 
The day after Hariri 's assassination, the French government put fonvard the 
need for an international investigation, which eventually developed into the 
enquiries and reports of the three successive investigators, Peter Fitzgerald, 
Detlev Mehlis and Serge Brammertz. A natural legal consequence was the 
67 'There is hereby established a Special Tribunal for Lebanon to prosecute persons 
responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of fonner Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons. If the Tribunal 
finds that other attacks which occurred in Lebanon between I October 2004 and 12 
December 2005, or any later date decided by the Parties and with the consent of the 
Security Council, are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice 
and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005, it shall also 
have jurisdiction over persons responsible for such attacks.' Article I of the Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, text released by the UN Secretariat end December 2006. 
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100 STL. It was excruciating slow: the earliest Security Counc il Resolution 
could have included the tribunal, sparing disputes on nature, competence, 
composition, and related complications, and establishing a potential 
deterrent to future assassinations, and, if not, an expectation which the 
families of the victims would see as a tangible response to their suffering. 
It took over two years to materialize. 
Legally, a number of related questions were bound to arise, chiefly 
what sort of tribunal it should be, and how to qualify the ki ll ing of Rafiq 
Hariri . 
From the beginning, advocacy was for a mixed tribunal rooted in the 
UN, to be formally set up under international legitimacy without excluding 
Lebanese judges. The format seems to have carried the day, although the 
two other poles were also possible: a fully Lebanese tribunal, like the 
one eventually set up in Iraq, or a fully international tribunal, like the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Because of the heavy 
political shifts within the countries concerned, it's hard to prescribe the 
best course of action with any confidence, so the internationally-rooted, 
mixed tribunal, located outside Lebanon if need be, looked like a logical 
compromise. 
The qualification of the crime, and the remit of the investigation 
and tribunal, were more difficult to solve. On the basis of Amnesty 
International's quali fications of bombings, suicidal or not, that claim lives 
indiscriminately, the qualification of crime against humanity is more useful 
than terrorism. This is true for the II September massacre, as much as for 
such acts as the Hariri assassination.6g But the assassination of Hariri was 
early on described by the Security Council as 'an act of terror' , and so it 
68 See the argument in Mallat, 'September II and the Middle East: Footnote or watershed 
in world history ?', Crimes of War Project, September 2002 (Special issue on September 
II, a year after), www.crimesof war.org; 'The original sin: 'TeiTorism' or 'crime against 
humanity'?', Case Western Journal oflnternatiollal Law, 34, 2002, 245-248. 
69 All relevant UN Security Council Resolutions qualify the Hariri assassination as a 
•terrorist' act. (Resolution 1595,7 April2005; Resolution 1636,31 October2005: Resolution 
1644, 15 December 2005) All were taken unanimously, and refer to the '14 February 
2005 terrorist bombing'; this was the early qualification adopted in a statement by= 
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remained through the various Security Council Resolutions.69 Despite the 101 
qualification, early draft statutes of the Hariri tribunal included the 'crime 
against humanity' category. This came as a surprise, and 1 was not ab le to 
unravel the twists and turns of the discuss ions that led to this unexpected 
development, which coincided with a consistent attempt in my own work 
to replace an elusive concept of 'terrorism' with a far more precise concept 
offered in ' crime against humanity', an effort which is infonned by my 
wariness towards the tenn because of a long-standing familiarity over its 
misuse since the French Revolution through the ICC discussions in Rome 
in 1998.70 Rather than a tribunal ad hoc, there was also a possibi lity to 
invo lve tbe ICC, but Lebanon has not yet ratified the Rome treaty. It may 
well be that the perspective of an ICC referral like in the Darfur case was 
on the mind of some of those involved in the discussions, but the pichtre 
may have simply been complicated by an approximate understanding of 
the field: the removal of the tenn 'crime against humanity' does not have as 
a consequence to grant any immunity to the accused, even if, acting for the 
Syrian leaders, the reported insistence of Hizbu llah on the removal of the 
term may have been caused by their fuzzy understanding of international 
criminal law. 
The political dimension was in fact simpler: for or aga inst justice. From 
day one, there were two clear camps in Lebanon, those who wanted 'truth 
and justice ' , and those who considered that it wasn't worth it, ' it' being 
the stability of the Syrian govcnun ent, the Syrian order in Lebanon, the 
fight against Israel, and other primacy considerations which arc believed 
= the President of the Security Council one day after Hariri 's assassination: ' The Security 
Council unequivocally condemns the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut. .. ' 
(S/ PRST/2005/4). 
70 Ben Saul, Defining terrorism in international law, Oxford 2006. notes at page 5 that 
' intemational attempts to define terrorism in legal terms have been exceedingly difficult' , 
but considers skepticism about definition to have become 'irrelevant', because 'the term 
now has legal consequences and cannot be ignored, as merely of academic interest, or 
wished away' . The main quandary remains about the boundary in Jaw between terrorism 
and political violence, and between State terrorism and terrorism of non-State actors. 
whether organizations or individuals. In the ICC Rome treaty of 1998, terrorism does not 
figure on the I ist of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. 
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102 by their supporters, essentially the pro-Syrian factions of Lebanon, 
to be more important than any rocking the boat by way of justice and 
accountability. Morally and politically, the line was and remains clear: the 
international tribunal is the only way to preserve the non-violent character F 
of the Revolution. On the effectiveness of justice depends the character of 
the Cedar Revolution and its place in hi story. 
More important than the qualification of 'crime against humanity' as 
a category to be included in the STL statutes, was the remit of any court 
in view of the continuing assassinations, from the bomb planted on l 
October 2004 through to the killing of young minister Pierre Gemayyel on 
2 1 November 2006 by point blank assassins blocking his car and shooting 
him dead with one companion. The pattern was systematic over two years, 
and wreaked havoc on the Cedar Revolution's leaders and symbols. The 
pattern was so consistent that the UN was frnally forced into including 
these attempts, albeit timidly by way of 'criminal connection', to the Hariri 
case. Eventually, the STL turned into an irresistible moral argument. 
The substance of the investigation is more controversial. This is because 
of the seesaw conclusions of the successive investigators. 
First investigation. 'UnitedNationsFact-FindingMission', 25 February-
24 March 2005. One report, released 24 March.71 Main protagonist: 
Ireland's former deputy police commissioner Peter Fitzgerald. Main 
results: a powerful framework which sets on its head the security system 
in Lebanon and other similarly authoritarian countries so common in the 
Middle East. Instead of protecting the citizen, Fitzgerald concluded, the 
security forces were used to intimidate him: 'It is the Mission's view that 
the Lebanese security services and the Syrian Military Intell igence bear the 
primary responsibility for the lack of security, protection, law and order in 
Lebanon. The Lebanese security services have demonstrated serious and 
systematic negligence in carrying out the duties usually performed by a 
professional national security apparatus. In doing so, they have severely 
failed to provide the citizens of Lebanon with an acceptable level of 
71 Fitzgerald Report, above n.45. In all UN repons cited here, available on the United 
Nations website (un.org), the bold and italic passages in the original are kept. 
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security and, therefore, have contributed to the propagation of a culture I 03 
of intimidation and impunity. The Syrian Military Intelligence shares 
this responsibility to the extent of its involvement in running the security 
services in Lebanon. m 
The conclusions were damning for the Syrian leadership and its 
Lebanese allies: 'It is also the Mission 's view that the Government of 
Syria bears primary responsibility for the political tension that preceded 
the assassination of former Prime Minister Mr. Hariri. The Government of 
Syria clearly exerted influence that goes beyond the reasonable exercise 
of cooperative or neighborly relations. It interfered with the details of 
governance in Lebanon in a heavy-handed and inflexible manner that 
was the primary reason for the political polarization that ensued. Without 
prejudice to the results of the investigation, it is obvious that this atmosphere 
provided the backdrop for the assassination of Mr. Hariri. ' 73 
On the particulars of the assassination, Fitzgerald noted the likely motive 
of the ki lling as the coerced extension of Lahoud 's presidency against 
the resistance of Hariri and his allies, and underlined the importance of 
the last meeting between the Syrian president and the Lebanese Prime 
/ 
Minister on 26 August 2004, which would be taken up in much more 
detail in the subsequent investigation.74 The report concluded 'that there 
was a distinct lack of commitment to investigate the crime effectively, and 
that this investigation was not carried out in accordance with acceptable 
international standards. The Mission is also of the view that the local 
investigation has neither the capacity, nor the commitment to succeed. It 
also lacks the confidence of the population necessary for its results to be 
accepted. '75 
Second investigation. United Nations ' International lndependent 
Investigation Commission', appointed by the Security Council on 7 
April 2005. Two reports, released 19 October, 10 December 2005. Main 
72 Fitzgerald Report, Executive Summary. 
73 Fitzgerald Report, para. 6 I. 
74 Fitzgerald Report, paras. 9 and 10. See below text at nn. 78 and 79. 
75 Fitzgerald Report, para 49. 
) 
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I 04 protagonist, Gem1an federal prosecutor Detlev Mehlis. Mehlis followed 
Fitzgerald's leads with powerful details. Furthem10re, between the end of 
the Fitzgerald mission and the first report of his successor, an important 
deve lopment took place: 'On 30 August 2005, the Lebanese authoriti es 
arrested and detained four high-level officials of the Lebanese security and 
inte lligence apparatus, pursuant to an·est wa rrants issued by the Lebanese 
Prosecutor General based on recommendations from UNll lC that there was 
probable cause to an·est and detain them for conspiracy to commit murder 
in connection with the assassination of Rafiq Hariri . The individuals 
arrested were General Jameel AI-Sayyed, fonner director general the Surcte 
Generate; General Ali A I-Hajj, former head of the Internal Security Forces; 
General Raymond Azar, fo rmer head of mi litary intelligence; and General 
Mustapha Hamdan, Commander of the Republican Guard Brigade. ' 76 
The conclusions were unequivocal in the first Mehlis report: ' Building 
on the findings of the Commission and Lebanese investigations to date 
and on the basis of the material and documentary evidence collected, and 
the leads pursued until now, there is converging evidence pointing at 
both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act. It is a well 
known fact that Syrian Military Intelligence had a pervas ive presence in 
Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian forces pursuant to 
resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of Lebanon were the ir 
appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the 
Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be 
difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination 
plot could have been carried out without their knowledge. m 
The Mehlis reports fill the gaps intimated by Fitzgerald on the infamous 
ten-minutes meeting that took place between Prime Minister Hariri and 
Syrian president Bashar ai-Asad on August 26, 2004: 'The apparent 
growing conflict between Mr. Hariri and senior Syrian officials, including 
Syrian President Bashar Assad, was a central aspect of the information 
76 Report oft he International independent Investigation Commission established pursuant 
to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), (Mehlis I), 19 October 2005, para. 166. 
77 Mehlis 1, 19 October 2005 , para. 9. 
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provided to the Commission through interviews and documents. A meeting 105 
in Damascus between Mr. Hariri and President Assad on 26 August 2004 
appeared to bring the conflict to a head. In that meeting, which allegedly 
lasted for l0-15 minutes, President Assad informed Mr. Hariri, who was 
then Prime Minister, that President Assad intended that Lebanon would 
extend the tenn in office of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr. 
Hariri opposed. '78 The most poignant finding was the following: 
'Rafiq Hariri, taped conversation with WalidAl-Moallem on l Febmary 
2005: 
"In connection with the extension episode, he (President Assad) sent 
for me and met me for I 0 to 15 minutes. " 
( ... ) 
"He sent for me and told me: " You always say that you are with Syria. 
Now the time has come for you to prove whether you meant what you said 
or otherwise."( .. .) He did not ask my opinion. He said: "/have decided. " 
He did not address me as Prime Minister or as Rafiq or anything of that 
kind. He just said: "/have decided. " I was totally flustered, at a loss. That 
was the worst day of my life. " 
( ... ) 
"He did not tell me that he wished to extend Lahoud's mandate. All he 
said was "I have decided to do this, don't answer me, think and come back 
to me."" 
( ... ) 
"/ was not treated as a friend or an acquaintance. No. I was asked: 
"A re you with us or against us?" That was it. When !finished my meeting 
with him, I swear to you, my body guard looked at me and asked why I was 
pale-faced". 79 
The lead offered by Fitzgerald was confirmed, in this tape in the voice of 
Hariri, and in a large number of concurring testimonies. In the investigation, 
78 Mehlis I, I 9 October 2005, para. 25. 
79 Mehlis I, 19 October 2005, para.28. 
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l 06 the Commission also underlined the contradictions in the statements ofWalid 
Mu'allem, the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, accusing him of misleading 
the investigation: 'The recorded interview clearly contradictsMr.AI-Moallem's 
witness interview of20 September 2005 in which he fa lsely described the just 
mentioned 1 February meeting as "friendly and constructive" and avoided 
giving direct answers to the questions put to him. ' 80 
A strong moment in the report was the connection made by Mehlis 
between the execution of the murder and a personal call to the mobile 
telephone of Lahoud: 'Mahmoud Abdel-Al's telephone calls on 14 
February are a lso interesting: he made a call minutes before the blast, 
at 1247 hrs, to the mobile phone of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud 
and at 1249 brs bad contact with R aymond Azar's mobile telephone.'81 
The killing took place at exactly 12:56:26 pm, eight minutes later. 
The overall conclusion of the investigation confmned Fitzgerald's: 
'Conclusion : There is probable cause to believe that the d ecision to 
assassinate former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, could not have been 
taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officia l and 
could not have been further organized without the collusion of their 
counterparts in the Lebanese security services.' 82 
Another troubling finding appeared in the following paragraph: 'One 
witness of Syrian origin but resident in Lebanon, who claims to have 
worked for the Syrian inte lligence services in Lebanon, has stated that 
approximately two weeks after the adoption of Security Council resolution 
1559, senior Lebanese and Syrian officials decided to assassinate Rafiq 
Hariri. He claimed that a senior Lebanese security official went several 
times to Syria to plan the crime, meeting once at the Meridian Hotel in 
Damascus and several times at the Presidential Place and the office of a 
senior Syrian security official. The last meeting was held in the house of 
80 Mehlis I, 19 October 2005, para. 30. 
81 Mehlis I, 19 October 2005, para.20. Mahmoud Abdei-Al and his brother Ahmad are 
shadowy figures in a Sunni Muslim militant group known as A1-Ahbash, and both were 
reported to have strong connections with the presidential palace. Raymond Azar was the 
head of military intelligence in the Lebanese army. 
82 MehJis I, 19 October2005, para 123. 
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the same senior Syrian secmity official approximately seven to 10 days 107 
before the assassination and included another senior Lebanese security 
official. The witness had close contact with high ranked Syrian officers 
posted in Lebanon. '83 
Irrespective of the witness's character, which became subject to great 
controversy, the report created considerable commotion because it was 
released before the final changes on the draft were effected. The Word 
programme 'Track Changes' device, which had been kept on, revealed 
a number of crossed names next to the mention of Syrian and Lebanese 
officials.K4 The Syrian names included Maher ai-Asad's, Asef Shawkat's, 
Hasan Khalil's, and Bahjat Suleiman's. Maher Asad is the brother of the 
president and the head of the presidential guard. Asef Shawkat is Asad's 
brother-in-law, married to his sister Bushra. Hasan Khalil was the head of 
military intelligence, succeeding Ali Douba in 2000. On 18 February 2005, 
he was fonnally replaced by Asef Shawkat. Bahjat Suleiman was Syrian 
Internal Security Forces chief in the General Intelligence Department, and 
is said to be one of the three members (the others are Maher al-Asad and 
Asef Shawkat) of the Syrian president's 'National Security Committee. '85 
On the Lebanese side were named, then crossed, Jamil al-Sayyed, director 
83 Mehlis J, 19 October 2005, para 96. 
84 Here is how the relevant paragraph read: 'One witness of Syrian origin but resident 
in Lebanon, who claims to have worked for the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon, 
has stated that approximately two weeks after the adoption of Security Council resolution 
1559, Maher Assad, Assef Shawkat, Hassan Khalil, Bahjat Suleyman, and Jamil AI 
Sayyed, senior Lebanese and Syrian officials decided to assassinate Rafiq Hariri. He 
claimed that Sayyed a senior Lebanese security officia] went several times to Syria to 
plan the crime, meeting once at the Meridian Hotel in Damascus and several times at 
the Presidential Place and the office of Shawkat a sen~or Syrian security official. The 
last meeting was held in the house of Shawkat the same senior Syrian security official 
approximately seven to 10 days before the assassination and included Mustapha Hamdan 
another senior Lebanese security official. The witness had close contact with high ranked 
Syrian officers posted in Lebanon.' Mehlis I, 19 October 2005, para. 96. The mystery 
persists over the omission of these names in the final report, and who at the United 
Nations was responsible for the deletion. 
85 See on the Syrian Leadership e.g. Esther Pan, 'Syria's leaders' , Council on Foreign 
Relations website, updated 10 March 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publicatioo/9085/syrias_ 
leaders.html 
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I 08 general of the Lebanese Security Services, the most powerful security agent 
in Lebanon until he was forced to resign on 25 April2005 under the pressure 
of the Cedar Revolution; and Mustafa Hamdan, the head of Emile Lahoud's 
presidential guard. Both were incarcerated on 30 August 2005. 
The next Mehlis report was dated December 10 and released on 
December l L for discussion in the Security Council. On the morning of 
December 12, Gebran Tueni, the editor in chief of the Nahar newspaper, 
a uniquely courageous journalist who had been elected MP for Beirut, was 
killed with his two aides in a bomb blast on his way from home to the 
paper. He had just returned to Lebanon from ' temporary exile ' in Paris, at a 
moment of significant tension resulting from high expectations following 
the release of the second Mehlis report. 
Those expectations took the form of an official list of Syrian suspects 
drawn in that report of December 10: ' Following the adoption of Council 
resolution 1636 (2005), the Commission immediately summoned six 
Syrian officials whom it considers as suspects. After arduous discussions 
and considerable delay due to procedural maneuvering and sometimes 
contradictory feedback from the Syrian authorities, a location was determined 
for the questioning offive Syrian officials. The interview of the sixth suspect 
has been postponed. The Commission is also still awaiting the provision of 
other requested materials. At the same time, the Syrian Judicial Commission 
organized a press conference with a Syrian witness who gave journalists an 
opportunity to question him before the Judicial Commission could do so, 
and who contradicted prior sworn evidence given to the Commission. The 
Syrian official statements that ensued, calling upon UNIITC to reconsider 
past mistakes and to revise its report, was a clear indication that, whi le an 
official channel of communication was operating between the Commission 
and the Syrian authorities regarding cooperation, the Judicial Commission 
and the Syrian authorities were aiming to cast doubt on the content ofUNITC's 
report. This was, at the least, an attempt to hinder the investigation internally 
86 Second report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established 
pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 and 1636 (2005). (Mehlis II), I 0 December 
2005, para. 9. 
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and procedurally. ' 86 This was a direct accusation by the UN mission that 109 
the Syrian government was not cooperating, indeed was obstructing justice. 
More importantly, Mehlis confirmed the existence 'a list of 19 suspects' .87 
These two central conclusions - lack of cooperation, list of suspects 
some of whom high-ranking Syrian officials -, were damning, and the 
Commission requested the application of ' the Council deci[sion], in 
this context, [namely] that: Syria must detain those Syrian officials or 
individuals whom the Commission considers as suspected of involvement 
in the planning, sponsoring, organizing or perpetrating of this terrorist 
act, and make them fully available to the Commission. '88 None of those 
suspects was arrested, but the extremely charged atmosphere at the United 
Nations after the assassination ofTueni resulted in pressing Lebanese and 
international requests to extend the investigation to the other assassinations 
and bombings since Marwan Hamadeh, and toward the tribunal sought to 
try those arrested and those who would eventually be incriminated. 
Then it was all downhill. 
Third investigation, ongoing since a new investigator was fonnally 
appointed on January 11 ,2005. Main protagonist, Serge Brammertz, former 
Belgian federal prosecutor and then assistant to the ICC chief prosecutor, 
Luis Ocampo. Four reports dated 15 March, 10 June, 25 September, 12 
December 2006.89 
87 Mehlis II, I 0 December 2005, para. 21. 
88 Mehlis II, 10 December 2005, para 74. Italics added. 
89 Four reports released since Serge Brammertz started his work as Commissioner 
UNliiC in early 2005: Third report of the International Independent Investigation 
Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 
(2005), and 1644 (2005), 15 March 2006; Fourth report of the International Independent 
Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 
(2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), I 0 June 2006; Fifth report of the International 
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council 
resolutions I 595 (2005), 1636 (2005), and 1644 (2005), 25 September 2006; Sixth 
report of the International independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to 
Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), and 1644 (2005), 12 December 
2006. [Update, summer 2007: as this book was going to press, two additionaJ, and 
similarly empty reports, had been issued, but the good news was that Brammertz would 
not carry on his investigation beyond December 2007, and that a Prosecutor would = 
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110 As soon as the first Brammertz report was issued, it was clear that the 
thrust of the Fitzgerald-Mehlis investigations was being undermined. Even 
before he issued his first report in June 2006, Brammertz's absence of 
action on suspects identified in the last Mehlis report was troubling. The 
year that fo llowed the appointment, and the meager results achieved, raised 
serious questions on Brammertz's competence and honesty. 
The new investigator 's pusillanimity was particularly manifes t in his 
third report on September 25, 2006, when he passed under total silence the 
attempt against the life of his Lebanese counterpart in the investigation and 
the killing of his four aides on September 5, only two weeks earlier.90 
Brammertz's lack of professionalism appeared in the prolonged 
detention of a number of accused without adding a shred of evidence why 
they should be kept in jail without trial. Justice delayed is a plague of the 
developing international judicial system, and the UN investigator could be 
given the benefit of the doubt on account of a tight building up of his case. 
This however is not a tenable position. By staying mum for a fu ll year, 
he undermined the conclusions of his predecessors, without mustering 
the courage to derive the legal consequences of his silence. Either the 
previous investigators did not have enough evidence, and were wrong, so 
those arrested should be released. Or the evidence was sufficient, and the 
investigation must have followed through their leads, especially on the 
significant list of suspects identified by Mehlis. 
Lack oflegalleadership was apparent in the repeated vacuity Brammertz 
served to the public and to the Security Council through the four reports he 
has delivered over the course of a full year, in contrast with the advances 
made by his two predecessors.91 Reading through the belaboured, vacuous 
"" finally take over. Meanwhile, more assassinations had taken place, including against 
majority MP Eido on 13 June 2007, killing him and his son, and eight other innocent 
people. Against systematic obstruction by the Syrian government and its Lebanese allies, 
the Security Council established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in UNSCR Resolution 
1757 (30 May 2007).] 
90 Attempt to kill investigator Colonel Samir Shehadeh in a car bomb, death of four men 
escorting him, September 5. Serge Brammertz did not mention this dramatic episode in 
paragraphs 95, 96 of the Fifth report of25 September, which deal with the security of the 
investigation. 
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reports, it is hard to come up with one single new element that can be Ill 
identified with a year-long investigation. 
Even giving him the benefit of the doubt, how could Brammertz expect 
that over a year of absolute silence coupled with the tabula rasa he made 
of the important conclusions reached by his two predecessors would go 
unchallenged? If he does come up with any conclusion that incriminates 
the Syrian leaders, it will be attacked as entrapment. Even his repeated 
statements that Syria is cooperating with the investigation sound bizarre and 
counterfactual: the Syrian leaders have been obstructing and denouncing, 
through their allies in Lebanon, and in official statements in Damascus, 
the intemational tribunal. More gravely, Serge Brammertz is responsible 
for deflecting that immense yearning of the Cedar Revolution for truth to 
come out in a judicial investigation. A year after he was appointed, the 
Revolution was in full retreat, and the Syrian leadership on the ascendancy 
inside Lebanon, and in the region as a whole. Here is the immensely 
negative impact of one individual on history. 
Silver linings could always be found, but perhaps the most disturbing 
dimension was the repeated Syrian assertion that it would not be concemed 
by the tribunal, while Brammertz was continuously praising Syrian 
cooperation. This brought up the grave following conclusion, reached 
together with colleagues like Professor Duraid Bsherrawi, from Strasburg 
University, that a different type of investigator-prosecutor was required.92 
The case was too important for Lebanon and the Middle East, and the STL 
prosecutor holds such a pivotal position, that far more important skills 
and courage were needed where the two first investigators performed 
remarkably well, and the third so questionably. 
In the larger order of things, justice is about process, not about persons. 
However inept or slow the Brammertz investigation, Lebanese history 
as defined by the Hariri assassination and the quest for truth and justice 
91 See lhe detailed analysis of Professor Dureid Bsherrawi (Doreid Becheraoui), 
'Brammertz a'ada a/-tahqiq ila niqtat al-sifr (Brammertz sets back investigation to 
starting point)', ai-Siyasa newspaper, 26-27 September 2006. 
92 Correspondence with Dureid Bsherrawi, 3-4 November 2006. 
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112 witnessed the steady emergence of an unprecedented horizon for justice 
in Lebanon as model for the Middle East. Restoring the revolution on 
that score needs not only the protection of the judicial process put in train 
for the Hariri assassination. It also means a more coherent approach to 
violence in Lebanese recent history, and in the region. 
xiii. Revolution restored: 
democracy 
'Citoyens, vou lcz-vous une revolution sans revolution'?93 In 2221 , a great 
wonder will remain. How could the Cedar Revolution be entitled to its place 
in history when the top symbols of the Ancien Regime remained in power? 
How could the Lebanese version ofRobespierre's question have remained 
unrequited on that simple score, let alone on the far more demanding 
reforms that at least some wanted to see the R evolution addressing? 
Beyond the tragically mediocre persona of many protagonists, political 
accountability failed on three levels. 
The first is epiphenomenal. Here is a revolution where the person 
responsible for the country's descent into mayhem, in a coerced extension 
now firmly documented in the Fitzgerald and Mehlis reports, was sti ll in 
power as pres ident two years after the Revolution. Similarly, the same 
speaker remained in position, after thirteen years of fa ithfully serving the 
old order and openly acknowledging its fide lity to Syrian, and beyond, 
Iranian leadership, organising meetings at his residence in open oppos ition 
to the revolutionary march, and then consistently and relentlessly rejecting 
demands to convene parliamentary sessions for the international tribunal 
and for the election of a new president. 
There is a processual, though not qualitative, difference between the 
president and the speaker staying in power. The contradictions of the 
Lebanese scene were such by June 2005, when the parliamentary elections 
93 Robespierre, speech at the National Assembly, 5 November 1792. 
..------- March 2221. Lebanon's Cedar Revolution 
114 were held, that the Speaker was reconducted in position by a free vote of 
the new Parliament. The fact that Nabih Berri ran unopposed is a sign of 
a serious flaw in the democratic process: No election in a democracy is 
meaningful without a contest. Whatever the nuances in his reconduction, 
the failure of the country to replace a pillar of the old regime (and a pillar 
poorly regarded in the population at large), was a signal failure in political 
accountability. Still, parliament had chosen freely, and the parliamentary 
leaders of the Cedar Revolution voted for him. It is a typically Lebanese 
irony that his eventually strong ally, Michel Aoun, abstained. 
The president, in contrast, had by then acquired a legally acknowledged 
position ofusurper, which came to the fore increasingly strongly unti l 14 
February 2006, when the largest crowd since the demonstration of March 
14 had assembled in the centre of Beirut, with one, exclusive slogan this 
time: 'Emile Lahoud must go. '94 The immense momentum created by the 
popular impulse, adding to the international isolation of Lahoud in the 
wake of the Fitzgerald and Mehlis revelations, failed to remove him for 
lack of detennination and coherence in the March 14 leadership. Without 
a new president, the country remained doubly headless domestically, 
lacking in a functioning head of executive power, as well as in its 
political representation of the Christian community in the sectarian-based 
constitutional system. A new president was an imperative request for 
order, domestic and international, and a sine qua non for Lebanon to tum 
a traumatic page in its history. 
By 2221, such nuances will have been lost in the wider picture, save one 
tragic trait: a Revolution without a revolution in basic political tenns, with 
two out of the three constitutional top positions in the Republic unchanged, 
and the third, that of the Prime Minister, isolated and weak. 
94 I had devised a full international and constitutional plan for presidential change, on 
which my presidential campaign. which started in November2006, had been built. The plan 
had been agreed with Walid Jumblat in late December 2005, and pursued systematically 
until mid-February. I hope to write one day a more personal account of the Revolution, 
which I am avoiding to develop here for fear that my limited personal story jars with the 
far more important phenomenon carried out by the people of Lebanon. 
J 
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The Revolution also failed the political accountability test on a deeper 11 5 
level: the renewal of political leadership altogether. In Lebanon, as 
elsewhere, strong yearning for basic decency means the dual rejection of 
blood spilling and money abuse. Violence and corruption Lebanon shares 
with a Third World replete with bribery and leaderships established by 
sheer force. In Lebanon, blood spilling is typical of the record of several 
top political figures who, Hariri excepted, share a past of violence since 
the 1975-1990 civil war. Corruption attaches to the same, + the Hariri 
'Saudi system of patronage' . On that score, the Cedar Revolution did not 
produce the leadership it deserved and was looking for. Nor should one 
have expected too much, since the revolt was in large part started over the 
kill ing of Hariri, and his aides and heirs came first in line to take over his 
mantle. 
Nevertheless, the Revolution was able to project a diffuse sense of the 
weak legitimacy of all dominant politicians, and the muffled demand that 
they should all go home, starting with those who support Syrian and Iranian 
influence in Lebanon because of the brutal nature of these governments' 
policy at home and in Lebanon. Singling out the supporters of Asad's Syria 
in Lebanon reflects a sense of moral gradation: those who shed blood 
and did not recant, opposed or pussyfooted on the tribunal, refused the 
replacement of the speaker and president, muffled or declared ignorance 
of the continued assassinations of anti-Syrian figures, and generally acted 
in support to, or nostalgia for the Syrian order, deserve to go first. The 
Revolution failed to push its enemies out of office, let alone produce a fresh 
leadership, and turned into Robespierre's revolution without a revolution. 
There is a third level of democratic yearning, a far more elusive and 
far deeper problem which is typically Lebanese, indeed Middle Eastern: 
.. 
sectarianism. Sectarianism doesn't work with democracy, because it 
undermines the principle of citizens' equality. This is ancient, complex and 
cannot be easily solved, because people identify with their communities/ 
sects as legitimate political agents. The problem with the Cedar Revolution 
is that it did not even open the debate on the need to reduce sectarianism 
other than by sporadic and unconvincing sloganeering by the occasional 
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116 politician or by marginal groups. It could have at least tried, by expanding 
the political space and the legitimacy of top elected executive officials 
through direct, universal election of the president/prime minister, and by 
reducing the grip of sectarianism to a ' higher' level, Christian-Muslim, 
rather than the detailed apportionment down to the smallest sects within 
the larger denominations. 
The fai lure of the Revolution was not total on any of the above scores. 
Syrian troops had physically left the country two months within its 
outbreak, and the sitting president's legitimacy had been all but removed 
internationally. From January 2006, Emile Lahoud was reduced to meeting 
only with the other presidential pariahs of the world. Even in the Arab 
world, he was unwelcome, his weak position making a visit to his declared 
allies in Damascus or Tehran inconceivable. Domestically, he was heavily 
constrained: in the so-ca lled national dialogue which brought together a 
number of leaders in April 2006, Lahoud was not invited to attend. Short 
of replacing the president, the Revolution had succeeded in rendering 
him marginal, by removing any role in active decision-making and by 
considerably reducing his domestic and international recognition as head 
of state. But his capacity for nuisance remained constitutiona lly significant. 
With him and the speaker remaining in office, the Counter-revolution had 
strong constitutional pegs, and it used them to maximum effectiveness. 
xiv. Epilogue: the future of non-
violence and justice 
In 2221, e ither the Cedar Revolution will have marked the turning 
moment of peace in the Middle East, or very little will have been written 
. about it, for it wou ld have turned into another Beirut Spring without the 
Summer fruit. The Cedar Revolution was not the first occasion for non-
violent revolutions in modern history. They were heralded in Berl in in 
1989, and spread eastwards, despite difficulties in Yugoslavia, Rumania, 
and the former states of the Soviet Union. But the Cedar Revolution was 
the first such identifiable non-violent moment in modem Middle Eastern 
history. 
The specter of massive violence was upon the country since Rafiq 
Hariri was threatened into submission by Bashar al-Asad on 26 August 
2004. As he and his allies, Jumblat and Hamadeh in the first place, res isted 
the continuation in power of Emile Lahoud in the style so well perfected 
by Middle East dictators at the beginning of the 21st century, they were 
the object of brutal assassination. So were all those who continued their 
resistance after the Revolution broke out. 
The Counter-revolution, domestic and regional, chose to escalate by 
violent means, with renewed and relentless targeted assassinations from 
June 2005 on, and with the more massive violent stances in the war 
initiated by Ilizbullah in the summer of2006, which it then carried out by 
intimidation into the heart of Beirut. 
At the beginning of 2007, violence loomed high again on Lebanon. 
The first sectarian killing took the shape of the murder on 3 December 
..-------- March 2221. Lebanon's Cedar Revolution 
118 2006 of a young Shi' i Lebanese who had ventured in a tense Sunni 
neighbourhood, as Hizbullah and its allies were developing their bid to 
take power by force, occupying inimical terrain and closing down roads. ln 
January, seven people at least were killed on the streets of Beirut, and the 
Cedar Revolution now risked losing its central meaning: its non-violent 
character. Unless a judicial process is established for the families of these 
victims to take the process of accountability off the street, civil war will 
have technically started in the country. 
Non-violence as the exclusive means of politics, and judicial response 
instead of unfettered vengeance, offered for almost two full years the 
central meaning of the Cedar Revolution. Windows onto the future mean 
that they need success to blossom into institutionalized pennanence. They 
also need to be complemented with other hori zons that are still missing. 
Fuller horizons on the front of political accountability are regained 
by addressing the three centra l items of unfinished business: removal of 
the pi llars of the Ancien Regime at the top, starting with the president; 
renewal of the political establishment with men and women who made the 
Revolution what it was, and remained shorn of representation; shake-up of 
the sectarian system in the direction of equality on the basis of merit, and 
not on the basis of religious denomination. 
Fuller horizons on the front ofjudicial accountability mean an indivisible 
justice. While the battle is on for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to get 
under way, and to exercise competence for all the assass ination attempts 
since the one against Marwan Hamadeh on October 1, 2004, including 
the likely future murders, the immediate past of Lebanon's protracted 
civil and regional wars cannot be ignored. It is not possible to occult 
the heavy legacy of crimes in Lebanon's difficu lt modem history, or the 
regional trail of assassinations. A cutoff date in late 2004, or in 2005, may 
be a pragmatic compromise, it will not efface the pattern of (generally) 
regionally commandeered assassination of Lebanese political and opinion 
leaders. Justice bas yet to shed light on, let alone to make accountable, the 
assassins ofMustafa Saad (1975), Linda Jumblatt (1976), Kamal Jumblat 
( 1977), Tony Franj iiyeh (1978), Riad Taha (1980), Salim Lawzi (198 1), 
xiv. Epilogue: the future of non-violence and justice-------, 
Bashir Gemayyel ( 1982), Ragheb Harb (1984), Subhi Saleh (1986), Rashid 119 
Karameh (1987), Hasan Khaled (1989), Rene Mouawwad ( 1989), Dany 
Chamoun ( 1990) and Elie Hobeika (2002), or the disappearance in Libya 
oflmam Musa Sadr and his two companions in 1978. 
Nor is the responsibi lity for such killings limited to regional powers: as 
militiamen, actual and would-be warlords, local actors have participated 
in the bloodshed since the collapse of internal peace in 1975. At the same 
time the killing pattern of Lebanese leaders underlines the propensity of 
Middle East governments to use Lebanon as the playground in which they 
settle their own accounts and promote their violent policies. 
In law, coverage of these crimes remains possible in theory, in so far 
as most of those cases have remained open in Lebanese courts under the 
category of 'Judicial Council cases.' The Judicial Council is a special 
tribunal which includes the senior judges of the Republic, and which was 
set up precisely for crimes that undennine the stability of the country. 
Criticized by human rights organizations for not providing a second-tier 
of appeal, a right now well established as fundamental in criminal law, 
the Judicial Council has been largely ineffective. Because of the proven 
or suspected involvement of foreign parties, usually governments, which 
have contributed to the regional bloodied over-determination of Lebanon, 
judicial accountability has not been forthcoming internally. These murders 
and disappearances have remained largely untried, and their foreign 
commandeers at large. The STL is technically limited to the assassination 
ofRafiq Hariri . Indivisible justice requires the widest possible competence 
of the international court. 
lf justice is indivisible, then the leaders assassinated in the Lebanese 
wars were not alone suffering: 'The legacy of the crimes of the past 
must be addressed. This requires the repeal of the amnesty laws which 
have ensured impunity for crimes committed in the context of the 1975-
1990 Civi l War, and in the period since. Amnesties and similar measures 
that lead to impunity for serious human rights violations are contrary to 
international law ... Without holding perpetrators to account, the fami lies 
of the thousands of ordinary people who have "disappeared" and the other 
victims and survivors of that Civil War would be denied their right to 
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120 truth and justice. '95 Thus Amnesty Intemational 's Secretary-General, upon 
a visit to Beirut in December 2006, calling for commissions of enquiry 
South-African and Moroccan style to address fa iled justice in Lebanese 
history. 
There may be other ways, and the search for justice means first the 
stated recogn ition of the victims' enduring pain. Even a basic list of the 
people who died in Lebanon during the civi l war does not exist, and the 
families of the disappeared continue their difficult battle to recei ve a final 
word on their beloved, some of whom having been lost over three decades ,. 
ago. 
It is true that such a policy requires a leadersh ip in Lebanon and the UN 
which may not be readily available. But the Lebanese may have succeeded 
in bringing the STL to life, and to enlarge its competence to cover seventeen 
(and counting ... ) bombs and assassination attempts which share the same 
pattem. By holding high and tight the bar of accountability as key for the 
future of Lebanon, the non-violent Cedar Revolution may yet prevail in 
preserving one of its essential meanings. 
95 Irene Khan, ' Lebanon's justice system on trial' , The Daily Star, 22 December 2006. 
Appendix 1 
Chronology 
Chronology of the Cedar Revolution, August 2004 - end 200696 
• 26 August 2004, Rafiq Hariri meets in Damascus with Syrian 
President Bashar Assad to discuss the extension of the term of 
President Lahoud. 
• 2 September 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopts 
resolution 1559 concerning the situation in the Middle East, calling 
for the withdrawal of all fore ign forces from Lebanon [, requesting 
the disarmament of all the militias, and asking for free and fair 
presidential elections conducted without foreign interference}. 
• 3 September 2004, the Rafiq Hariri bloc approves the extension 
law for President Lahoud. [29 MPs out of 128 refuse to amend the 
Constitution.) 
• 3 September 2004, the Lebanese parl iament adopts the extension law 
for President Lahoud and forwards it to the Lebanese government 
for execution. 
96 The following chronology appeared in the first Mehlis report (19 October 2005) as 
'Chronology, mid-2004 to mid-September 2005'. It is amended in places to correspond 
to other significant dates and events mentioned in tbe text, and brought up to December 
2006. Amendments and additions are in italics. Names may be spelled in different ways 
(Rafic or Rafik for Rafiq, May for Mai etc). The reader can find a good chronology of 
the period September 2004 to March 2005, with stunning pictures of the Revolution, in 
Ghassan Tueni and Eli Khoury, The Beirut spring, Beirut 2005. 
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122 • 7 September 2004, Economy Minister Marwan Hamadeh, Culture 
Minister Ghazi Aridi, Minister of Refugee Affairs Abdullah Farhat 
and Environment Minister Fares Boueiz, resigned from the cabinet 
in protest at the constitutional amendment. 
• 9 September 2004, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri indicates to journalists 
that he will resign. 
• I October 2004, Assassination attempt on Marwan Hamadeh, m 
Beirut, Lebanon. 
• 4 October 2004, Rafiq Hariri resigns as prime minister. 
• II October 2004, Syrian President Bashar Assad delivers a speech 
condemning his critics within Lebanon and the United Nations. 
• 19 October 2004, United Nations Security Council expresses concern 
that resolution 1559 has not been implemented. 
• 20 October 2004, President Lahoud accepts Hariri 's resignation and 
names Omar Karame to form the new government. 
2005 
• 14 February 2005, Rafiq Hariri and 22 other individuals are killed in 
a massive blast in a seafront area of central Beirut. 
• 16 February 2005, first street demonstration in Beirut for Hariri 's 
funerals. 
• 17-18 February, petition on 'resignation'. Tents set up in Mar~vrs ' 
square. Recurring demonstrations until March 14. 
• 25 February 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission arrives 
in Lebanon. 
• 26 February 2005. Following growing street demonstrations in 
Egypt, Mubarak announces cosmetic constitutional change. 
• 27-28 February, Revolution tips. Order to disband ignored. Prime 
Minister 'Umar Karameh announces resignation. 
• 8 March 2005, Hezbollah organizes a one [half?] million strong 
"pro-Syrian" march. 
• l 0 March 2005, Prime Minister 'Umar Karameh reinstated. 
I 
,. 
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• 10 March 2005, protestors in Damascus heavily repressed. 
• 14 March 2005, [an almost twice as large a demonstration as 
March 8] Christian/Sunni-led counter demonstration demands the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops and the arrest of the chief of the security 
and intelligence services. 
• 19 March 2005, a bomb explodes in Jdeideh, a northern suburb of 
Beirut, wounding ll people. 
• 21 March 2005, Walid Jumblat, after visit to Egyptian president 
Husni Mubarak, announces that presidential change is no longer a 
demand of the Cedar Revolution. 
• 23 March 2005, three people are killed and three others wounded in 
an explosion in the Kaslik shopping centre, north of Beirut. 
• 25 March 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission issues its 
report in New York. 
• 26 March 2005, a suitcase bomb explodes in an industrial zone in 
northeast Beirut, injuring six. 
• 1 April 2005, nine people are injured in an underground garage in an 
empty commercial and residential building in Broumana. 
• 7 April 2005, the Security Council forms the United Nations 
International independent Investigation Commission into the 
assassination of Rafiq Hariri and 22 others on 14 February 2005. 
• 13 Apri/2005, 'Umar Karameh resigns again. 
• 18 April, Basil Fleihan succumbs to 14'h Febru01y burns. 
• 19 April 2005, Lebanon's Prime Minister Najib Mikati [forms 
cabinet,} announces that parliamentary elections will be held on 30 
May 2005. 
• 20 April, Haririfamily announces that Saad Hariri will succeed his 
father as politicalleade!: 
• 22 April 2005, General Jamil Al-Sayyed, head of the Internal Security 
Forces and General Ali Al-Hajj, head of the Surete Generate, decide 
to put their functions at the disposal of Prime Minister Najib al 
Makati. [Sayyed resigns formally on 25 April.} 
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• 26 April 2005, the last Syrian troops leave Lebanon ending a 29 year 
military presence. 
• 26 April 2005, the United Nations Verification Mission starts its 
mission to verify the complete withdrawal of Syrian military and 
intelligence agents from Lebanon and its full compliance with the 
resolution 1559. 
• 6 May 2005, a bomb explodes in Jounieh north of Beirut injuring 29 
people. 
• 7 May 2005, Parliament convenes to adopt the proposed changes to 
the electoral Jaw of2000. [All changes are in fact stalled by Speaker 
Nabih Berri, and the law remained the same as that of 2000.} 
• 7 May 2005, return of Michel Aoun from 15-year exile. Cedar 
Revolution splits. Beginning of shifts in alliances. 
• 30 (Sunday 29] May 2005, the first round of the elections was held. 
[Last, fourth round held on Sunday 19 June 2005} The Rafiq Hariri 
Martyr List, a coalition of Saad Hariri 's Future Movement, the 
Progressive Socialist Party and the Qomet Shehwan Gathering, won 
the majority of the seats in Parliament. [Strong showing of Michel 
Aoun in central Metn, Kesrouan and Jbeil districts. Dominance of 
Hizbullah and Amal in the South. Hizbullah supports Jumblat in 
Baabda.} 
• 2 June 2005, journalist Sarnir Kassir is killed when his car explodes 
in east Beirut. 
• 21 June 2005, former Lebanese Communist Party leader George 
Hawi is killed when his car explodes close to his home in Wata 
Musaytbeh. 
• 28 June 2005 Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament, reelected without 
opposition after thirteen years in power. Aoun bloc abstains. 
• 30 June 2005, Fouad Siniora, former finance minister under Rafiq 
Hariri, forms the new government composed of 23 ministers. 
• 12 July 2005, Defence Minister Elias Murris wounded and two other 
people are killed in a car bomb attack in Beirut. 
• 22 July 2005, at least three people are wounded near rue Monot when 
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a bomb explodes in the Ashrafieh quarter. 
• 22 August 2005, three persons arc injured in an explosion in a garage 
near the Promenade Hotel in the AI-Zalqa area north of Beirut. 
• 30 August 2005, Generals Jamil ai-Sayyed, Raymond Azar, Mustafa 
Hamdan, Ali al-HaJ) arrested by Lebanese authorities upon request 
of UN investigator Mehlis. 
• 16 September 2005, one person is killed and ten others wounded by 
a bomb near a bank in Ashrafieh. 
• 19 September 2005, one person is killed and two wounded in a small 
explosion at the Kuwaiti infonnation office in Beirut. 
• 25 September 2005, a car bomb injures prominent news anchor, May 
Chidiac, in north Beirut. 
• 12 October 2005, Ghazi Kenaan, former head of Syria s security 
services in Lebanon, and Syria s Minister of Interior, is reported to 
have committed suicide. 
• 19 October 2005, .first Mehlis 'track changes' report. High Syrian 
officials, Lahoud and entourage implicated. 
• 2 November 2005, Mal/at starts presidential campaign. Intensive 
campaigning for seven months. 
• 10 December 2005, second Mehlis report. List of 19 suspects, 
undisclosed. 
• I2 December 2005, Gibran Tueni killed with two aides in car 
bomb. 
• 27 December 2005, Mukhtara plan announced for constitutional 
removal of Emile Lahoud. 
• 30 December 2005, Abdel Halim Khaddam, former Syrian Vice-
President defects. 
2006 
• II January 2006, Serge Brammertz takes over from Detlev Mehlis as 
UN lead investigator 
• 23 January 2006, UN presidential statement requests 'free and fair 
~:m------------------
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126 presidential elections for Lebanon. ' 
• 14 February 2006, largest demonstration since 14 March 2005. calls 
for new president. 
• 16 February 2006, Bristol meeting to chart constitutional course for 
presidential change. 
• 2 March 2006, 'National dialogue 'convenes. Several inconsequential 
sessions held. Presidential change scuppered. 
• 12 July 2006, Hizbullah kidnaps two Israeli soldiers and kills 8 
in cross-boundary action. War with Israel starts. Lebanese Shi 'i 
population forced out of most of its villages and neighbourhoods. 
• 30 July 2006, Israeli massacre at Qana. 
• 7 August 2006, Arab f oreign ministers meet in Beirut to support 
Siniora 's government, after Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
denounce Hizbul/ah ~· initiation and prosecution of war. 
• 12 August 2006, Ceasefire. UNSCR 1701 calls for disarmament of 
Hizbullah and starts deployment of new UN troops in South Lebanon. 
Hizbullah declares 'divine victory · and regroups North. 
• 5 September 2006, Attempt to kill investigator Colonel Samir 
Shehadeh, in a car born. Shehadeh wounded, four aides killed. 
• I I November 2006, six ministers, five of them Shi 'i, resign. 
• 2 I November 2006, Minister and MP Pierre Gemayyel and aide 
assassinated. 
• I December 2006, Demonstrations staged by Hizbullah and allies to 
bring down government. Tents set up in Central Beirut. 
• 3 December 2006, scuffles in Beirut between Sunnis and Shi 'is. Ali 
Mahmoud, 19, killed in Sunni neighbourhood. 
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Chronology of the French Revolution 1787-179597 
1787 February 22 The first Assembly of Notables convenes 
July-September Conflict between the king and the Parlement 
de Paris 









August 4- 11 
King convokes Estates General for May 
1789 
Meeting of the Second Assembly of 
Notables 
Preparation of Cahiers de Doleances 
(popular lists of grievances) and elections to 
the Estates General. Sieyes publishes Qu 'est-
ce que /e Tiers-Etat? 
Estates General assemble at Versailles for 
the first time since 1614. 
Adoption of the title 'National Assembly' by 
the Third Estate. 
Members of the Third Estate (plus some 
reform-minded clergy and nobility), excluded 
from their meeting place, assemble and take 
the 'Tennis Court Oath' , swearing not to 
disband until a constitution is established. 
National Assembly declares itself a 
Constituent Assembly. 
Fall of the Bastille. 
Beginning of the 'Great Fear', the peasant 
revolt against feudalism, and of municipal 
revolts. 
National Assembly decrees the abolition of 
feudalism, equality of taxation and the sale 
of offices. 
97 The following chronology was assembled from various sources. I have amended it, in 
brackets and italics, to correspond to relevant references in the text. 
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October 5-6 
October 10 










National Assembly approves the text of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen. 
The 'October Days '- women's march to 
Versailles and force return of the king to 
Paris. 
Louis XVI decreed 'King of the French' 
rather than 'King of France'. 
Suppression ofreligious orders and monastic 
vows. 
Abolition of nobility and titles by Constituent 
Assembly. 
Fete de Ia Federation:jirst public celebration 
of BastH/e Day. 
First counter-revolutionary assembly at Jales 
(between Loire and Rhone). 
Publication of Edmund Burke's Reflections 
on the Revolution in France. 
Black inhabitants of French colonies born 
of free parents declared to have equal civil 
rights with whites 
Louis XVI flees Paris for Varennes. 
King forced to return to Paris. 
'Massacre of the Champs de Mars'- National 
Guard fire on crowd during protests against 
the king's reinstatement. 
Declaration of Pillnitz - Austria and Prussia 
ready to intervene in French affairs, but 
Britain remains neutral. 
September 13-14 Louis XVI fonnally accepts constitution. 
September 30 
October l 
Constituent Assembly dissolved. 
First meeting of Legislative Assembly. 




Assembly orders all .emigres to return under 
pain of death. Civil marriage and divorce 
instituted. 
King vetoes Assembly s ruling on emigres. 
King vetoes Assembly s decrees against non-
juring priests. 
1792 January- March Food riots in Paris. 
January 2 Decree that 1 January 1789 shall be reckoned 
the start of the 'Era of History'. 
Apri l 20 
April 24 






' War of the First Coalition ' begins - France 
declares war on Austria. 
'La Marseillaise' composed by Rouget de 
Lisle. 
Revolutionary days of 10 August. Storming of 
Tuileries. King imprisoned with his family 
Lafayette, commander of the National Guard, 
flees to Austria. 
Royalist riots in La Vendee, Brittany and 
Dauphine. 
Prussian army captures Longwy. 
Prussian army captures Verdun. 
'September Massacres ' - Paris crowd murder 
1200, including 100 priests. 
September 20 French defeat Prussians at Valmy. 
September 20-21 Final sessions of Legislative Assembly. First 
session of the Convention. Unanimous vote 
to abolish monarchy. Revolutionary calendar 
introduced. 
September 21-22 Year I of the First Republic proclaimed 
September 29 
October 10 
French occupation of Nice (Sardinian 
territory) 
Convention decree forb ids use of madame 





























French victory over Austria at Jemappes; 
occupation of Belgium. 
Edict of Fraternity offers aid to all subject 
people everywhere 'struggling to be free '. 
Trial of the king at the Convention begins. 
Louis XVI executed. 
France declares war on Britain and Holland. 
First Coalition against France formed by Britain, 
Austria, Prussia, Holland, Spain and Sardinia. 
Food riots in Paris. 
France declares war on Spain. 
Beginning of revolt in La Vendee. 
France withdraws from Belgium. 
Committee of Public Safety established 
as executive branch of government with 
dictatorial powers. 
Insurrection leads to faJI of Gironde and 
purge of all government committees except 
the Committee of Public Safety. 
'Maximum' imposed on grain prices. 
The Convention accepts the 'Jacobin' 
Constitution of 1793 (Year I). 
Danton leaves Committee of Public Safety. 
Royalist insurrection in Toulon. 
Marat stabbed to death in his bath by Charlotte 
Corday. 
Abolition of all feudal rights without 
compensation. 
Robespierre and St Just appointed to 
Committee of Public Safety. 
Decree of Levee en masse. 
Surrender of Toulon to British. 



















1795 August 22 
October 5 
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Robespierre dominales Committee of Public 
Safety. 
Law of Suspects and beginning ofTerror. 
Beginning of 'Year II' of the Revolution 
Decree suspending constitution and 
sanctioning Revolutionary government for 
the ' duration of the war' . 
Execution of Marie Antoinette. 
Festival ofLiberty and Reason. 
Toulon retaken by French. 
Revolt in Vendee crushed by Republican 
forces (Battle of Savenay). 
Abolition of slavery in all French colonies. 
Tricolour adopted as French flag. 
Danton arrested. He is executed on April 5. 
Law of 22 Prairial increases power of the 
Revolutionary Tribunal, mass executions 
start. 
Battle of Fleurus - French reconquest of 
Belgium. 
Thermidor: fall of Robespierre in National 
Convention. Robespierre executed with Saint 
Just the following day. 
Reorganisation of Committee of Public 
Safety. 
Reorganisation of Revolutionary Tribunal. 
Britain, Austria and Russia form Alliance of 
St Petersburg against France. 
Jacobin Club closed. 
Convention approves 'Constitution of Year 
ill' which establishes Directory. 
Defeat of attempted Parisian insurrection of 
13 Vendemiaire by Napoleon Bonaparte's 
'whiff of grapeshot'. 
131 
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132 October 26 Convention dissolved. Directory IS 
inaugurated. Place de La Revolution renamed 
Place de Ia Concorde. 
1799 June 18 Directory resigns. 
August 22- Napoleon abandons anny m Egypt and 
October 9 returns to France. 
November 9-10 Coup d 'etat of 18 Brumaire. Napoleon 
proclaimed First Consul. 
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Victims of assassinations and bombings, :: 
October 2004 to December 200698 
Date· Location - main target dead wounded Names of killrd Seriously inj urcd 
0 1-0ct-04 Corniche, Beirut 2 Gha7j Bukarrum Marwan Hamadeh, Usama 
• Marwan Hamadch Abdcl Samad 
14-Fcb-05 St Georges, Bei- 23 135 Rafiq Hariri, Basil Flcihan, Muhammad Jamal Shafik 
rut · Raliq Hariri Yahia a!-' Arab, Tala! Nabih Dia, 
Naser, 'Amcr Shchadc, Hasan al -
Ziad Muhammad Tarraf, 'Ajuz, 
'Umar Rashid Hammud 
Ahmad Nasri, Muhammad 
Sa'daddin 
Darwish, Mazen aJ-Zahabi, 
Muhammad Ghalayini, 
Abdci-Rahim 
Ghalayini, 'Abdo Abu 
Farah, 'Ala' 
'Asfur. Haytham 'Uthman, 
Joseph 
Aoun, Rima Bazz.i. Rawad 
Haidar, 
Subhi ai-Khudr. Yamana 
Damcn, 
Zahi Abou, Ahmad Gha-
layini 
19-Mar-05 Jdc!Cich II 
23-Mar-05 Junich/Kaslik 3 6 Narimdair Sinth, Surjit Ibrahim Khury.Salah • Abd 
Sinth, Yusef, 
Sukhbindcr Sinth (lndi- Haikal Abu Faisai.Charbcl 
an nationals) Khalil 
98 List originally prepared by Nisrine Abiad. 
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134 26-Mar-05 Jdcidch /lndus-
trial zone 
0 1-Apr-05 Brummana 
06-May-05 Junich 
02-Jun-05 Ashrafiyych, 
Beirut - Samir Kassir 
21-Jun-05 • \Vata Musait-
be h. Beirut . Georges 
Hawi 
12-Jul-05 Antclias - Elias 
EI-Murr 




25-Scp-05 Sarba -Mai Chi-
diac 
12-Dcc-05 Mkallcs - 3 
Gebran Tucni 
5-Scp-06 Saida -Samir 4 
Shchadch 















Including one US citizen 
Eleven severely wounded 
Elias cl Murr. Elias ai-
Baisari, 
Amin ai-Murr. Ziad Ka;,-
sis. Chnrbel Tohmc, Karl 
Khal il. Roger Mrad. Arbi l 
Baksian. Lina Baksian 
Joseph El ias. Mahdi 
Achour. Yassin Nabil. Nico-
las Joseph. Rita Hournni 
lssam Moussa Kiriako. 
Dani Moughamcss 
Roni Assaf. Rima Saikali. 
Stefanic Rachcd. N:~dia 
Hochar. Souad Younes. 
Suad FawaL. Joseph .Mach-
aalani, Elianc Tohmc 
Mai Chidiac 
Gcbran Tucni, Andre Tarck Ali (Iraqi), Mosbah 
Mrad, Nicolas Flouti cl Ahmar (Syrian). Joseph 
Abu Slcunan, Fadi R11k, 
Joseph ni -Mohr, Rabih Abu 
Yuncs, Joseph Habr, Muna 
Hanna, Joseph Abuslcunan, 
Muhammad Rizk. Fndy 
Zaini, Chawuki Ahmed. 
Mohammed Hasawi, Sami 
Farah, Claudia Haddad, 
Chadia Elia, Youssef Bachri 
·umar Muhammad al- Samir Shchadch, Zahcr 
Hagc Shchadch. Nemr Qudcih 
Yasin. Shchab Husain Jihad ai -Dabct. 'Ali Ahmad 
Aoun, Wisam Lutfi al-Rabi ' 
Aoun 
Pierre Gemayycl. Samir 
Chanouni 
Printed in lebanon by Print Shop 
Legal deposit September 2007 
ISBN: 978-9953-454-06-1. 
What is the meaning of the Cedar Revolution in the 
history of Lebanon ? in world history ? 
This is what this short book is about. 
Like Edmund Burke and Tom Paine just after the 
French Revolution broke out in 1789, the essay 
offers an understanding of what happened in 
Lebanon in February-March 2005 and in the months 
that followed. The momentous events of the Cedar 
Revolution are still fresh in the minds of all of us who 
made it. The deeper meaning is more elusive, and 
the historiography of the French Revolution since 
1789 helps provide the key questions which may 
still be asked about Lebanon's Cedar Revolution 
two centuries hence: in 2221. 
In its own way, this little book is a militant essay 
for justice and for non-violence. The power of 
non-violence, and the quest for justice, are the two 
extraordinary contributions of Lebanese men and 
women who vindicated them by taking massively 
to the streets. 
It is also about how we win our Revolution back. 
Chibli Mallat 
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